

471-B

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 24, 1950.

The President today transmitted to the Congress supplemental estimates of appropriation for the fiscal year 1951 amounting to \$10,486,978,000 for the Department of Defense. The request for additional defense appropriations was forecast in the President's message of July 19, 1950, on the situation in Korea.

In his letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives transmitting the request, the President stated: "The purpose of these proposed estimates is two-fold: first, to meet the immediate situation in Korea, and second, to provide for an early, but orderly, build-up of our military forces to a state of readiness designed to deter further acts of aggression.

"The additional requirements for Korea provided for in these estimates are urgently needed and will receive the first priority in the execution of the program recommended herein. This situation is still fluid, however, in the course of the year it may be necessary to make some program changes. For this reason I am requesting authority to adjust by ten per cent any single appropriation by transfer from other appropriations. This will also permit any desirable adjustments in the second or build-up phase contemplated by these estimates. With respect to this latter part of the requirement, it is my intention that the expansion of the forces will be done in an orderly, efficient and economical manner, recognizing the need for flexibility to meet changing conditions."

The supplemental estimate is divided as follows:

Army	\$3,063 million
Army and Marine Corps	2,448 million
Air Force	4,581 million
Establishment-Wide Activities	440 million

The revised estimate call for an increase in the planned fiscal year-end strength of military personnel of about 800,000.

Of the total estimate transmitted to the Congress today, \$1,343,500,000 is for military pay, clothing and allowances; and \$2,504,840,000 is for the operation and maintenance of plants and facilities, such as tanks, planes, guns and ships. Aircraft procurement amounts to \$3,348,000,000; ship construction, \$185,000,000; and tanks, guns, field artillery, electronics and other major procurement, \$2,448,000,000. The remainder of the estimate, 443,978,000, is for high priority construction, research development, industrial mobilization, miscellaneous establishment-wide activities and contingencies.

(CONT)

The specific appropriation requests follow:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

<u>Appropriation</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Contingencies of the Army.	\$ 10,000,000
Finance Service, Army:	
Pay of the Army.	143,093,000
Treasury of the Army.	30,820,000
Finance Service.	4,030,000
Quartermaster Service, Army:	
Welfare of Relieved Men.	2,544,000
Subsistence of the Army.	178,743,000
Regular Supplies of the Army.	42,930,000
Clothing and Equipment.	143,817,000
Incidental Expenses of the Army.	33,058,000
Transportation Service, Army.	288,830,000
Signal Service of the Army.	148,793,000
Medical and Hospital Department, Army.	11,448,000
Engineer Service, Army.	389,118,000
Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army.	1,438,393,000
Chemical Service, Army.	31,883,000
Army Training.	2,847,000
Army National Guards.	17,648,000
Organized Reserves.	8,808,000
Reserve Officers Training Corps.	8,000,000
Salaries, Department of the Army.	7,118,000
Contingent Expenses.	7,013,000
Expediting Production.	128,000,000
TOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY	\$3,989,124,000
Civil Functions:	
Armed Communications.	4,393,000
GRAND TOTAL	\$3,993,517,000

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Military Personnel, Navy.	438,489,000
Navy Personnel, General Expenses.	19,618,000
Military Personnel, Marine Corps.	128,348,000
Marine Corps Troops & Facilities.	149,749,000
Aircraft and Facilities.	149,078,000
Construction of Aircraft and Related Procurement.	844,369,000
Ships and Facilities.	483,748,000
Construction of Ships.	185,000,000
Ordnance and Facilities.	204,077,000
Medical Care.	18,431,000
Civil Engineering.	38,404,000
Service-Wide Supply and Finance.	163,843,000
Service-Wide Operations.	29,795,000
TOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY	\$2,848,029,000

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Construction of Aircraft and Related Procurement.	2,777,370,000
Special Procurement.	487,709,000
Acquisition and Construction of Real Property.	183,700,000
Maintenance and Operations.	799,100,000
Military Personnel Requirements.	307,000,000
Salaries and Expenses, Administration.	21,800,000
TOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE	\$4,333,470,000

ESTABLISHMENT-WIDE ACTIVITIES

Contingencies, Department of Defense.	\$9,000,000
Emergency Fund, Department of Defense.	183,000,000
TOTAL, ESTABLISHMENT-WIDE ACTIVITIES	\$ 192,000,000

The President has today sent the following letter to Honorable Walter F. George, Chairman, Committee on Finance of the United States Senate:

follows in ref

"My dear Mr. Chairman:

The increased military appropriation requests transmitted to the Congress on July 24, 1950, together with other requests I shall transmit at a later date, will entail sharply increased Federal expenditures. We embark on these enlarged expenditures at a time when the Federal budget is already out of balance. This makes it imperative that an increase in revenues promptly meet a growing deficit or else inflationary forces detrimental to our defense effort.

We must make every effort to finance the greatest possible amount of needed expenditures by taxation, and we must design taxation methods which prevent profiteering and distribute the new burden fairly among the different groups of our people.

I appreciate that the development of a comprehensive revenue program adequate for our present needs will require careful Congressional consideration. Our wartime experience will tend to be reviewed and alternative approaches explored. Under the most auspicious circumstances, such a comprehensive tax program could not be completed in a short time.

In the present situation, however, speed is of the essence and delay would be costly.

I recommend that, as an interim revenue measure, action should be taken immediately to revise and amend the tax bill now pending before your Committee, so as to increase tax collections substantially for the taxable year 1950. Specifically, I suggest that the revenue-raising provisions of the pending bill be retained and supplemented by increases in the corporate and individual income taxes. This could be done without interfering in any way with the development of a once comprehensive revenue program as soon as practicable.

Three adjustments would be required in the pending bill:

First, to eliminate the various tax reductions and other revenue-losing provisions, but retain the corporate-losing, dividend withholding, and life insurance company provisions.

Second, to adjust the revised corporate rate structure contained in the pending bill by increasing the normal corporate rate from 21 to 25 percent. Taking into account the 20 percent surtax contained in the present bill, and the \$25,000 exemption from surtax, this would result in a 25 percent tax on the first \$25,000 of a corporation's income, and a 45 percent tax on the balance.

Third, to increase individual income tax rates to the "tentative" levels adopted in 1943, by removing the reductions from those levels made in 1945 and 1946. This would leave unchanged the income-splitting provisions

of present law, and the present personal exemptions of \$400 per person. These rate schedules are familiar to the Congress, since they were involved in the consideration of the tax reductions adopted in 1943 and 1948.

The increased corporate income tax rates should be made applicable beginning with 1950 corporation income, as the pending bill would do. With respect to individual income taxes, the increased rates should be applicable beginning with one-quarter of each taxpayer's 1950 income. This would require an increase in the withholding rate from the present 15 percent to 18 percent, beginning with the last quarter of 1950.

These adjustments in the pending tax bill would increase the Government's revenue, on a full year basis, by about \$3 billion at present income levels. Clearly, this will not meet our long-run revenue requirements. As an interim step, however, it will have a timely effect on tax revenue and our financial preparedness. It will serve to restrain inflationary forces generated by increased defense expenditures. Without this action, we would face very substantial deficits before any additional taxes could begin to be collected.

In addition to increasing revenues, enactment of the revenue legislation I am recommending would improve the soundness of our tax system. The loophole-closing provisions of the pending bill will strengthen the tax structure and make it more equitable. This is particularly desirable in view of the higher tax rates in prospect, which would surely increase the incentive to exploit present tax loopholes. Moreover, the corporate income tax structure will be substantially improved by eliminating the present "netted" rate, which bears heavily on smaller corporations. This will moderate the effect of increased rates on business enterprises.

I believe that prompt legislative action along these lines will provide tangible evidence of our determination to conduct our national finances in a sound manner, consistent with the national effort we are required to make. It will also be a major step toward preventing inflation during the time necessary to develop a carefully balanced tax program suited to our longer-range requirements. I expect to transmit further recommendations to the Congress concerning a more comprehensive tax program when we have additional information on the extent of our needs.

I am grateful for your cooperation in working out arrangements for the prompt consideration of these interim proposals. I currently hope that they will be favorably acted upon by the Congress at an early date.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives, who, as you know, participated in working out the procedure for prompt action recommended in this letter.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC 76/1

COPY NO. 1

A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

U. S. COURSES OF ACTION
IN THE EVENT SOVIET FORCES ENTER KOREAN HOSTILITIES

July 25, 1950

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12958, Sec. 1(b) and (2) of 1

DATE 10-10-2000 BY SP-6

By: [Signature] NAME: [Name]

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 25, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT
SOVIET FORCES ENTER KOREAN HOSTILITIES

Reference: NSC Action No. 308-G

NSC 76

The enclosed comments on NSC 76, prepared by the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board Consultants, respectively, are submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 76 as Item 2 on the Agenda of the Meeting scheduled for Thursday, July 27, 1950.

The National Security Council Consultants recommend that after discussion by the Council, NSC 76 together with the enclosures be referred to the Consultants for preparation of a report on the subject in the light of the discussion by the Council.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

STATE DEPARTMENT CONSULTANT'S COMMENTS
WITH RESPECT TO NSC 76

1. The State Department agrees completely that full-scale mobilization should be initiated immediately if it is determined that major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have indicated their intention of engaging. The further decisions set forth in NSC 76 relate to the most basic national policies and should not be taken except at the highest level in the light of all relevant circumstances at the time.

2. The determination whether major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities, and the decision to initiate the actions contemplated by NSC 76 should be made only by the President. It is difficult at this time to foresee clearly the various possible ways in which the engagement of Soviet combat units might be indicated or occur. It would be of the utmost importance that a course of action not be touched off by an incorrect evaluation of the actual situation which had arisen.

3. The phrases "prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea" and "prepare to execute war plans" appear to require clarification. The State Department assumes that the phrase "prepare to minimize its commitment" means that the evacuation of Korea would be prepared and undertaken. The State Department is not clear as to what, in addition to the initiation of full-scale mobilization, is contemplated by the phrase "prepare to execute war plans". In any event, it is the opinion of the State Department that the actual decision should be made by the President in the light of all the circumstances at the time. It is the State Department's opinion that, prior to the actual execution of war plans, careful consideration should be given to the following points, among others:

- a. Appropriate action in the United Nations.
- b. The effect on our relations with our principal allies. The Atlantic Pact does not by its terms cover hostilities breaking out in Korea.
- c. The advisability of the immediate execution of war plans under the particular state of facts which had occurred. In this connection it would be important to determine:

(1) Whether the nature of the commitment of Soviet forces had been such as to secure the clear support of world opinion for the execution of war plans by us.

(2) What would be the affect upon our allies, in particular our European allies, of an immediate generalization of hostilities.

(3) Whether the country was sufficiently mobilized to carry out its war plans with maximum effectiveness in the light not only of the immediate military situation but also of the total campaign to be waged, or whether additional time for mobilization would improve the prospects of ultimate victory.

4. The type of action to be taken by the Congress before the initiation of war plans. A decision as to what action the Congress should take would have to be made by the President.

NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD CONSULTANT'S
COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NSC 76

1. The NSRB recommends that United States action in the event Soviet forces enter the Korean hostilities be considered on the basis that such a situation is most likely to occur within the next six months and, therefore, that any policy dealing with the situation be related to our military forces-in-being at the present time and as they may be developed within the next six months.
2. The overt entry of major Soviet forces into the Korean hostilities might occur under two sets of circumstances. It could occur either conjunctive with other Soviet aggression elsewhere in the world, or it could occur in isolated form in Korea.
3. If the Soviets overtly enter the Korean fighting on a major scale in conjunction with Communist aggression elsewhere in the world, United States action should be one of participation in UN retaliation against Soviet Russia to the limit of war plans for United States forces-in-being at the time.
4. If overt Soviet action should be confined to the Korean theater, certain alternatives should be considered, and action directed by the President in light of circumstances prevailing at the time. Since the majority of our deployable forces-in-being are already and will be for the next few months committed to the Korean fighting, these alternatives in this instance would seem to be restricted to two general courses of action:
 - a. Comparatively immediate retaliation against the Soviet Union, subsequent to Presidential direction and in execution of United States war plans for all of such forces as we have in-being at the time. This retaliation to be made, if possible, in behalf of the United Nations, and in conjunction with the initiation of full-scale mobilization of the United States.
 - b. Attempt to confine the United States-Soviet combat to the Korean theater as long as possible in order to gain time to build further material strength and gain additional international support against the latest time when action as suggested in paragraph a becomes unavoidable.
5. In any event, it is recommended that every immediate and continuing effort be made to recruit at least token participation by other nations on behalf of South Korea in order that, should an overt Soviet action eventually occur in Korea, its aggressive effect would be directly against the greatest possible number of UN member nations.



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



ORIGINAL

8/1006
20 July 1950

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1950 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TRANSMITTING THE FIRST REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OF THE COMPLEX OF ACTION TAKEN UNDER THE UNITED COMMAND (UNCOM) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (8/1006)

I have the honor to refer to the resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950 and, in accordance therewith, to submit, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the "First Report to the Security Council by the United States Government" on the course of action taken under the Unified Command (UNCOM).

I would appreciate the text of this Report not being made public prior to the meeting of the Security Council scheduled for Tuesday, 25 July at 3 p.m.

(Signed) HARVEY R. ARTER

Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the
United Nations

First Report
8/1006

**FIRST REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950**

At 0400 hours time on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army launched a completely unprovoked invasion of South Korea. North Korea's infantry crossed the 38th parallel, led by Soviet-made tanks to an estimated number of 104. The main attack was given the Pochon-Ai-Jong-A-Soul carrier. Significantly, attacks were launched in the Chappa Peninsula to the West, against Chosin in the eastern mountains, and down the east coast road. The North Korean Air Force covered the amphibious landings, and attacked Kijong Airfield, near Seoul. The size of the attack, the fact that it covered the principal areas along the 38th parallel, and the amount and character of material involved, and the use of amphibious landings, indicated clearly that the invasion had been carefully planned for long in advance.

The character and disposition of the Republic of Korea Army indicated that it did not expect this sudden attack. This fact is supported by a report of an observation team of the United Nations Commission on Korea, made along the 38th parallel and dated 24 June 1950. This report stated that its team of observers "had, in the course of a two-week inspection team left with the impression that the Republic Army was organized entirely for defense and (was) in no condition to carry out a large-scale attack against the forces in the North. The observers found that the Republic of Korea forces were disposed in depth all along the 38th parallel with no concentration of troops at any point, that a large number of Republic of Korea troops were actively engaged in rounding up guerrillas and were, in any case, entirely lacking in the armor, heavy artillery, and air support necessary to carry off an invasion of North Korea." These facts controverted completely the North Korea broadcast from Pyongyang, late in the morning of 25 June, that the Republic of Korea had initiated an attack across the border and that the North Korean Forces had been ordered to repel the attack.

The North Korean invaders were reported to have committed initially 6 divisions of Infantry, 3 Border Counter-Attack Brigades, supported by approximately 100 Soviet-made T34 and T70 tanks and ample heavy artillery. Their Air Force held complete control of the air, and was at the time estimated to be composed of 100-150 Soviet-made combat planes. The total strength of the North Korean forces was placed at between 20,000 and 100,000, organized in approximately

7 divisions

7 divisions and 3 brigades, well trained and equipped solely with excellent Soviet material.

Opposed to their mobile army, Republic of Korea troops were initially deployed along the 38th parallel with elements of 4 divisions, with the remainder in the interior, without tanks or heavy artillery and with only 16 trainers as an air force as organizations assigned primarily for preserving internal security.

With such a discrepancy in character and armament between North and South Korea, the actual date of the assault is immaterial; the potential for it was present for months.

In the light of the above facts, it is apparent that the assault upon South Korea was a carefully-planned, full-scale invasion in force.

From the attack to the fall of Seoul on 28 June, North Korean forces struck southward across the 38th parallel on 25 June, in four major drives:

A. To the west, a Border Constabulary Brigade attacked in the Chagju Peninsula against approximately one Republic of Korea regiment and was reported as of 26 June in control of the area. However, a considerable number of Republic of Korea men escaped by sea.

B. One North Korean Division, plus 40-50 tanks captured Kumsong on the afternoon of 25 June, and later pushed south through Kumsong toward Seoul. Another North Korean force of from 8,000 - 10,000 men, plus more than 50 tanks, drove down the Pochon-Daejeon Corridor toward Seoul.

C. A Division of North Korean troops, supported by heavy artillery and tanks, struck south toward Ulsan.

D. Along the east coast, a Border Constabulary Brigade reinforced to approximately 10,000, attacked Kumsong and carried out two amphibious landings further south.

The North Korean attack was initially opposed by five Republic of Korea divisions located in or north of Seoul. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, and other light infantry weapons. Taken completely by surprise, and facing greatly superior equipment, they fought desperately, but were forced to withdraw gradually. Another Republic of Korea division, hastily brought up from the north, was badly mauled in the fighting of 26 June. An official report on 30 June indicated that the Republic of Korea forces had suffered a high percentage of casualties and had lost much equipment in the hurried withdrawal.

/On 28 June,

On 24 June, aircraft of the United States Air Force, operating pursuant to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations, began air operations against the North Korean invaders in support of Republic of Korea forces and later struck at military targets north of the 38th parallel with a view to disrupting the lines of communications and supply of the invading forces.

The badly decimated Republic of Korea forces reformed north of the Han River, the with U.S.A.F. assistance, sought to delay the North Korean advance. By sheer weight of numbers the material they were forced back step by step until, on 2 July (Korean time) the town of Suwon, 20 miles south of Seoul, was reported in North Korean hands.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of United Nations recommendations, United States ground forces were introduced to the area for stabilization of the front. On 5 July, a very small United States force went against with the invaders, south of Suwon. On 7 July, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the Unified Command was established and General Douglas MacArthur was designated by the President of the United States as the Commanding General of the forces of the members of the United Nations.

The first United States troops were small in number but were introduced as a holding force only. They were followed by additional supporting forces as rapidly as these could be transported to the battle line. "Facing odds at times as high as 20 to one, "Our Army troops, ably supported by tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force and Navy and our Australian friends, fighting under most adverse conditions of weather . . . distinguished themselves in the most difficult of military operations - a delaying action".

Under the protection of this delaying action Unified Command forces have steadily been strengthened. Under the combined impact of ground, air and naval forces, the progress of the invasion has been slowed, while the enemy has suffered severe losses on sea and land which are curtailing his supply and transportation capabilities.

As the outset of the North Korean invasion, naval forces available to oppose the aggression consisted of a small Republic of Korea Coast Guard. United States the other forces proceeded to the operational areas and by virtue of overwhelming superiority established a patrol of both coasts of Korea. These forces took the necessary action to prevent movement by sea of forces and

/s/Supplies

supplies for use in operations against the Republic of Korea, including ingress and egress to and from Korean ports of merchant vessels furnishing or likely to furnish assistance to the North Korean authorities. United Nations Naval Forces covered some of the initial movement of evacuees, rendered logistic support, and by operating against North Korean waterborne forces denied the Communist invaders the logistic support of its forces by sea.

Naval units proceeded to accomplish the waterlift of troops and supplies to Korea, patrol by naval aircraft of water and coastal areas, escort duties and coastal patrol functions. Harassing fire from naval units on both coasts shelled targets susceptible to naval gunfire, breached roads, and generally interfered with enemy communications. Naval units have attacked North Korean water traffic where found, and have already destroyed approximately one-third of the vessels originally available to North Korean naval forces.

A new phase of naval operations commenced on 3 July with the first aircraft carrier air strikes. They struck on the west coast of North Korea. Subsequent carrier strikes on the east coast of Korea have been made by the British and United States units. The first amphibious landing by United Nations Forces was accomplished on the east coast of Korea on 18 July 1950.

The present naval situation from both coasts of Korea covered by naval forces of the United Command. Harassing fire and fire support missions are being carried out by these forces. Patrols and reconnaissance are being conducted by naval patrol planes over coastal and water areas. Logistic support of men, equipment, and supplies by transport continues with effort.

It has been surprising to witness the rapidity with which various Member States have contributed to the naval forces assisting in the restoration of peace to Korea. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands have dispatched vessels to support the United Nations' effort to cut off supplies for the invading forces from north of the 38th parallel. In carrying out this work, escort bombardments have been conducted where and as necessary to interdict the supply of Communist troops which have moved into that portion of Korea governed by the Republic of Korea under the aegis of the United Nations. Valuable service has also been rendered by a British naval unit in the rescue from the water of aircraft the had been compelled to abandon their airplanes. The Coast Guard of the Republic of Korea has been rendering

/s/Arnoldus

available service is providing for the security of the shoreline. Naval air provided by the United Kingdom and concentrated in a major way in the support of landing operations at P'Ohangdong.

Upon the request by the Security Council of the United Nations for assistance to defend the Republic of Korea against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in the area immediately available were those United States and British Commonwealth occupation forces under the command of General MacArthur in the occupation of the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were sufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan.

Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council resolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards for peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suitable for combat in Korea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment and supplies, from their various occupation stations in Japan, by combinations of water, rail, water and air transportation, to Korea. Even so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately available to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to Korea from the United States - a distance of one-third of the way around the globe. Future assistance for the defense of the Republic of Korea, both men and materials, would be transported over corresponding distances from the Harbor Island of the United Nations rendering such assistance. The well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the size of their force, their logistical support and their ability to continue to press the attack, unknown for the degree of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the Republic of Korea have been forced to stand at the time and place selected by the aggressor, and are most depend upon assistance from aidland peacefully disposed and lying not merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away.

From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers of enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the North Korean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess of their tactical capabilities. This, still the initial advantage of the aggressor, combined to give the enemy a strategy that cannot be overcome until the United Nations forces achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and manpower. The task is not a small one when faced in comparison with the potential resources of the aggressor force. Until forces of the United Nations Command are increased further in strength, the rapidly with which

/message

success will be achieved speedily be predicted. However, with the combined efforts of the United Nations, the full effect of the contribution from each major nation will be felt in the ultimate defeat of the aggressors from north of the 38 degree parallel.

In conclusion, it is believed appropriate to quote the Unified Commander's latest estimate of the Korean operations.

"With the deployment to Korea of major elements of the Eighth Army and accomplished the first phase of the campaign has added has with it the chance for victory by the North Korean Forces. The enemy's plan has great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun North Korea once he has breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers has superior weapons temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from Japan to stop his rush. When he crossed the Han line the way seemed entirely open his victory was within his grasp. The desperate decision to throw in place our American elements as they arrived by every available means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete co-ordination by air has moral elements, forced the enemy into continued delays, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics which is slowing his advance and lighted his drive that we have bought the previous time necessary to build a secure base.

"I do not repeat yet believe that history records a comparable operation which equalled the speed and problems with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate commitment to major operations. It merits highest commendation for the commanders, staffs and units concerned and tribute to their superior training and high state of readiness to meet any eventuality. This phase added emphasis to the fact that the Far East Command, until the President's great pronouncement to support the special action of the United Nations, and in respect of slightest responsibility for the defense of the Free Republic of Korea. With the President's decision it assumed a completely new has added mission.

"It is, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving numerous local

/s/ Douglas,

struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our final elimination time will unquestionably be rectified and tactical improvement will involve planned withdrawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not repeat our be without choice. Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He had had his great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored. Washington."

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

23

Memorandum of Conversation

SUBJECT:

Aid to Korea

DATE:

July 28, 1960

PARTICIPANTS:

The President;
 Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia;
 Secretary of State

213

COPIES TO:

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The President received Mr. Menzies at 3:30 p.m.. The interview, including the photographs, lasted approximately one hour.

The discussion opened with general conversation on non-business subjects.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of Australian defense and the sending of Australian ground forces to Korea. He said that Australia was wholeheartedly behind American policy and wished to play its full part in the defense of the free world. To do so Australia would have to increase its defense forces substantially. This required legislative changes. Australia also wished to send ground forces to support the United Nations in Korea. At present, however, it had no forces available. Out of the 3,000 troops in Japan only about 500 were combat troops and these had been utilized only for service in Japan. The Prime Minister expected promptly upon his return to attack the whole broad subject. He did not think it advisable to confuse the broader issue by attacking first of all the problem of forces for Korea. He wished to get through a universal service bill and to remove restrictions upon the place of service since it was highly likely that in the event of general war Australian troops might be needed in the Near East and in the Far East beyond areas where service was

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-1-

now practicable. He had made his announcement that Australia would make ground forces available in Korea in order to acquit his Government to that objective, but it would not be immediately possible to provide the forces.

The President expressed the hope that the Prime Minister could make rapid progress both in regard to forces for Korea and the general expansion of the defense program.

W Dams

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

PRIORITY NOT REQUIRED

TO: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff
M. E. Stephens, Capt G.S.
Navy Executive Secretary
JCS 55234

RE: JCS 57522

28 July 1950

From JCS

1. Under the UN Security Council resolution of 7 July 50, the United States Govt is required to transmit reports to the Security Council, as appropriate, on the operations of United Nations Forces in Korea. The first report, which was prepared in time and upon which your comments were obtained, was submitted to the Security Council on 25 July.

2. For obvious political and psychological reasons, it is considered desirable that your Staff prepare future periodic reports for transmittal to the Security Council by the United States Govt, covering all operations of forces of the United Nations.

3. It is visualized that such reports will be considerably briefer than the initial report of 25 July and will be of such a nature as to permit publication without danger of security violation.

4. You will appreciate that certain political factors which must be determined in time may from time to time indicate the desirability of certain alterations in your reports. In all such cases, any proposed changes will, of course, be cleared with you before transmittal of your reports to the UN.

5. It is requested that your first report, under this procedure, be transmitted to the JCS prior to 4 August and thereafter at intervals of approximately two weeks.

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: RMAIDS, CSAP, GDS, CMA, GS, GJ, Seciter, OAS

CK GUY 57522

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By LIT *[Signature]* 11-5-80

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16-58889-1

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 29, 1950

SUBJECT: Formosa;
Contribution of Troops by Canada.

PARTICIPANTS: Mrs. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador; Mr. Norman Robertson, Clerk of the Privy Council, Canada; Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State; and Mr. George J. Parkes, Assistant Secretary of State.

COPIES TO: S/S - The Secretary

Mr. Pearson asked me about the Formosa situation and about the contribution of troops by Canada to the UN for Korea. On Formosa I outlined our position to him very frankly explaining our belief that so long as hostilities continued in Korea we could not tolerate the idea of Formosa being occupied by Communist forces of any kind and repeated that of course we had no designs on the island permanently and were perfectly willing to see the problem ultimately disposed of by the UN or through other similar means. On the question of troops from Canada, I told him quite forcibly that I felt that it was of the greatest importance that everyone contribute as much as they could to the UN effort, and that I felt that Canada should make a commitment along these lines.

Mr. Pearson pointed out the difficulties in the Canadian situation and in the Cabinet and also pointed out the fact that they had no troops available at the present time that could be sent.

I told

I told him that I could understand his difficulties, but it seemed to me that they ought to do what Australia the New Zealand had done which was to get going on the raising of troops, as we believed the campaign would be a long one, the even if by some chance it were the long, there would be need for supporting forces for some time to come. Mr. Pearson explained that before any action could be taken they would have to call a meeting of the Cabinet and that he felt this probably would be done in the not too distant future although it was difficult to do promptly as everyone was away.

Apparently Mr. Pearson's trip resulted from the fact that practically all the members of the Cabinet had gathered together for the funeral of Mr. MacKinnon King, the this had provided an opportunity for them to talk about the world situation even though there was no formal Cabinet meeting. As a result of this Mr. Pearson felt it important to get my frank views of the two questions discussed above.

Dean Acheson

KID:SWP:Kins:cha

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 31, 1950

SUBJECT: Korea
Migration Program
Requirement for Funds

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister of Australia, Robert G. Menzies;
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson;
Assistant Secretary of State Thorp;
Assistant Secretary of State Rank;
and Assistant Secretary of State Perkins.

COMES TO: S/S
I - Mr. Thorp
TE - Mr. Rank

RA
SNA

The Prime Minister stated there were three principal items, with which Australia was concerned, with they wished to discuss with the U.S. The first was Korea. He stated that as of course we know Australia was wholeheartedly with the UN and the U.S. in the Korean situation. He skipped over briefly the fact that they intended to send further help to Korea and went on to say that they were planning, and in fact had been planning before the Korean incident, to build up their military strength, and believed that some kind of universal training of adequate duration would have to be adopted to carry this out. In this connection and in connection with any forces they might send to Korea, they were very anxious to work closely with us on what they should do and what equipment they should provide. This, he said they proposed to discuss with Defense.

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Printed JUL 31-50

By RUS AL - 1077, Date 8-1-50

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The second point which he wished to mention was their migration program. He stated that Australia was undertaking a program which in proportion to their existing population was larger than any immigration into the U.S. at any time. This was putting a great load on the Australian continent in housing and in securing so basic commodities. He indicated that it was important for their own interests and for the interests of the other nations of the free world for Australia to be strong and they would probably not develop in strength without additional population. He indicated that they could take 200,000 immigrants a year and might even raise this to 250,000 per year in time.

The third point which he made was largely related to the second although not wholly dependent upon the second, and this was their requirement for funds for developing the country. He stated that their basic industries needed expansion, that they required public works, particularly hydro-electric facilities which would serve the double purpose of irrigation and power production. He specifically mentioned the need for earth-moving machinery which they could only buy in the U.S. He said they did not feel in a position to ask for more dollars than were now allotted to them in the sterling pool and that, therefore, additional dollar requirements must come from other sources. He mentioned that they had considered Wall Street, which he did not think was possible; a Government loan from the U.S., the difficulties of which he recognized; the International Bank; or the Ex-Im Bank. He said in his conversations with the British they had seen an objection to Australia attempting to obtain credit and that the British had favored the International Bank as the source thereof. He had insight, however, about the International Bank as he understood they usually operated as a project unit and this involved detailed studies which in turn took appreciable periods of time and that on fait there was an urgency in their migration program which made prompt action essential. In reply to my question he indicated that the amount of money they were thinking of was 250 million dollars over a 5 year period or 50 million a year. I told him that we would be very glad to give him such help as we could in studying the details of his suggestions. It was agreed that Mr. Thorp would arrange a meeting at which State, Treasury, and Commerce representatives would meet with his representatives to study the problem.

Dean Acheson

HR:447 Perkins:cmw

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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Joint Chiefs of Staff
Col Ladd 55234

TOP SECRET

TO: CINCPAC TOKYO J44C

INFO: JCS 87522

11 JUL 50

From JCS.

1. The JCS consider it highly desirable to undertake mass air operations against North Korean targets, the destruction of which will assist your future operations, destroy industrial targets in North Korea and reduce the North Korean ability to wage war in the future.

2. With these considerations in mind, the JCS have directed COMAF to make available to you two additional medium bomb groups for a period of thirty days. It is desired that all medium bomb groups be employed in the destruction of military targets indicated in para 3 below. In directing these operations it is not the intent of the JCS to preclude their emergency employment on other missions which in your judgment are overriding.

3. Targets:

- a. Pyongyang (2 munitions plants, railroad shops and yards).
- b. Kusan (3 chemical plants).
- c. Wusan (1 oil refinery, railroad shops and yards).
- d. Hojindong (1 petroleum storage plant).

4. The JCS will furnish additional data on targets contributing to the context expressed in para 1. You are authorized to destroy similar-type targets if info available to you indicates it is warranted. Rather alternate targets north of 38 parallel as designated by you.

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: COMAF, CMA, NATASIDE, CWO

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By W.D.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
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PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Capt W O Lator USM
Secretary JCS 72700

TO: CINCPAC (COMMAND) TOKYO JAPAN

NR: JCS 87570

31 JUL 50

PERSONAL FOR MACARTHER FROM JCS

In accordance with previously approved long-range plans, formulated prior to the Korean incident, for dispersed storage of non-nuclear components for atomic bombs, 10 such components will be placed in storage on Guam. The expected date of completion of the movement is 12 August 1950. Shipment of nuclear components, requiring 72 hours, plus Presidential decision authorizing use would be necessary before atomic bombs could be employed.

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR: GEN VANDENBERG, GEN COLLINS, ADM BERMAN,
GEN BRADLEY

ON OUT 87570

(Jul 50) DTG: 312216 owl

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3-402

DDO Directive 5100.22, June 18, 1979

By RLT/RL NARS, Date 12-5-74

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August 2, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILSON

John Sharon gave me a preliminary (confidential) report on the work that he is doing on the fireside chat correspondence. The most striking thing that he has picked up so far, after examining the available (250) favorable and unfavorable communications, is that only one out of thirty-five is devoted to the Korean war and foreign policy in general, whereas one out of two letters urges price and wage control or talks about the rising prices of food and the shortages of sugar. Very few correspondents seem to be interested in the world-wide significance of the President's action as a major step in foreign policy, but they talk rather profusely about the domestic situation which the international crisis has produced.

Sharon will render a more complete report to Wilson after he has finished his survey.

KWJ
Kenneth W. Bechler

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 3, 1950

SUBJECT: Proposed U.K. Note Relating to Increased Military Effort;
China.

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador;
Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State;
Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President;
Mr. E. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State; and
Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State.

COPIES TO: S/S
O
SMA

Sir Oliver came in to discuss the proposed note which the U.K. was planning to deliver to the American Embassy in London in connection with their increased military effort. He prefaced his remarks by saying that in considering the situation we should allow for the fact that ten days ago we had been proceeding for a statement from the U.K. and that the fact that the statement appeared less urgent to us now did not alter the fact that it had been prepared in answer to our request. He then said that he had heard from London in connection with the deletions which had been discussed with Mr. Perkins the previous evening. London was unwilling to drop the part of paragraph 3 suggested for deletion, and I agreed that this was not of great importance. Sir Oliver said that they were, however, prepared to make the deletions in paragraphs 4 and 7 which had been suggested. I stated that we felt this to be very important and urged strongly that this be done.

Mr. Harriman raised the question of the negative basis of the note and felt that the way in which the increased effort was being procured percentage-wise did not be justice to what the U.K. was in fact doing.

Sir Oliver

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Sir Oliver agreed, but felt that it would probably be impossible to make these changes, and that we must allow for the fact that the note was probably good public relations in the S.R. even though it may not be the best public relations in the S.S.

I told Sir Oliver that putting aside the wording of the note, we felt the action which the British Government indicated it was willing to take was very good and would set a good pattern for the other European countries; that if all of them could get their military expenditures up 10 percent it would be a great step forward.

Sir Oliver then switched to the question of China and said that he was increasingly disturbed about the developing sentiments of London and Washington concerning China. He stated that he feared that there might crystallize be a point where it could be very difficult to reverse them, and he hoped that something could be done to keep the situation fluid. He reviewed briefly the British attitude towards the situation and particularly emphasized the feeling that although we might win in Korea we still might lose the orient to the Communists. I told him that I shared his concern and that my position on China was perfectly clear and referred to my speech before the press club. I said that, however, under the circumstances I did not see what other course was open to us; my greatest hope was that the whole issue might somehow be deferred and considered rationally and at leisure in the General Assembly.

Donee addeat

ECR:GVP:Kins:sta

471-B

August 4, 1950

Statement 3
4/27/50
Pro
W

My dear Mrs. Whitman:

Please accept the President's thanks for your letter of July seventeenth and for your kindness in submitting an expression of your views. In connection with the matter in which you are interested, I am enclosing a copy of the President's radio address of July nineteenth which you may wish to see.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM D. HASSETT
Secretary to the President

B

Mrs. Roland ~~Whitman~~ Jr.,
558 Hill Terrace,
Winnetka,
Illinois.

f.m.c.

mt

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pg

555 Hill Terrace
Cicero, Illinois
July 17, 1950

President Harry Truman
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Let's have complete mobilization now - to
win in Korea as soon as possible, and to deter the
Russians from attacking anywhere else in the world.

We are very proud of your quick reaction to the
North Korean aggression.

Yours sincerely,

Mary Whitman

Mrs. Roland Whitman, Jr.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC 73/2

COPY NO. 1

A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ON

THE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES
IN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION

August 8, 1950

WASHINGTON

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August 8, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON

THE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES
IN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION

References: 1. NSC Actions Nos. 331, 335, 338-2
2. NSC 73/1 and NSC 73

The enclosed report on the subject, a revision of NSC 73/1 prepared by the senior NSC staff in the light of the revisions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the 63rd Council meeting (NSC Action No. 331), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury at the next regularly scheduled Council meeting on Thursday, August 10.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosure, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve the conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling of this report.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

THE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES
IN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate possible further Soviet moves and assess and appraise the position and actions of the United States with respect thereto in the light of the Korean situation.

ANALYSIS

Introduction

2. In determining our position and our actions in the present crisis we must bear in mind that the fundamental objective of the United States is to maintain the integrity and vitality of its free society and the measure of world order necessary thereto. This involves the willingness to fight for that objective if necessary. Although a global war has not necessarily begun in Korea and may not eventuate, the U. S. has nevertheless been engaged in a crucial struggle for some time involving political, economic and military factors. As the aggressor continues his policy of expansion, we must accept the possibility of local conflicts and must devise the right policies, diplomatic and military, to meet these aggressions. The military capabilities of the United States are not adequate to its current commitments and responsibilities. As a deterrent, and also in preparation for possible eventualities, the degree of our

military readiness should therefore be increased as a matter of the utmost urgency. We should also by means short of war build up the military strength of the free world and step up the implementation of a political, economic, and psychological offensive against the USSR.

3. Those actions which the United States with its allies should now be taking to regain the initiative, to deter further aggression, and to increase our ability to defeat aggression, are not included in this report, although their critical importance should not be overlooked. The present situation requires many such measures, some of which are now being undertaken. Others are under study and will be the subject of subsequent recommendations, including those which will flow from NSC 68. These measures should be taken regardless of future Soviet actions so long as the USSR retains its present capabilities and intentions to threaten the security of the United States.

General

4. It is a tenet of communism that war between communist and non-communist countries is inevitable. This conviction is a basic premise in the determination of Soviet policy, although history has shown that Russia can be influenced to delay action or retreat from local objectives if strongly opposed. The Kremlin is determined first to protect and to preserve its regime in Russia and second to promote world communism. The USSR is the implacable enemy of the

United States and the non-communist world. Therefore, the degradation, weakening and ultimate destruction of the United States are essential to the attainment of the aims of the USSR.

5. In assessing the danger of further aggressive moves directed by the USSR, it is essential to take into account estimated Soviet military capabilities and, in so far as possible, to assess Soviet intentions. The USSR has the military capability to occupy any country on its periphery, to invade Western Europe and the Near and Middle East, to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and Alaska and upon shipping, and to reinforce the communist military effort in the Far East. The USSR also has the capability of initiating limited-scale air attacks on the United States and Canada. The USSR is not, however, believed to have at the present time the capability of preventing the United States from carrying out an atomic attack. On the other hand, the USSR may have the capability of reducing our industrial potential. The USSR, by provoking insurrections and satellite armed actions simultaneously on many fronts, and without openly committing its own forces, would confront the United States and its allies with the following alternatives: abandoning positions of vital political and strategic importance, committing and dissipating available strength on the many fronts chosen by the USSR, or undertaking global war.

6. Given these capabilities, which have existed for some time and are progressively increasing, an attempt must be made, in the light of the Korean situation, to analyze and evaluate further

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possible short-range moves by the USSR. This analysis attempts to scan only the immediate future rather than a period two or three months ahead, though the long-range possibilities cannot be ignored.

7. The opening of hostilities in Korea could conceivably mean that the Kremlin intends to embark on any one or a combination of the following courses of action:

- a. To initiate global war.
- b. To employ Soviet forces, alone or with satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited objectives, not designed to bring on global war.
- c. To inspire further aggression using only satellite forces, but not using USSR armed forces.
- d. To probe U. S. determination and military effectiveness.

Possibility of Global War

8. It has been our estimate that the Kremlin did not intend to engage in a major war and might be deterred from initiating such a war in the future if confronted with sufficient political, economic and military strength designed to force the retreat of Russian communism. This estimate has not necessarily been invalidated by the events of the past few weeks, which are consistent with the following interpretations:

- a. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the Kremlin did not intend to bring about a global war and did not expect, although militarily prepared for, United States military

involvement in Korea. The probable aim of the Kremlin was simply to gain control of the entire Korean peninsula and thus to strengthen materially its strategic position in Northern Asia with global political and military results.

8. The Kremlin seems to have calculated its moves with a view to keeping the responsibility of the Soviet Government unengaged and its own military forces uncommitted.

9. On the other hand, the events of the past few weeks could be interpreted as the first phase of a general Soviet plan for global war. Should the Kremlin in fact be desirous of or reconciled to a global war, of which the Korean situation is the first phase, the following considerations might govern its actions in the near future:

a. The Kremlin might be disposed to forego any action which it calculated would provoke global war until such time as the United States had reached the point of maximum diversion and attrition of its forces-in-being without involvement of the military forces of the Soviet Union, or until it had developed its atomic striking capabilities to the point which it deemed desirable for a general attack on the West. As long as we are being forced to commit ever greater increments of our forces-in-being in Korea, the Kremlin might not hasten the outbreak of general hostilities since the USSR would be increasing its own capabilities as those of the U. S. diminished. This could change, however, at the point where the Kremlin estimated that our maximum weakness had been reached, and that further passage

of time leading to the material strengthening of the relative position and military posture of the United States would not work to Soviet advantage.

f. The Kremlin might undertake immediate and simultaneous attack in all possible theatres of action.

g. Such attack could be accompanied or immediately followed by a direct attack upon the continent of North America, since a Soviet attack upon United States territory as well as upon its armed forces abroad is a Soviet capability.

h. In view of the advantages of surprise and of the desirability for an enemy of the United States to strike a serious blow at the North American industrial potential, the possibility must be constantly borne in mind that the Kremlin might now decide to initiate global war by a direct surprise attack upon the territory of the United States before taking the actions referred to in g or h above.

10. Global war could come in one of three ways: (a) by Soviet design; (b) by a progression of developments growing out of the present situation; or (c) by a miscalculation on the part of either the U. S. or the USSR. If there were evidence justifying the assumption of immediate global war by Soviet design, the only course for the United States would be full preparation at full speed. While not ruling out the possibility that global war is imminent, it is not yet a sufficient certainty to be the assumption on which U. S. action should be based. The present question is one of the degree of

preparation we should undertake to improve our ability to meet any of the eventualities treated in this paper. Our efforts should be urgently directed toward preventing global war from developing and toward increasing our war capabilities.

Isolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces to Achieve Local Objectives not Designed to Bring on Global War

11. USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment of satellite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon but possibly as part of a general plan which might involve correlated action in other parts of the world. A danger of direct commitment of Soviet forces is in Korea itself where actual conflict is in progress between the United States and a Soviet satellite. A successful repulse of the North Korean invasion would not merely restore the status quo. United States troops would be back in force in South Korea, and a build-up of military strength in certain of the non-communist areas of the Far East would have taken place.

12. The Kremlin might be prepared to accept in varying degrees the risks of a general conflict by launching local armed attacks in order to attain objectives regarded as of importance to the Soviet Union. Without automatically starting global war by attacking American troops or a country covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the principal areas where actual Soviet forces could be employed for a local purpose are Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Finland. In addition to any one or more of these local operations, the Soviets would still be capable of conducting with

surprise important operations simultaneously in Germany and Austria, in the Near, Middle and Far East, and against the United Kingdom and the North American continent. Soviet forces are already deployed in sufficient strength to give them the military capability to act in many areas. The following specific comments apply to: Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Finland, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

a. In the case of Iran, it is possible but not probable that the Soviet Government would regard the risk of general war as relatively small while at the same time the acquisition of the Near Eastern oil fields and the consequent domination of the European economy which would result, and the reduction of a threat to the Baku oil region of the Soviet Union, are important Soviet objectives. Overt USSR attack on Iran would in fact give rise to the risk of global war.

b. In the case of Turkey, the control of the Turkish Straits and the approaches to the eastern Mediterranean represent very important military considerations from the point of view of Soviet defense as well as a traditional and deep-seated Russian objective. The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East, which under existing U. S. policy^a is

^a Memo for Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chairman, NSAS, from Executive Secretary, NSC, subject: "Documents Resulting from Conversations with the British in Regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East", dated November 19, 1947.

vital to the security of the United States, would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of Turkey. Therefore, a direct USSR attack on Turkey would involve serious risk of precipitating global war.

c. In the case of Greece, the control of the Peloponnese and the Greek islands would present to the USSR very important military and political advantages. Geographically, Greece is a salient through the ring of non-communist states which enclose the Soviet hegemony, and its possession would provide to the USSR access to the Mediterranean Sea as well as a strategic position with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Dardanelles. Direct USSR attack upon Greece would probably precipitate global war because of the political commitments and military and sentimental associations of the United Kingdom and the United States with Greece.

d. Re-establishment of Soviet control over Yugoslavia would bring definite military advantages to the USSR. At the same time, the Kremlin would have to weigh the political advantages of eliminating a dangerous source of communist heresy against the political disadvantages of a Soviet armed assault on a communist regime, which would tend to deepen rather than heal the disruptive effect of independent tendencies in the communist parties in the free world. Unless such an assault were quickly successful, the repercussions throughout the foreign communist parties would be harmful to the Kremlin's

prestige and control of the international communist movement. Success in Yugoslavia would enable the communists to renew guerrilla operations against Greece from Yugoslavia as well as from Bulgaria and Albania. Direct USSR attacks on Yugoslavia would include a risk of involving the Western Powers and might lead to global war.

g. Occupation of Finland, while completely within Soviet capabilities, would undoubtedly encounter fierce and continued Finnish guerrilla resistance, which might render Finland less useful to the USSR for the immediate future than the present state of Soviet-Finnish relations.

h. Afghanistan and Pakistan are of strategic value to the USSR because of their geographical position. Afghanistan could be occupied with little effort. An attack on Pakistan would require much more effort and would incur serious risk of global war because of Pakistan's membership in the British Commonwealth.

i. Unless the Kremlin is willing to accept global war it will not commit Soviet armed forces to action in Germany and Austria.

Soviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces

14. The USSR might gain considerably from a policy of initiation of piecemeal attacks by present or created satellite forces against Yugoslavia, Iran, Greece, Turkey, or other states around the Soviet periphery. Further, it might be distinctly to the political

and military advantage of the USSR to involve the allied nations progressively in conflict without a declaration of war on the part of the USSR or without commitment of its military forces. Such action might leave the allies with the alternative of fighting an undeclared war, or of being open to the charge of aggression by initiating a declaration of war. None of these areas is one in which the USSR particularly needs the advantage of surprise. Furthermore, the military and political capabilities of the USSR and its satellites are so great as to permit it to direct piecemeal action against isolated areas while still retaining the capability of strategic surprise. A progressive series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR would confront the United States and its allies with the issue of global war.

15. It is presently estimated that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, collectively do not possess the capabilities for a successful assault on Asiatic Turkey, although they could overrun portions of European Turkey. Even with military assistance and leadership from the USSR comparable to that provided the North Koreans, it is estimated that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary could not successfully attack Asiatic Turkey. A satellite attack on Yugoslavia is a possibility. A resumption of fighting in Greece is also a possibility.

16. The use of Polish and Czechoslovakian troops is always a military possibility in any action in Europe. However, withdrawal of large numbers of troops from Poland and Czechoslovakia might require the employment of other forces to maintain the present communist regime.

17. The use of the East German para-military forces against allied troops in Germany is another possibility. It is doubtful that this force would undertake a direct attack on any of the western zones. Such an attack could not easily be undertaken without directly involving the Soviet Union. If all or a large part of this force were sent into the western sectors of Berlin it might overcome the small forces of the western powers there. Such overt action by the East German police force would again be difficult without directly involving the Soviet military authorities. The East German forces might be useful to the Soviet Union in connection with a blockade of Berlin.

18. Further use of the Chinese communists, including the employment of organized Chinese communist forces against South Korea and Southeast Asia, is a strong possibility. They are the only satellite forces in Asia which could commit major acts of aggression. The Chinese communists are anxious to control Formosa (including the Pescadores) and have announced their determination to do so regardless of U. S. decisions or actions. An early attempt to invade Formosa is a continuing possibility. The prevention of such an invasion is primarily the responsibility of the U. S. Seventh Fleet. However, although the current effectiveness of Nationalist resistance, if attacking forces establish a substantial lodgement on the island, is highly speculative, we should proceed with the implementation of NSC 37/10.

19. Chinese communist attack on the islands near China held by the Nationalists can be expected to continue.

20. Chinese communists, in addition to an attack on Formosa, have the military capability to enter directly the Korean war and to initiate military action against Indochina or Burma or Tibet. Any or all of these actions are possible. A move against Tibet may be expected.

21. Chinese communists have the military capability to capture Hainan and Hong Kong. Civil disorder, subversion, and sabotage, appear to be the more likely actions, particularly in Hong Kong, since these could in all probability eventually achieve the objective without military involvement.

22. The capabilities of the Chinese communists outlined above contribute to the over-all capabilities of the USSR since any major military success by these forces in the Far East, with the consequent political results, adds security to the Soviet eastern flank and lessens the probability that the Soviets may have to fight on two fronts simultaneously.

23. Considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners remain under Soviet control and constitute a potential communist para-military force for the invasion or infiltration of Japan should conditions in that country invite such action. The diversion of U. S. occupation forces from Japan to Korea, the lack of Japanese defense forces, and the inadequacy of Japanese police, present a dangerous situation which must be kept under review.

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Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR

24. The USSR will undoubtedly direct communist parties and stooge groups abroad to embarrass us in every conceivable way. Intensified communist subversive or revolutionary activity might fully engage local military resources throughout Asia, as well as involve additional United States and allied military resources.

25. The following examples will provide cases in point. Current conditions in Iran, though improving, still provide wide opportunities for subversive and communist infiltration, particularly for attempted seizure of the government by the communist-dominated Tudeh Party. In addition, guerrilla operations fostered by the Soviets might be successful in Azerbaijan. The testing of our firmness in other areas may take every form known to communist ingenuity. Provocations and annoyances may occur, even up to and including an attempt to reimpose the Berlin blockade or to blockade Vienna. If any weakness or hesitation on the part of the United States is encountered anywhere it will be instantaneously exploited by the communists to undermine confidence in and support of the United States everywhere.

26. In addition, the USSR may well seek to create division in the UN membership with respect to the police action in Korea by playing upon hopes of a peaceful settlement, creating the impression that major concessions to the UN position may be forthcoming, or even by offering such concessions in a context in which the USSR would gain substantial though perhaps not immediately obvious advantages if such

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a settlement were made. If the UN forces were to be dislodged from the peninsula the theme of accepting a fait accompli would certainly be played for all it is worth. It is also to be anticipated that the USSR will make every effort to exploit the division between the United States and other non-communist powers on the issue of Formosa. In general there will also no doubt be a continuance of the peace offensive designed both to divide the U. S. and its allies and to create in the latter domestic division between elements determined to resist Soviet aggression and elements which lack such determination. The United States must also be alert to the possibilities of sabotage and subversion in this country.

CONCLUSIONS

Part I

Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Immediate Future

Possibility of Global War

27. Since 1945 the USSR has continued materially to increase its capability to wage global war. Even though there is no conclusive indication that the USSR intends to launch a global war at this time, the danger of Soviet resort to war, either deliberately or by miscalculation, may have been increased by the Korean war. Even an immediate solution of the Korean crisis would not obviate this danger.

Isolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces
to Achieve Local Objectives not Designed to Bring on Global War

28. There is as yet no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has or has not decided to commit its forces, alone or with satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited objectives, without intending to bring on global war. However, if a decision should be made to use USSR forces in this manner, action could be taken with varying degrees of risk in any of the following areas: Finland, Korea, the Near and Middle East, and the Balkans.

Soviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces

29. Use of European and Asiatic satellite military forces against a variety of objectives is a possibility for the immediate future.

1. An immediate possibility is the use of Chinese communist forces in Korea and against Formosa. The prevention of an invasion of Formosa is primarily the responsibility of the U. S. Seventh Fleet. The current effectiveness of Nationalist resistance, if attacking forces establish a substantial lodgment on the island, is highly speculative.

2. In addition, depending upon developments in the world situation, the USSR might inspire aggression by satellite forces against Western Germany (including Berlin), Austria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Tibet, Burma, Indochina, Hong Kong, and Macao.

Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR

30. We must also expect a variety of Soviet efforts to achieve victories by subversive action and tactical maneuvers in the "peace offensive" to keep us off balance, to divert our attention, to waste our resources, to test our firmness, and to split the free world.

Part II

U. S. Actions to Counter Further Soviet Moves in the Immediate Future

31. It is not possible within the time presently available to recommend specific reactions to any further Soviet aggressions since such reactions should be based upon fundamental policy decisions which are now under study by the NSC Staff for submission to the Council. The Conclusions of this paper are confined therefore to a statement of a few general propositions and to certain illustrative specific actions which can be clearly defined.

32. Statement of General Propositions

a. Further aggressions cannot be allowed to pass unopposed without grave danger to the security of the United States.

b. The effective counter to further acts of Soviet aggression whether direct or through satellites is not to be found in piecemeal commitment of isolated United States forces resulting in their dissipation and attrition.

c. While unilateral action may in some cases be necessary, the United States should seek to avoid such purely unilateral action to meet further Soviet aggression. We should

August 6, 1950

471-B

Statue
6/27/50
P
W

My dear Mrs. Williams:

I wish to tell you how much the President appreciates that letter you sent him. Expressions such as yours are a source of strength and courage and he asks me to extend his thanks.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM D. HASSETT
Secretary to the President

Mrs. Betty Williams,
1322 Northwest First Street,
Miami,
Florida.

JPH

Dear Mr. President, July 18, 1952

I am praying with all my heart that you will be guided by God to do what is right for this country.

I am with you in everything you do. God said is my husband.

May God help you to carry on our wonderful work for years to come.

A Friend,

ackd
8/17/52
JW

Mrs. Betty Williams
1922 N.W. 1st St
Tulsa, Okla

August 8, 1950

491-B
Statement
D
W

My dear Mrs. Egan:

The President deeply appreciates your letter of July eighteenth. He wants you to know that he is grateful for your generous assurances of confidence and support and asks me to express his thanks.

re Love

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM D. EAGLETT
Secretary to the President

B

Mrs. Henry Egan,
204 East Maple Avenue,
Wildwood,
New Jersey.

644

19
Aug 11/20

Ackd
8/18/20 (B)
Lal

7-17

304 West Maple Ave.
Wildwood, N. J.
July 12, 1958

Dear Mr. President.

I am writing to tell you
that we're all behind you in what
ever you do.

I want you to make this
world a better place to live in.
So when my little boy grows up
this world will be a better place
to live in.

I've prayed every night
for this ugly war to end. I hope
my prayers are answered soon.

When my little boy grows
up I hope he doesn't have to
go to war. And that all wars
will be ended.

I hope my letter has
explained my need.

And that were all behind you
 100%

I hope this war will end
 all wars & that this world will
 be a better place to live in And
 that our boys' lives shall be vain.

Thank you,
 Mrs. Dorsey Wigand,

August 8, 1950

471-B

Statement

P. O.

W

My dear Mr. and Mrs. Ward:

I want to tell you how much the President appreciates that letter you sent him. Expressions such as yours are a source of strength and courage and he asks us to extend his thanks.

R

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM D. BASSETT
Secretary to the President

Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert Ward,
1635 Avenue L,
Port Madison,
Iowa.

X

for

4 10 July 18-50
15/15/15 635 Ave. L
Fort Madison
Iowa

Dear Mr. President.

We are all behind
you 100%, and will
work to the best of
our ability to
stop this aggression
to keep Peace among
all Men. So whatever
you do, we want you
to know we are
pulling for you and
will do all in our
power to help,
May God be

2.

his heaven bless
you and may he
watch over our
most wonderful
country.

your countrymen
Mr & Mrs Gilbert & Ward
& son's Gilbert Jr 19
in the Navy and
Clifford who is 6 1/2

Wallace, Henry A.

W. E. McSweeney Sgt. P.O. 001085

AUG 10 350

Dear Henry:

I have received your letter of July 26, 1960 requesting information on an alleged attack by the Republic of Korea prior to the June 25 invasion by the North Korean Communist regime. Thank you for it and the enclosed communications from Mr. L. D. Harding and Mr. John T. McManis, and the photostat copy of "Background of the Civil War in Korea".

I am glad to have the opportunity to call your attention to several important facts in connection with the allegations made in the China Weekly Review article and in Mr. Harding's communication. As Ambassador Jessup recently pointed out, there have been times in history when serious and conscientious scholars have been able to disagree on the question of who started a conflict or who was guilty of an act of aggression. In the Korean situation there can be no doubt or sincere debate, for the record is abundantly clear. No serious, honest scholar can ever have any question about it. North Korean Communist forces attacked the Republic Korea without warning, with provocation and without justification.

It is especially significant that knowledge of the facts of this situation does not depend upon statements by the Korean Government nor upon statements by Americans on the spot. At the last meeting of the General Assembly, the United Nations Commission on Korea was specifically authorized to have teams of observers to keep watch along the thirty-eighth parallel. The UN Commission on Korea is composed of representatives of the following countries: Australia, China, India, El Salvador, Turkey, the Philippines and France. The Commission's team of observers had concluded an on-the-spot survey of the situation along the border on June 24, barely twenty-four hours

before

The Honorable
Henry A. Wallace,
Farrus,
South Salem, New York,

cc - PL 8/11

before the Communist forces attacked. The following is the text of a cable dated June 22, 1950 from the Acting Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Korea to the President of the Security Council:

"Following report dated June 24 from United Nations field observers submitted to Commission on their return from field trip along 38th parallel commencing 9 June to report developments likely to involve military conflict is forwarded for information:

"General situation along parallel. Principal impression left with observers after their field tour is that South Korea army is organized entirely for defense and is in no condition to carry out attack on large scale against forces of North. Impression is based on following main observations:

1. South Korea Army in all sectors is disposed in depth. Parallel is guarded on southern side by small bottle troops located in scattered outposts together with revolving patrol. There is no concentration of troops and no massing for attack visible at any point.

2. At several points, North Korean forces are in effective possession of salients on south side parallel, occupation in at least one case being of fairly recent date. There is no evidence that South Korean forces have taken any steps for or making any preparation to eject North Korean forces from any of these salients.

3. Proportion of South Korean forces are actively engaged in rounding up guerrilla bands that have infiltrated into the mountainous area in the eastern sectors. It was ascertained that these bands are in possession of demolition equipment and are more heavily armed than on previous occasions.

4. So far as equipment of South Korean forces concerned, in absence of armour, air support, and heavy artillery, any action with object of invasion would, by any military standards, be impossible.

3. South Korea Army does not appear to be in possession of military or other supplies that would indicate preparation for large-scale attack. In particular, there is no sign of any dumping of supplies or ammunition, petrol, oil, lubricant, in forward areas. Roads generally are little used and apart from convey four trucks taking company from Kaepung westward to join rounding up guerrilla band, no concentration transport anywhere encountered.

4. In general, attitude South Korean commanders is one of vigilant defense. Their instructions do not go beyond retirement in case of attack upon previously prepared positions.

5. There is no indication of any extensive reconnaissance being carried out northward by South Korea Army nor of any undue excitement or activity at divisional headquarters or regimental levels to suggest preparation for offensive activity. Observers were freely admitted to all sections various headquarters including operations rooms.

6. Observers made special point inquiring what information was coming in regarding situation north of parallel. In some sectors it had been reported that civilians had recently been removed from areas adjoining parallel to north to depths varying from 4 to 8 kilometers. Another report received during night Thursday 15 June at regimental headquarters Ongjin was to effect that there was increased military activity in vicinity Chongja about 4 kilometers north parallel. No reports, however, have been received of any unusual activity on part of North Korean forces that would indicate any impending change in general situation along parallel. "

The texts of this cable and others from the Comandante on Korea to the Secretary General relative to the Korean situation both before and after the Communist invasion are contained in the Department's White Paper on Korea, a copy of which is enclosed, in case you have not yet had access to it. The cable dated June 28 from the Comandante on Korea to the Secretary General giving a summary report on background events preceding the attack (UN Document S/1806) may also be of special interest to you, and excerpts from its text may be found beginning on page 18 of the White Paper.

The

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ACTION

Age Group	No (%)
18-24	~18
25-34	~22
35-44	~15
45-54	~12
55-64	~10
65+	~8

Rev. Dean Johnson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

1000

Could you have the appropriate person in the Department inform us as to the truth or falsity of the unclassified concerning the heavy armed attack by the South Koreans on June 25 prior to the invasion by the North Koreans? You might return the enclosed to us with any statement your people deem advisable to send.

Sincerely yours,

24 02 2020

755.00/7-2650

99

Political Action

14997

Monday, July 24

Dear Mr. Wallace,

I thought you would be interested in this report on Korea published in the *China Weekly Review* for July 8, so I had it photostated since our copy was required for our files.

The Review is owned and edited by John B. Powell, son of the late China editor who was tortured by the Japanese and eventually died of the after-effects of this following his return to the U.S.A. after the war.

Cordially,

JOHN T. McMANUS

C O P Y

Henry A. Wallace declared, from South Salem, N.Y., July 15 (AP), that

"It is insanity for the U. S. to fight for Syngman Rhee and his cruel government which was repudiated by the South Koreans themselves on May 30."

In the same breath, Wallace says he supports the Korean war because his country is now engaged in it, and "the United Nations sanctions that war."

In the opinion of this writer, there is no longer a "United Nations". The U.N. formerly represented the two forces now contending for world leadership - the revolutionary, and the counter-revolutionary, elements. The former were forced out, by the pressure brought by the United States to continue Nationalist China in the Security Council after the Chiang group had been forced out of China. (Sec'y Gen. Trygve Lie has stated his opinion that it was indefensible to take this position.)

Wallace thus demonstrates his inferiority in moral courage to Abraham Lincoln, who opposed the United States after it had declared war on Mexico; and to Eugene V. Debs, who went to jail for maintaining his convictions. It is to be noted that Debs - who ran for President as an avowed radical - got practically the same number of votes that Wallace did as an advocate of reformed capitalism.

"The real crime against humanity," says Dean Acheson, "is aggression... The weapons used are quite incidental to the crime." Not always true that aggression is crime. The French revolutionists who pulled down the Bastille - an event recently celebrated even in the United States - was an aggressive act.

Furthermore, although open to conviction, this writer is not now of the opinion that the North Koreans made an unprovoked assault on So. Korea. There are the following grounds for decided doubt:

(1) Although in a position to send whatever news it sees fit, the MacArthur censorship bureau has given us absolutely no details as to where the invasion took place, in what force, etc. If the facts were as

alleged,

alleged, this information obviously would have been broadcast immediately for propaganda purposes. The so-called United Nations has a one-sided commission in Korea, which sent in a report from Seoul without making an independent investigation. In the light of the recent attempt made to deceive the public in the "Privateer"-plane incident - as to the course laid out for the plane and the purpose of the flight - arbitrary statements by officials, without sustaining facts, are to be viewed with suspicion.

(2) It is no reason for swallowing the invasion story just as put out, to call attention to the fact that the North Koreans were better armed, and fought better. Chiang Kai-shek's forces were amply armed; and, in spite of the persistent propaganda put out in the United States, the troops of New China were not given Japanese arms in Manchuria by the Russians. (See "The Situation in Asia," by Owen Lattimore, p. 143.) Those who fought Chiang were by no means all Communists; and those who were conscripted to fight for him but surrendered as soon as they had a chance, did so because he was unworthy of support by the Chinese people.

(3) It had been suggested by Sen, Knowland and others, that China was about to attack the Chiang forces in Formosa about July 18th; troops were said to be massing on the mainland, and it was felt that Chiang could not make a successful resistance. This Korean struggle came just in the nick of time to save his neck. It was altogether too opportune. It was against the interest of China to have this diversion now, for some of its best troops are North Koreans who fought in Manchuria, and who probably will now have to be sent to Korea.

(4) According to the "National Guardian" (NY. Prog.) of June 28, U. S. army troops on the spot have confirmed the report that South Korean troops had captured a town six miles north of the line in the early hours of the fighting. Considering the weak opposition that has been put up by So. Korean fighters, even when backed by U. S. ground troops, we may be sure they never, by themselves, captured any town six miles north of the border, unless they advanced in an offensive at some point through the mountains without being observed.

The United States having instituted the atrocious So. Korean police state - which was fully exposed by Mark Gayn in his "Japan Diary" - trouble has been brewing ever since. The North Koreans were prepared for it: the South Koreans repeated the story of China. This does not answer the question: which was the invading force?

L. A. HARDING
486 Mendocino Street,
Brisbane, California

471-LB

August 12, 1950

REC'D BY
CONWAY

SEP 2 1950

Dear John:

I appreciated very much your sending
me a copy of your letter to Louis Johnson. I read
it with a great deal of interest. I, of course,
appreciate most highly your interest in the welfare
of our men at the front.

8/12/50



Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable John D. Dingell
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Ken
LPP:140

JOHN D. DUNNELL
FOR THE SENATE

STATE AND ARMY
COMMISSION

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
ARMY

JOINT COMMITTEE ON
INTERNAL SECURITY

1.7.215
Congress of the United States

House of Representatives THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington, D. C.

Aug 11 5 14 PM '50

August 8, 1950

RECEIVED

President Harry S. Truman
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

Knowing of your interest in the conservation of
human lives, I am enclosing a copy of a letter just written
to the Secretary of Defense. I thought that you might
endorse these ideas if they are practical, and I have no
doubt but that they are practical.

A special order from the Army might be necessary
in order to convince our fighting men of the value of this
equipment, and to counsel them to discard their bravado and
conserve their lives.

God bless you, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

John D. Dunnell

x1285-Mine
#771-B Mine

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

August 3, 1950

Honorable Louis Johnson
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It strikes me as humane and timely that the Armed Forces in Korea, and the Ground Forces particularly, in the interest of conserving human life be immediately provided with bullet proof vests or at least bullet and shrapnel deflected breast plates.

Supplying these in a very short time should not be very difficult inasmuch as I understand that this military and life preserving adjunct has not only been designed but has been tested and proved thoroughly practical. Only speedy transportation by air would be involved if they are stored and available in our military warehouses.

Although sometimes regarded by the bold and reckless American fighting men, it is an invaluable essential to their safety and would be particularly effective in Korean fighting where the enemy is known to use the captured American Japanese small bore 25 caliber ammunition. I trust that this matter will be considered thoroughly and promptly and the suggestion acted upon favorably.

I am prompted to make another proper and pertinent suggestion in view of the infiltrating tactics of the Korean Communists, and, therefore, urge the immediate consideration of providing speed-off and standard length short guns of heavy gauge (8, 10 or 12 gauge) suitable to the individual soldier's use, or standardized to the 10 gauge using heavy buckshot.

The military view may be that the infantryman in the front line may be expendable when the number committed to the many military tasks is unlimited. But that situation does not obtain in Korea as of today. Also it may be that events will take shape in other parts of the world which may require extreme conservation of combat soldiers.

August 6, 1950

At any rate, and in any eventuality, the use of bullet proof vests or breast plates protecting vital parts of the human body, and standard length and sawed-off shot guns will reduce the drain upon the Armed Forces. This in turn will be reflected not only in the reduced cost of training, transportation and supplies, but will also add to the longer experience and effectiveness of our fighting forces.

Thanking you for the consideration of the thoughts which prompted a layman, I subscribe myself,

Respectfully yours,



P. S. In the suggested use of standard length or sawed-off shot guns of heavy gauge, I am wondering if it would be practical to incorporate the use of square instead of round chilled shot. If the pattern of shot at reasonable range could be kept to effective proportions, I can foresee the terrific effect of this type of shot being used to repel and exterminate guerrillas and to increase the effectiveness of night patrols. This may be a problem for our ballistics and ordnance experts of the Army to solve. The shocking and destructive power of square shot may be compared to a lesser degree with the effect of grenade or shrapnel.

J. B. D.

August 26, 1950

FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE MACARTHUR STATEMENT

If General MacArthur's message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars stands as an authoritative US statement it would have the following serious impact on our foreign relations:

1. Formosa question in the United Nations.

The statement would greatly complicate the handling of the Formosa question in the United Nations, especially the difficult problem of getting friendly support for a favorable Formosa solution from such governments as the United Kingdom, the British Commonwealth and especially India. It would be almost impossible to steer the views of others toward a solution favorable to us because any argument we use other than strategic would be suspect.

2. Handle for Communist propaganda.

The statement would give the Soviet Union a convenient and persuasive basis for raising the cry of United States imperialism in Asia and the Pacific; propaganda of this nature would have a devastating effect among the Asians who are particularly sensitive to the ambitions of the white races in Asia.

3. Conflict

DISSEMINATED

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3. Conflict with previous declarations on Formosa.

The statement would have the effect of undermining the reasons which have been given thus far by the President for United States action regarding Formosa. The argumentation of the President's June 27 statement, his July 19 message to Congress, and Senator Austin's letter to the Security Council does not rest upon United States national strategic interest.

4. UN-UN Command Problems.

Since many governments draw a sharp distinction between Korea and Formosa and have already raised the desirability of separating the UN command in Korea from the UN command in any Formosa operation, MacArthur's statement would almost certainly cause friendly governments to insist upon a sharp separation of these command functions. The MacArthur statement would directly affect international unity on the Korean issue itself.

5. Asian Reaction.

General MacArthur's attempt to speak for Asia on this issue will be sharply rejected by Asian leaders whose opinions on the matter are already known to us. It would become necessary for Mr. Nehru to disclaim MacArthur's views in order to keep his own position clear. Such a disclaimer on his

part

part under present circumstances would seriously impair our diplomacy which is now seeking to obtain Nehru's support for what we are doing in Formosa and elsewhere in Asia.

6. President's Authority on Foreign Relations

A serious problem in the conduct of our foreign relations will arise if our friends abroad are left with the impression that we have an uncontrollable military commander in such a key position as that occupied by SCAP and the United Nations Unified Commander. MacArthur's statement would thus greatly exaggerate the difficulties we have had throughout the Japanese occupation with the governments of the Far Eastern Commission. Although it must be assumed that the text of MacArthur's statement will now become known, it is essential from the point of view of our foreign relations that there be no diminution of the position of the President as the authoritative spokesman for the United States on foreign relations matters.

7. Effect on the Chinese Nationalists.

General MacArthur's statement will tend to deliver US - China policy over to the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek will take

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will take both his own position and United States policy increasingly for granted and will assume that he will be supported in whatever he chooses to do on Formosa and in whatever provocation he directs against the mainland.

8. Effect on Chinese Communists.

MacArthur's statement will greatly strengthen the hand of the Soviet Union in putting pressure upon the Chinese Communists to attack Formosa at a time when it is believed that the Chinese Communists are resisting such pressure. The statement would tip off Red China that our long-range purpose is to deny Formosa to them, will confront them with the fact that they can never expect to get it except by military seizure, and may lead them to ^{the} erroneous conclusion that we look upon Formosa as a convenient spring board for an American or an American-backed attack against the mainland itself.

9. US Military Commitment.

If MacArthur's statement goes unchallenged, the effect would be greatly to increase the nature of US military commitments concerning Formosa, both as to scale and as to timing. It would involve an unlimited commitment toward

Formosa

Purpose itself, with whatever ground or other troops would be required, and would mean a United States involvement with Red China on issues and in areas which are not of vital strategic concern.

10. Effect on Free World Solidarity.

The exasperation of our friends in the free world with a statement of this sort would easily lead to breaches in the solid front on other matters such as European defense, and could create such an impression of irresponsibility and volatility on our part as to affect seriously our ability to maintain solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat.

11. Effect of Statement if Clearly Unofficial and Unauthorised.

Most of the above results would be greatly diminished if the President should order General MacArthur to withdraw his statement, even though the statement should subsequently leak. The mere fact that the President had asserted his authority and that the President saw good reasons not to accept the MacArthur statement as a valid statement of US policy would greatly reduce its unfortunate effects.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC 41

COPY NO. 1

A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ON

UNITED STATES COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET

September 1, 1950

WASHINGTON

ROUTED

U. S. DEPT. OF STATE and AID to (1)

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By MAIL ROOM, DATED 10-10-50

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 1, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON

UNITED STATES COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

References: 1. NSC Action No. 338
2. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
subject: "Future United States Policy
with Respect to Korea", dated July 17
and August 30, 1950

Pursuant to the President's request the enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury at the next regularly scheduled Council meeting on Thursday, September 7, 1950.

It is recommended that, if this report is adopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.

JAMES H. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON

UNITED STATES COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREATHE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.

ANALYSIS

2. The present United Nations action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel", and called upon all U. N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United Nations to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U. N. flag. In response to

this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U. S. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest, to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U. S. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U. S. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined

to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, provided it believes that it can take action which would prevent this and which would not involve a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before United Nations forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the "People's Republic of Northern Korea". Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although it does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula, for it is believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective.

It is possible that the Soviet Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korea by United Nations forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U. N. forces undertake ground operations north of the 38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces conducted the operation north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be reduced. In no circumstances should other U. N. forces be used in the north-eastern provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the

majority of U. N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. At some point after the U. N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U. N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example, to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea, are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation. Should such approval not be forthcoming, accomplishment of this political objective would not be feasible. It would have to be recognized that a stalemate freezing the U. N. forces indefinitely in Korea or returning to the status quo ante June 25, would be undesirable.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS

14. Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in the light of: the action of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations, and appraisal of the risk of general war.

15. The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. The U. N. Commander should be authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a roll-back, north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.

U. N. operations should not be permitted to extend into areas close to the Manchurian and U.S.S.R. borders of Korea.

16. Concurrently U. N. forces should be developed and plans should be perfected with a view to the possible occupation of North Korea. However, the execution of such plans should take place only with the explicit approval of the President, and would be dependent upon prior consultation with and the approval of the U. N. members.

17. The United Nations Commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should re-occupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or implicitly giving warning that its forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U. N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt should then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U. N. majority. Military action against North Korean troops south of 38 would continue, but action north of 38 should not be initiated or continued and if any U. N. forces are already north of 38 they should prepare to withdraw pending further directives from Washington.

18. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U. N. Commander should defend his forces, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to Washington. The same action should be taken in the event that U. N. forces are operating north of the 38th parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. In either of these events the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should immediately:

a. Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows. These measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

(1) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

(2) Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if necessary, to the aggression.

b. Give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

c. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.

d. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.

e. While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national war plans.

19. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel:

a. The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

b. As long as action by U. S. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U. S. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U. S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U. S. courses of action.

c. The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.

20. In the event of an attempt to employ Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of 38, the United Nations Commander should continue the action as long as he believes his forces capable of successful resistance.

21. The United States should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. Special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U. S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

22. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POW's, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW's now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be

selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war, of experiences in Greece, and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

23. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat or sudden collapse of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected and there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. If the terms offered are not accepted, the U. S. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purpose of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the use of U. S. forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border.

24. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U. S. forces, reprisals against the

forces, officials, and populace of North Korea, except in accordance with international law, and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

25. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K.. The United Nations forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the U. N. occupation.

26. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U. N. responsibilities for Korea, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U. N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U. N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U. N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

27. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in

these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.

28. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

a. The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

b. The Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea.

c. An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

29. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to secure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.

h. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

i. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

30. The United States should urge that the U. N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K.. The U. S. should recommend that the U. N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any aggression. The question of U. N. guarantee should be studied but no U. S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

31. The United States should urge that U. N. forces be retained in Korea until a stable, unified, and independent state has been

firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U. N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in conjunction with other U. N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

Copy sent to SAM 1466
IMP. Philip

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ARMY REPORT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 1 TO 15 AUGUST 1950

Press Release No. 343
September 2, 1950

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 1 TO 15 AUGUST 1950, SUBMITTED BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

.....

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, taken to verify Korean, for circulation to the Members of the Security Council, the "Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the Period 1 to 15 August, 1950."

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 1 TO 15 AUGUST, 1950

Theewith submit report under lines of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 to 15 August, inclusive. Details of these operations are contained in Eighth Army Communiqués numbered 13 to 46 inclusive and Korean releases numbered 175 to 233.

A general description of the operations for the period is as follows:

Heavy action during the period was characterized by a rapid follow-up of United Nations withdrawals and a tightening of the squeeze of the lodgment area in southeastern Korea. Two major penetrations of the United Nations positions were effected and eliminated during the period, and as the close of the period a major potential penetration loomed as the result of a progressive enemy concentration.

Along the south coast, enemy forces drove through Chinju on the last of August and sustained a two-pronged attack in the direction of Wonsu, with two major units, the north Korean 4th and 6th Divisions. The deepest penetration in this sector was reached on the 6th of the north line north Korean forces were stopped eight miles west of Wonsu by a United Nations counter-offensive. Task Force Ross launched the first United Nations attack in this sector on 7 August. This force consisted of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division, the 5th U.S. Amphibious Command Team, the 1st U.S. Provisional Marine Brigade, and a Republic of Korea force of two battalions. The purpose of this attack was to remove the southern threat to the Pusan line and secure suitable defense areas. The attack progressed smoothly and efficiently with minimum losses to United Nations forces. All units reached their objectives by 13 August after having advanced some twenty miles. This attack not only secured the southern approaches to the Pusan line, but also secured that the north Korean forces will not hold under attack. The "withdrawal" of some of the north Korean 6th Division units became a full retreat. Much north Korean equipment was abandoned to United Nations forces during this operation.

To the north of this sector, in the early part of the period, the operations of United Nations forces followed the latest reported in my previous reports. Units were an extended front of fifteen-thirty miles per division with light

Lines only possible between Taishan. Penetration and infiltration could not be prevented and a strategic withdrawal became necessary. On the night of 2-3 August, the U.S. 1st Cavalry and 2nd Infantry Divisions conducted an orderly planned withdrawal of about twenty miles to the Nakdong River line. The enemy advanced east from Taishan to cross on the Nakdong River line by the 4th of August. Elements of this force, identified as the 4th Division, pushed up and down the river line under the cover of an artillery duel. On the 4th of the month, the enemy selected the crossing site at a bend in the river eight miles south of Puyong-a.

Crossings began on the night of the 4th, and by the 5th the enemy had pushed one regiment into the bridgehead in the face of repeated local counter-attacks. By the 12th of the month the enemy had pushed probably the bulk of his division into this bridgehead at great cost in casualties.

In the central part of the sector, generally outside the Namwon-Taegu axis, the enemy drove hard against Namwon from three directions on August 1st, and then promptly followed the planned United Nations withdrawal from the area. The enemy used his front-line pre-war divisions in this area, the weapons 1st, 1st and 1st Divisions. The significance of these dispositions is best perceived in a comparison of frontages, the Republic of Korea 1st Division held a front of twelve miles while its neighbor to the south, the 1st Cavalry Division covering Taegu held a front of twenty-eight miles. In a disposition of regiments across the river front, this discrepancy of numerical and tactical strength which was critical from the beginning of the campaign the improved slightly but never to a point of security for the United Nations Forces. They are compelled to continue the fight in great pain.

By the 4th of the month the enemy closed on the Nakdong River line opposite Namwon and again, as in the south, began probing for a crossing site. Twenty miles northwest of Taegu a small enemy force failed across the river and disappeared into the hills before it could be destroyed. Northwest of Taegu, at Namwon, the enemy pushed two battalions across to the 8th of the month. The next day the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division and 1st Republic of Korea Division attacked and forced the enemy to evacuate the remains of this force to the west bank of the river. When the enemy deployment terminated, an epidemic fire divisions were employed in this sector, and near the end of the period there were indications of a general concentration of forces across the river from Nakdong in preparation for early assault.

Against the northern part of the line the enemy drove down the Chungju-Taegu axis and the Taegu-Namwon axis with a total of three divisions, the 15th, 17th and 8th Divisions. Under this attack and to preserve the continuity of the line with the withdrawal of U.S. Forces mentioned above, it was necessary to direct the I and II MCZ Corps to withdraw to their defensive positions. The Republic of Korea Army withdrawal was conducted in an orderly fashion in the successive nights of 2-3 and 3-4 August. Namwon and Taegu were secured by the enemy on the 1st, and two parallel driver columns against the stiffening resistance of the 2nd Corps of Korea Forces in this sector. Three enemy regiments concentrated in an attack from Taegu-dong on the 5th and three as far as Kari, twenty-five miles south of Taegu, but were forced to withdraw in the face of United Nations counter-attacks on the 12th to a general line through Waseung. Republic of Korea forces conduct their defense operations with determination and inflicted heavy losses on the attackers.

On the east coast the town of Tongliang changed hands twice during the period. On the 1st of the month the enemy lost the town to attacking forces of the 1st MCZ Division, and by the 12th it had built up the forces in the area sufficiently to retake the town and drive a few thousand yards south. Indeed

SECRET

from the Taeguk-Pohang-dong axis as enemy forces of two regiments, later identified as elements of the 12th Division, filtered through the rugged mountain trails over a period of days. By the 5th this force reached the general vicinity of Hage, the entire west of Pohang-dong, and by the 12th of the month had entered Pohang-dong and was active within wider range of the United Nations airfield in that vicinity. By the 15th of August this threat was considered sufficiently serious to again, recalled the Republic of Korea and some U.S. Army Forces. This readjustment resulted in another local withdrawal on the lines: Kumi, Pusan-dong, Chongju-dong.

At the end of this period the hard-pressed enemy 4th Division retained its withdrawal across the Chikong River west of Taeguk. On the same lines the enemy continued to draw off United Nations forces to the east by his deep penetration to Pohang-dong, and slowly concentrated his forces north west of Taegu, poised for a final drive to Taegu and Pusan. Enemy command forces now consisted of twelve fully identified divisions with a possibility of two fractional.

In his enemy rear areas a large army concentration was reported near the northeastern border of Korea indicating possible recruitment of Koreans from northeastern Manchuria.

Augmentation of United Nations Forces in Korea during this period included the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division and the 1st U.S. Provisional Marine Brigade from the U.S., the 7th U.S. Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii, and an increase in U.N. command and service support units. During the course of this period a material number of U.N. high units were arriving and will soon be ready to enter combat. The Republic of Korea Army continues to improve its organization and combat effectiveness. Several new ROK Infantry Regiments have been previously activated and ongoing training were ready and continue to proceed during the period. The Republic of Korea Army is showing determination and gallantry in the defense of its territory, and developing increased tactical skill and maneuverability. There are still no United Nations ground units equipped the Republic of Korea in Korea except U.S. Army and Marine units. These units maintain their greatest effectiveness within although heavily outnumbered and deflect their smallest possible landing.

The information I have received on the size and type of units offered by South Nations shows a united and determined spirit in the actions of the United Nations to repel the invasion of the Republic of Korea that is gratifying. I still feel it my duty to report to you that contributions must be forthcoming whenever today if this threat to international security is to be resolved promptly.

United Nations Naval Forces now comprising warships from eight nations are operating under the control of the United Nations Naval Commander, Vice Admiral S. F. Joy. The coordinated efficiency of this command is an exemplary operation in proving the ability of the United Nations to quickly assembly their naval strength in distant areas and operate jointly with great effectiveness. Such a coordination of naval strength by no way means to be seen as far distant from our naval bases in cooperation in history. These contributions to this formidable fleet have included significant numbers of United States aircraft carriers.

These naval forces have been continuously engaged in their tasks with ever increasing effectiveness. To meet the threat of increasing numbers of ground and aerial forces from the northeastern regions of Korea, naval aircraft have been employed in intensive operations to disrupt rail and road facilities and road networks. Naval aircraft have also been engaged with excellent results on north forces strategic targets including harbors, oil installations, factories,

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warehouses, power stations, merchandising parks, and railroad stations. Vehicle and supply concentrations. In close support of the Infantry, naval aircraft spending in close continuous application, and guided by ground controllers, have found a great number of various military targets in the battle area. At sea, naval aircraft have ranged the coasts, striking military targets along the enemy lines of communication.

Naval surface craft have continued the constant patrol and interdiction of enemy water, rail and highway movement along these coasts. On the west coast divisions and headquarters have been bombarding on call for and in direct support of the Infantry, in addition to their patrol functions.

Naval escort of enemy ships and shipping continues to guarantee arrival of additional men and supplies in the battle area, and sea evacuation has been continued.

United Nations Naval Forces were virtually unengaged by the enemy. In the end of August a duel between the enemy shore battery and a destroyer and the enemy air ships battery.

Since the enemy is apparently forcing civilian labor to the sea, problems of identification have become difficult. At sea the enemy is using every available craft, but United Nations forces in close coordination with the South Korean Navy are making every effort toward proper identification in order to allow continuance of intense fighting. On land, civilians are carrying supplies in pack-trains and supply carts which have and continue to be strafed. The enemy does not permit the use of military equipment in civilian dwellings, resulting in the necessity to fire and destroy such dwellings when such information is given. However, the problem of avoiding the killing of innocent civilians and to the civilian economy is continually present and given by personal attention. The United Nations forces are rapidly endeavoring to restrict destruction to the combined military forces of the invaders.

United Nations has that the Force action bombers struck heavy blows at North Korean industrial targets of military significance and at the North Korean transportation system. The Korean manufacturing complex, the largest in the Far East, and the oil refinery at Pusan, have been extensively damaged by successive attacks. The merchandising parks at Pyongyang, Wonsan, and Seoul have been repeatedly attacked, as have parks of local importance. A general transportation interdiction program continues with destruction of rail and highway bridges along principal lines of communication. The rail and port transportation center at Haila-long was also bombed.

A heavy toll of North Korean troops and material strength is being taken by the Sea Fleet Air Force light bombers and fighters and by Royal Australian Air Force fighters in close ground support action. From bases located in five hundred sorties are now flown daily by United Nations Air Forces committed to action in Korea.

The intensity of night intruder missions by fighters and light bombers has been stepped up with satisfying results.

Against United Nations air activity the enemy still refuses to shed the dominating Air Force aloft in strength greater than one or two planes at a time. The enemy lost a total of fourteen aircraft destroyed with additional numbers damaged, but damaged in losses numbered the forces had effectiveness of the anti-aircraft force.

During the Korean a force of four hundred sixty-four North Korean prisoners were taken by United Nations forces. This brings the total collected to date

A series hundred nineteen. I have extended the proclamation I issued as Commander-in-Chief of all United States Forces to and the West with regard to treatment of prisoners so that it now applies to all Forces of the United Nations Command. I have accepted Mr. Foran's report, International Red Cross, as an accredited delegate to this command under Paragraph 3, Article 18, and Paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Geneva Convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war, 1949 August 1949. Mr. Foran has been provided legislative support in Korea and given full opportunity to carry out the mission. Mr. Foran's reports have clearly been the source for compliance with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention are being carried out. Mr. Foran's reports prove to and would that the discipline and treatment of prisoners of war are essential to the United Nations Command prisoner of war collecting points, and hospitals, and camps. Capture areas are being to become promptly. In addition, I have established a branch Prisoner of War Information Bureau in the United Nations Command of the United Nations Command where all required data in regard to enemy prisoners of war is recorded and copies transmitted through Washington to the International Committee of the Red Cross to become.

United Nations radio broadcasts and air-dropped leaflets are the only major channels of two-way information with open to the Korean people. An additional 1,000,000 leaflets and news sheets, signed a grand total of 27,000,000 have been dropped by aircraft over north Korea and occupied territory, and regular broadsheet sheets totaling two and one-half times sections daily. The highest priority is being given to messages designed to save lives. Civilians are warned daily to move away from military targets that must be bombed. North Korean soldiers are being informed of the humane treatment guaranteed them by prisoners of war, and encouraged to lay down their arms and abandon the cause of aggression. Despite continued tactics of terror and intimidation to prevent reception of these leaflets and radio messages, there is increasing evidence of their effectiveness among them and the commission have on seriously damaged human to the front.

Summary:

Army: United Nations Army Forces are well equipped and have been required to become more straightforward. The United Nations have been the same correspondingly increased. The field conditions of and ground forces have been consistently maintained. The United Nations treatment of prisoners of war has been the Geneva Convention.

Naval: United Nations Naval human sections their important sections with the human effectiveness. In both Naval and Air operations various measures are being to insure as attacks against innocent civilians on human destruction of the civilian economy of either Republic of Korea or North Korea.

Air: United Nations air power is growing in strength and effectiveness particularly in the capabilities of the human. Coordination between ground and air will be improving the effectiveness of and Air Forces in close support of the ground units.

In Conclusion:

I am glad to report that during this period the cohesion displayed by the United Nations Forces of this command has proven the validity of the United Nations concept for peace.

My greatest concern is for a prompt build-up of the one unbalanced ground Force of this command.

September 9, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL: The following address of the President, to be delivered by radio from his office in the White House at 10:30 p.m., E.S.T., 18 FOR WILSON at 9:30 p.m., E.S.T., tonight, Saturday, September 9, 1950.

CHARLES C. Holt
Secretary to the President

Last week, I talked with you about Korea, and about our efforts to maintain peace and freedom in the world.

Tonight, I want to talk with you about what we must do now at home to support our fighting men and to build up the strength which the free world needs to deter communist aggression.

The leaders of communist imperialism have great military forces at their command. They have shown that they are willing to use these forces in open aggression, in spite of the united opposition of all the free nations. Under these circumstances, the free nations have no alternative but to build up the military strength needed to support the rule of law in the world. Only in this way can we convince the communist leaders that aggression will not pay.

To do our part in building up our military strength and the military strength of the free nations throughout the world, the United States must more than double its defense efforts. We have been spending about fifteen billion dollars a year for defense. We are stepping up this rate rapidly. By next June, under our present plans, we expect to be spending at that rate of at least thirty billion dollars a year. In the year after that, we shall probably have to spend much more than thirty billion dollars. And we must be prepared to maintain a very strong defense program for many years to come.

This defense program cannot be achieved on the scale of business as usual. All of us -- whether we are farmers, or wage earners, or businessmen -- must give up some of the things we could ordinarily expect to have for ourselves and our families.

The danger the free world faces is so great that we cannot be satisfied with less than an all-out effort by everyone. We have not given up our goal of a better life for every citizen in this great country of ours. But, for the time being, we have to make absolutely sure that our economy turns out the guns and planes and tanks and other supplies which are needed to protect the world from the threat of communist domination.

To do this job, we must meet and solve three hard, tough problems.

First, we must produce and materials and equipment needed for defense.

Second, we must raise the money to pay the cost of our increased defense efforts.

Third, we must prevent inflation.

Solving these three problems is our challenge we face on the home front. And we must solve them if we are to preserve our freedom and the peace of the world.

First is the problem of producing and materials and equipment we need for defense. We can do that. But it will impose great new demands upon our productive power of our economy.

To meet these demands, we must do everything we can to expand our total production. This will require harder work and longer hours for everybody. It will mean additional jobs for women and older people.

It means that businessmen should expand productive facilities, develop new techniques, and increase efficiency in every way possible. It means enlarging our capacity to produce basic materials such as steel, aluminum, and copper.

America's productive ability is the greatest in the history of the world, and it can be expanded a great deal more to meet the conditions with which we are faced. With our economy now producing at an annual rate approaching 275 billion dollars, the goal I set last year of a 300 billion dollar economy by 1954 will undoubtedly be far surpassed. With this kind of dynamic growth, we can arm ourselves and help arm the free world. We can improve our industrial plant and maintain the civilian efficiency and morale which constitute our defensive strength.

But we cannot get all the military supplies we need now from expanded production alone. This expansion cannot take place fast enough. Therefore, to the extent necessary, weapons and plants will have to stop making some civilian goods and begin turning out military equipment.

This job of building new plants and facilities and changing over to defense production is a challenge to our free economy.

Management and labor our and will do most of this defense production job on their own initiative. But there are certain steps which the Government must take to see that the job is done promptly and well.

Yesterday, I signed a new law, the Defense Production Act of 1950. This law will enable the Government to provide special financial help to businesses where that is necessary to enlarge the production of our mines and factories for defense purposes.

This law also will enable the Government to make sure that defense orders have top priority, and that manufacturers get the steel, aluminum, copper, and other materials they need to fill such orders. This law gives the Government the power to prevent the hoarding of raw materials essential to defense. It also enables the Government to cut down the production of non-essential civilian goods that use up critical materials.

I have today issued an Executive Order authorizing the appropriate agencies of the Government to administer these new defense production powers. The administration of these and other powers granted by the new law will be coordinated by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Mr. W. Stuart Symington.

I have directed and agencies to exercise these productive powers vigorously and promptly, making use of every resource of American business, large and small. These powers will be administered with our permanent purpose in mind: to produce the defense equipment we need as rapidly as possible.

Our second problem is to pay for our increased defenses. There is only one sensible way to do this. It is the plain, simple, direct way. We should pay for them as we go, out of taxes.

There are very good reasons for this.

In the midst of what we finance our defense effort out of taxes now, we will avoid an enormous increase in the national debt. During World War II, we borrowed the money and did not tax ourselves enough. We must not run our present defense effort on that kind of financial basis.

Furthermore, if we tax ourselves enough to pay for defense, we will help to take down prices. Inflation would hurt us more in the long run than higher taxes now. Inflation would benefit and hurt, and hurt and easy. Taxation -- just and equitable taxation -- is the way to distribute the cost of defense fairly.

This means heavier taxes for everybody. It will mean a hard fight against those capitalist people who will try, by every possible means, to make astronomical profits out of the emergency and escape their fair share of the load.

But we can and will win that fight.

No one should be permitted to profiteer at the expense of others because of our defense needs. Nobody should get rich out of this emergency.

Congress is now considering my request to increase corporation and individual income taxes by about five billion dollars a year. This is only our first installment. I believe the Congress should enact further tax legislation as soon as possible. Among other things, this should include a just and fair income profits tax, which will remove some profits made since the start of our communist aggression in Korea.

I hope that every one of you will get behind this plan of "pay as we go" for our defense program. I hope you will give your full support to your representatives in Congress in enacting legislation to pay for this defense effort out of current income.

Our major problem is to carry out the defense program without letting inflation weaken and endanger our free economy.

Everybody must understand just why we have this problem and why it is so important to solve it.

The defense program means that more men and women will be at work, at good pay. At the same time, the supply of civilian goods will not keep pace with and growth in civilian incomes. In short, people will have more money to spend, and there will be relatively fewer things for them to buy. This inevitably means higher prices, unless we do something about it. Higher prices would lead to higher wages which in turn would lead to still higher prices. Then we would be started on the deadly spiral of inflation.

Everybody would lose if we let inflation go unchecked.

Wages would be hurt. The extra dollars in Saturday's pay check would be taken away by the higher prices for Monday's groceries.

The wives and children of our fighting men would be hurt even more. They would suffer far more than our workers, because many of them are dependent on fixed family allowances.

Everybody living on a pension, on retirement benefits, or a fixed income of any kind would be hurt in one way or another.

Millions of individuals would be caught between spiraling prices and lagging incomes.

The Government -- and that means all of us -- also would be hurt because the cost of our defense program would skyrocket.

We must not let these things happen.

The new Defense Production Act prevents the Government with certain powers to stabilize prices and wages. But the fight against inflation is not just the Government's fight. It cannot be won just by passing Government regulations.

It is your fight, the fight of all of us, and it can be won only if all of us fight it together.

I want to talk with you, first of all, about what we need to be loyal, intelligent, not responsible citizens, quite apart from any Government regulations.

For the consumer, the guiding principle must be: Buy only what you really need and cannot do without.

Every American housewife has a most important responsibility. She must not buy more than she needs. She must get off buying whenever she can. If not every time, there will be enough of the essentials -- the fuel, enough of almost everything -- to go around. If the housewife insists on buying more than she needs, there will not be enough to go around, and prices will go up.

For example, there was a rise of about the not one-half per cent in retail food prices between June 15 and July 15. Most of this rise was not in panic buying and profiteering. We are finding out now that there was no reason for panic. The major supplies of sugar, for instance, show how foolish it was for some people to hoard sugar last June and July. We have plenty of food.

As retail panic buying has subsided, retail food prices have declined more than one and one-half per cent from their high levels of last July.

I am glad to see that people have stopped hoard of the scare buying that started right after the outbreak of commercial aggression in Korea. A lot of credit should go to those people throughout the country who have organized movements against hoarding and panic buying.

To take one example, housewives in Portland, Maine, signed and carried out an anti-hoarding pledge. This was a real public service. It was a patriotic act, and I hope that other groups elsewhere are doing the same kind of thing to hold prices as we can hold.

For businessmen, the guiding principle must be: Do not pile up inventories; hold your prices down.

There is obviously no excuse for price increases where costs have not risen -- and in many industries costs have not risen since the outbreak of fighting in Korea. Where costs have risen, there is no excuse for price increases which go beyond the amount of the rise in cost. Individual price adjustments may have to be made here and there to correct imbalances, but there is no need for general price increases. In fact, many businessmen are enjoying large enough margins of profit so that they do not need to raise their prices even though they have incurred higher costs.

In cases where price increases have already been made without being justified by higher costs, businessmen should reduce those prices immediately. I have been told about companies that have increased the prices of all their products -- all not only across the board -- without corresponding increases in costs. That is just plain profiteering, and should not be tolerated.

If businessmen will conscientiously review their prices, we shall see fewer price increases in the days and weeks to come, and a good many price reductions.

For wage earners, the guiding principle must be: Do not ask for wage increases except what is needed to meet the rise in the cost of living.

Our defense effort needs that there will be an increasing number of jobs. If wage earners so that amongst ask for higher and higher wages, they will be driving prices up, all along the line. For the time being, therefore, wage increases should not be sought beyond what is necessary to pay wages in line with the cost of living. Existing inequities in wage rates, of course, and should be corrected, with due consideration for recognized labor-industry relationships.

There is another guiding principle that applies to all of us — workers, wage earners, farmers, and businessmen. It is this: We should save as much as we can out of current income. Every dollar of saving now will serve several purposes. It will help hold prices down. It will help every family provide for the future, and it will also help provide investment funds needed to expand production.

The principles I have outlined will not be easy to maintain. They will require patriotism and self-restraint. But we are all in this situation together. We must be prepared to accept some reduction in our standards of living. I am sure that we will be willing to make sacrifices now if we think of the much greater sacrifices being made by our men and women and children and husbands who are fighting at the front.

If we adhere faithfully to the principles of self-restraint I have outlined, we may lessen the need for controls. But controls will still be necessary in some cases where voluntary individual action is not enough or where the honest majority must be protected from a few scoundrels. In these cases, the Government will not hesitate to act its power.

Government controls are needed right now to set the volume of easy credit buying. Many of us would like to buy our household appliances, our automobiles, or our houses on easy terms — and pay for them out of future income. But at a time like the present, easy credit buying is a dangerous inflationary threat. It will drive prices up. Furthermore, it will use up materials that we need for defense.

To prevent this, the Government is issuing an order requiring people to make higher down payments than usual, and to pay off the balance faster, when they buy such things as automobiles or refrigerators. The Government is also tightening up on easy credit for houses, especially higher-priced houses, and this, too, will save materials for defense.

As for prices and wages, the Government is not waiting on mandatory ceilings at this time. But we will impose ceilings vigorously and promptly when the situation calls for them.

So that we may be ready to impose price ceilings when they are needed, I have today issued an order under the Defense Production Act requiring businessmen to preserve the records of their prices and costs during the base period of May 15 to June 30, 1950. This means that information will be available to set ceilings at fair levels, and to identify the sellers who have taken advantage of the present emergency.

I have also turned an order establishing an Economic Stabilization Agency, to be headed by a Stabilization Administration. This Administration will guide our voluntary efforts to hold down inflation. It will also be the task to first set where and when price and wage controls are needed.

The Administrator will have under him a Director of Price Stabilization, who will help him determine what should be done to hold prices in line. He will also have under him a Wage Stabilization Board composed of representatives of labor, management, and the public. This Board will help determine wage policies.

The Stabilization Agency will go to work first at present danger spots. The Agency will consult with management and labor and will attempt to work out the necessary safeguards without compulsion. However, if these efforts fail, price ceilings and wage restrictions will have to follow.

The law which Congress has passed will enable us to get ahead with the defense production job. It will be faithfully administered. There are two matters, however, which give us particular concern.

We cannot yet be sure that the new law permits effective use of selective controls. As a result we might have to resort to general controls before they are really necessary. This may prove to be a serious defect in the law which will require correction.

Secondly, we do not have authority for adequate rent control. What we gain in holding down other cost-of-living prices must not be lost by failure to hold down the cost of shelter. The existing rent law is inadequate to meet the present situation and should be improved. Meanwhile, State and local governments should take the necessary steps to keep present rent controls in effect.

We will undoubtedly need further legislation as we go along later. Right now, there is work enough and responsibility enough for all of us.

Our goods are plain.

We must produce the goods that are needed.

We should pay for our defense as we go.

We must hold the cost of living steady, and keep down the cost of defense items.

All these things we can do if we work together, and share the sacrifices that must be made. We set and meet submerge petty differences in the common task of preserving freedom in the world.

The enormous resources and vitality of our free society have been proved. In World War II, we astonished the world and astonished ourselves by our war production. Since then, our rate of growth has exceeded our expectations.

Today, spurred by the world-wide menace of communist imperialism, we set surpasses every previous record. I am certain that the American people, working together, can build the strength needed to establish peace in the world.

Every American must ask himself what he can do to help keep this nation strong and free. We should ask God to give us the faith and the courage we need. We should ask Him for that help which has preserved our nation in the past, and which is our great reliance in the future to come.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ATTACHMENT NO. 1
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

Press Release PRC
September 18, 1950

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 14 TO 31 AUGUST 1950, TRANSMITTED BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council who has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 14 to 31 August, 1950.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 14 TO 31 AUGUST, 1950

I herewith submit report number four of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 14 to 31 August, inclusive. Eighth Army communique (numbers 41 through 43) and Seventh Division (numbers 24 through 30) provide detailed accounts of these operations.

General situation

During this period, the north Korean forces, still operating with limited initiative, concentrated its preparations for renewed offensive activity, despite heavy losses and serious local losses inflicted by United Nations Forces. The enemy gradually re-organized units opposite the extreme flanks and center of the United Nations positions, and through the application of gradually increasing pressure along the entire northern front, has achieved moderate local gains in the face of continuing United Nations resistance. Front lines for the entire period ran generally from Tongyeong on the south coast northwest to the confluence of the Han and the Nakdong Rivers, thence north along the Nakdong River to a point several miles north of Wajima, thence generally eastward through the Inae area to the Kijang area continuing to the east coast north of Pohang-do.

In the east coast sector, the north Korean 12th Division was driven back by elements of the I CGC Corps which regained Pohang and Kijang on 18 August. By 24 August, the enemy 34th Division entered into action and together with the 12th Division renewed the attack, retook Kijang, and pushed United Nations Forces back to a line two miles north of Pohang. However, Kijang changed hands and was again regained by the Republic of Korea Army on 29 August, but was lost to the north Koreans on 30 August.

Concurrently, the principal enemy effort was directed against the Taegu salient during this period, too. By 28 August, the enemy moderate gains along the northern part of the area in the zone of action of the II CGC Corps. The enemy 1st and 13th Divisions forced the United Nations defenses back several thousand yards, taking Inae in their most extensive advance. In reported local attacks, the enemy 8th Division took Wajima on 27 August. The 2nd and 3rd north Korean Divisions near Waegwan were increasingly active, though no major effort is at evidence as yet. The net enemy gains, however, represented only local effort of an indecisive character. Heavy long-ranged artillery continued east of the Nakdong River has shelled Taegu incessantly as a means of constant harassment firing.

Operations in this northern and eastern sector were primarily by Republic of Korea Army units, intermittently supported by United States units. The 4th, 8th, Capital, 2nd and 1st ROK Divisions have been in battle continuously since the war began against an enemy with initial firepower which is vast and fierce. Though operating on extended frontages of up to twenty miles these divisions have maintained their tactical unity and their current recovery and performance is most gratifying.

In a wide band of the river south of Taehung the enemy 10th Division has held a bridgehead in an inactive state since mid-report. This position, estimated at one to two enemy regiments was being effectively contained by United Nations Forces at the close of the period.

Further south, near the confluence of the Nam and Nakdong Rivers, attacked by the United States 1st Division and the Marines annihilated a major penetration of the Nakdong defense line on 12 August. Here the enemy 4th Division was decisively defeated, lost its bridgehead and was thrown eastward across the Nakdong River, suffering very heavy losses in both personnel and equipment.

At the southern end of the front in the Chinhae-Saechon corridor, the north Korean 4th Division, having been severely united in early August, reportedly reentered contact with United Nations Forces, beginning 18 August, along a north-south line about one mile west of Pusan. By 24 August, this division, composed by two regiments, probably of the 7th Division, indicated a series of sharp probing attacks which continued to engage the attention of United Nations defending forces, though they have called the enemy small units on the ground. The Saechon-Saechon line has changed hands several times. Nevertheless, the large volume of fire area troops and volleys movements indicate that the enemy intends to maintain strong resistance in this front, which represents the greatest threat to the United Nations base at Pusan. Prisoners from the north Korean 4th Division report that one of the three organic regiments are composed of troops who previously served in the Chinese Communist Army.

United Nations forces were augmented by the arrival of British Army combat units in Pusan.

Naval Operations

During the period of this report the United Nations Naval Forces have encountered only slight resistance by two enemy. Complete United Nations control of the seas continues, with guaranteed safe arrival in Korea of additional troops and supplies, and safe removal by sea of the sick and wounded. Naval patrol forces have met little interference, and a close patrol of the Korean coast is being maintained.

Further augmentation of Naval forces is continuing. New units arriving during the period of this report have been mostly from the United States Navy. The entire Naval organization is well integrated, functioning smoothly, and coordinated efficiently with United Nations Army and Air Force units.

The United Nations Naval Force, now fortified by many smaller elements which together constitute a well balanced Navy, has attained such a degree of efficiency that it is now capable of handling any type of Naval situation in Korean waters.

Operational efficiency has reached very high standards. Naval Forces not only continue to perform all tasks assigned, but are steadily increasing the range of application.

Radio intercept problems have been solved.

Naval aircraft operating from ships and land bases are performing the battle tasks of reconnaissance, spotting for artillery and naval bombardment, strafing and dive bombing of both tactical and strategic targets. Naval bombardment of military targets, harassing fire, and destruction of coastal land communications is carried on continuously by surface craft. Marine amphibious landings and water lift of troops have been conducted. Raiders have been launched for special tasks. Islands in strategic locations have been seized. Carrier aircraft have simultaneously given direct support to ground elements while striking strategic targets in north Korea. United States Marines have participated with traditional valor and great effectiveness in important land operations in the southwestern sector.

As long as the enemy commits innocent civilians to serve his purpose in front line areas, the problem of avoiding casualties to our combatants is unendingly difficult. Our Naval bombardment forces, from surface and air, are exercising every precaution to avoid harming the civil population and are employing every possible means to identify and destroy military targets only.

Air Operations

Enemy air strength continued to diminish until even the end of the period when a few minor single plane raids were staged. However, twin-engine bombers have been sighted recently on enemy airfields in both north and south Korea, leading to the belief that his air force has been strengthened by aircraft from outside bases which are prepared to stage forward at an opportune time.

The combined air forces of the United Nations daily are producing a superior effort in support of ground forces. From the early strikes on 29 June of the United States Far East air forces jet aircraft, in support of ground forces of the Republic of Korea, the complete integration of the air and ground efforts has been outstanding. The air units of Australia, of the Republic of Korea, of the United States Navy and Marines and of the British Navy have joined the United States air force in the effective tactical support of all ground forces. Answering the call of United States Army, Marine or Republic of Korea ground forces for air support may be aircraft from any of the United Nations Forces in the area Korea.

Control parties located with front line troops and observers in aircraft continued, over the battle area and over front lines, to direct air strikes in a matter of minutes from any targets they reveal themselves.

The enemy shows exposure by day, revealing his supplies and reserves in towns, in vehicles, and along public buildings. He crosses his tanks and trucks through walls of simple peasant shelters that he might avoid daylight detection.

Enemy movement and attack by night are being countered by ever expanding operations of night intruder aircraft. These planes, equipped with special devices, have successfully harassed him by night, causing considerable reduction in his operations.

The enemy crossed across the Yalu River from Tientsin on 16 August was subjected to the heaviest tactical assault yet mounted when medium bomber aircraft delivered over 400 tons of bombs on the aggressor forces. Fighter-bomber aircraft roving the sector following this strike found few targets remaining in the disaster area.

Evidence continues to be gathered showing the depletion of stocks of munitions and supplies in the battle area.

The program of interdiction of the transportation system supporting north Korean forces has reduced seriously the enemy's capacity to sustain and has hampered his movement of reinforcements. Southern bridges have been destroyed, the utility of the enemy's marshalling yards has been drastically reduced, many of his railroad repair and maintenance facilities have been eliminated. The effectiveness of the interdiction program is clearly indicated by the quantities of rolling stock idle in yards and on sidings. The enemy employs every expedient to substitute for the destroyed bridges. His transportation is subjected to attrition by all feasible means.

Pin point destruction of industrial and other military objectives in north Korea continues. Evaluation of photographs of these objectives after attack shows remarkable accuracy has been obtained in striking the selected targets which in every instance have been of military significance. Targets have been great chemical complexes, iron works, electric power plants, tank assembly plants, desalination plants, and other similar installations which reduce north Korean war potential. All continue subject to attack until United Nations Forces attain their goals.

United Nations air forces have dealt severe blows to sea industries and transportation in Pyongyang, to Hamhung and Wonsan, to Tumen, Kengchi, Chongjin, Chongjin and Juchon. The north Korean population has been scared by radio and by leaflets to vacate their areas that contain military targets. They have been urged "to leave these cities and go to the country or to the mountains". They have been informed that "military installations will be destroyed by United Nations planes", but that, "the United Nations Air Forces will do everything possible to protect innocent civilians from the sea forces on Korea by the Communists". United Nations aircraft have been ordered to continue operations to military targets.

The accusation that United Nations aircraft have attacked the civilian populace has no basis of factuality.

Current Summary for North Korean Forces

Considering that the present aggression of the north Korean forces is largely Communist led, planned and inspired, it is appropriate to review existing evidence of material and technical assistance rendered to north Korea, specifically, evidence of equipment which the Soviet Union has provided and is now providing to the north Korean forces, as well as evidence of trained military personnel which the Chinese communist forces have furnished.

The USSR-dominating of the northern portion of Korea began when Soviet occupation authorities arbitrarily interpreted the Yalta protocol as a permanent delineation between two military zones. Immediately following the surrender of Japanese forces to Korea, in September 1945, the Soviets began to organize a North Korean military force under the guise of a national police force or constabulary. This force, now known as North Korean People's Army, has from its inception been trained, supervised and logistically supported by the Soviet Union.

The supply of munitions and equipment to north Korea prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces in December 1948 is openly acknowledged by the Soviets. However, they claim that all material now being utilized by north Korean forces was provided prior to their withdrawal, and that there had been no resupply from Soviet sources since that time.

Despite this Soviet claim, however, above the surface of the war, a wide variety of definitely identified Soviet equipment captured from the north Korean in battle bears the manufacturing date of 1946 or 1950. Obviously, dated material could not have been provided prior to December 1948, thereby further confirming the many reports received by this Headquarters of Soviet delivery of munitions

to north Korea forced during 1947 and 1950. Physical proof of such deliveries was included in specific items fully reported, including photographs, as well as the physical items, forwarded to appropriate United States Army divisions, being forwarded definitely identified items were a T-42m PWSM-41 one-machine gun; an aircraft radio receiver type BR-41-1; 2 types of hand grenades; and ammunition of varying types and calibers. In addition to these items, some forty-one other pieces of equipment, including small arms, mounted machine, artillery, and missiles have been captured from the north Koreans, and are definitely established to be of Soviet manufacture.

It may be possible that north Korea is manufacturing some material, particularly small arms. However, her industry in and capacity of producing heavy equipment seem to be small, and artillery.

To date, there has been no confirmation of direct or overt Chinese Communist participation in the Korean conflict. However, they have furnished substantial if not decisive military assistance to north Korea by releasing a vast pool of combat-experienced Korean of Korean ethnic origin, which provided the basis for expansion of the north Korean army. This fact, originally established by espionage information supplied from the Manchuria-Korea area during the past four years, is now fully confirmed by numerous prisoners-of-war interrogations across the network of hostilities in Korea. A substantial percentage of all prisoners-of-war so far interrogated have received training in Manchuria or have performed active service with the Chinese Communist Army; at least half of the personnel and particularly those officers and non-commissioned officers in the north Korean 7th, 11th, and 12th Divisions and the 24th Independent Unit have participated in training or combat action with the Chinese Communist Army. The Chinese Communist Army returned many of these Korean troops to north Korea during the past year.

Approximately 120,000 Korean troops have participated in training and combat action with the Chinese Communist forces in one of three categories: (a) the Korean Volunteer Army, which was formed from Koreans in Communist-held China and Manchuria during 1947-48; (b) USSR-trained Koreans, who were transferred from north Korea and were integrated into the Korean Volunteer Army or Chinese Communist Army to gain combat experience; and (c) USSR-trained Koreans, who participated in training at Chibarov, Manchuria, or attended the officers' warlike school at Loughatung, Manchuria. During the early part of 1947, the Korean Volunteer Army was integrated into the Chinese Communist Army, and Korean troops were gradually intermingled throughout the Chinese Communist Army in Manchuria. A great number of these Koreans have subsequently fought with the Chinese Communist Army on far more as Indochina Peninsula in the Vietnam Island operations. After the Communist conquest of Manchuria during the fall of 1948, Korean troops began filtering back into north Korea. An acceleration of this movement became apparent during the early part of 1950, and by the middle of February 1950, Korean troops of the Chinese Communist 6th Field Army had departed from north China for north Korea. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, a probable aggregate of 40,000 to 50,000 Koreans trained by the Chinese Communists had been released and integrated into the north Korean army to expand the initial divisions and a substantial brigade to a current battle order of thirteen to fifteen divisions, almost including corps troops, line of communication troops and service elements.

Shooting

Treatment of United Nations prisoners made by enemy forces has on occasion been characterized by extreme brutality. Positive evidence of murdering of prisoners with machine guns has led to the making a warning to the Commander-in-Chief of the North Korean forces on this subject.

The first instance of this character was discovered in July 1950 when United Nations troops struck last ground and discovered dead American soldiers with their hands tied behind their backs, obviously killed while captives, and all had been shot through the head. Official photographs of four of these murdered American contribute visual proof.

A second was the murder of thirty-six American prisoners on the afternoon of 17 August 1950. Forty-one American soldiers, serving the United Nations cause, had been captured by an overwatching Communist Force on the morning of 15 August. Immediately after their capture, each prisoner was stripped of all means of identification and each man's hands tied behind his back with telephone wire or shoe laces taken from his boots. The men were held prisoners for thirty-six hours without food. At the end of this time, the group of Americans were told to stand as overcharges they were sprayed by fire from individual weapons of approximately fifteen to seventeen men's Korean. After the men had fallen to the ground, they were fired upon once again to insure that all were dead. After the north Korean soldiers had left the scene, five soldiers still alive were able to walk to a nearby back to American lines. All soldiers in this massacre were members of the 1st Cavalry Division, United States Army.

Ill-treatment of PWs

In sharp contrast to the foregoing, Mr. Frederick Ward, International Red Cross Representative accredited to the United Nations Forces in Korea reports that according to Korean standards, handling of Korean treatment of prisoners of war was "perfect" and that he has never previously made a case when prisoners of war guards from their own personal supply and received algorithms and food to prisoners.

Over 1,000 prisoners of war were taken by United Nations Forces during the period. This is many times the number that have been taken in previous wars. Many descriptions, though limited in detail, are interesting, especially as a direct result of United Nations guardship of human treatment. Surprisingly enough, some officer defections are highly Communist-loyal, and have served in their units as political-cultural "bureau" officers, suggesting that propaganda officers themselves are not susceptible to an effective presentation of accurate information.

Psychological Warfare Operations

Daily United Nations radio broadcasts and over 17,000,000 air-dropped leaflets are providing the last message to the Korean people for glorification of the truth. Communist falsification of military claims is being scientifically exposed by United Nations broadcasts and news sheets. Some million leaflets guaranteeing human treatment of prisoners of war have been dropped over enemy lines. North Korean soldiers, who have been repeatedly told by their masters that capture or surrender will allow their lives in grave jeopardy, are becoming increasingly cognizant of the duplicity of their leaders. An official message from the United Nations Command, transmitted by leaflets in Korea and in English, has urged north Korean military officers to Pyongyang and to field division headquarters, that United Nations prisoners must be accorded the human treatment guaranteed by the rules and provisions of war.

Rescuees in Korea

There exists a very high state of morale both among the civilian population in general and in the government offices of the Republic of Korea. Although the area under control of the United Nations Forces at the present time has a poor number of refugees, these refugees are being assisted in every way possible to provide them shelter and other necessities of life.

A great amount of this assistance is coming from voluntary aid from such organizations as have been established since 25 June; for example, The Emergency Central Committee of the Korean Red Cross organized by Dr. Mo-Yun Kim, an eminent doctor in Korea. This organization comprises voluntary workers who assist in the relocation of refugees and distribution of food and certain relief supplies. In addition to providing shelter and assistance to refugees, this body provides assistance to military necessities of the Republic of Korea Army by volunteer nursing aid, by procuring and selling bandages and surgical dressings, and in some cases, assisting in the medical treatment of the casualties.

Another evidence of high morale is the formation of a Patriotic League to give all-out assistance to our United Nations effort in Korea. This is again an organization of volunteer workers who assist in gathering needed labor, and procuring equipment as their own supplies for use by United Nations Forces.

Government offices are operating on a twenty-four hour basis, even at Cabinet and Ministerial levels to cope with every situation of any other day of the year.

Other signs of high morale of the people of Korea are evidenced by the numerous "welcome" signs in all of the armed communities and the spontaneous contribution of refreshments to United Nations troops. In fact, in all walks of life and in all fields of endeavor Korea exhibits only the highest morale and the indomitable will to win.

Civilian Relief

In surveying the relief needs in Korea, it has been determined that the Republic of Korea was able during the withdrawal to salvage sufficient food supplies to provide subsistence for individuals in the area under control of United Nations Forces during the period of this report. However, it is estimated that these stocks will be inadequate to provide even a minimum subsistence after the middle of September. Arrangements therefore have been made as an emergency measure to supply the Republic of Korea with 15,000 metric tons of rice and 3,000 metric tons of barley in September, and 20,000 metric tons of rice and 10,000 metric tons of barley in the Korea of October.

The Republic of Korea has adequate rice stocks on hand and in shipment for operation of the cloth producing facilities in the area under protection of United Nations Forces until end of December. The quantity of cloth produced during this period, however, would represent only a three month normal supply.

The Army Command in Korea has submitted an estimate of requirements for medical supplies and supplies, insecticides, chemicals for water purification, weapons, vaccines and anti-toxins. To alleviate possible suffering resulting from procurement time lag, approximately twenty-five percent of these requirements have been procured locally as an emergency measure. The remainder of the requirements has been forwarded through established channels to appropriate procurement coordinators.

At the present time, relief supplies are being delivered to Korea by military means and are being distributed in Korea by the Republic of Korea, Office of Supply. Through the Department of the Army, United Nations personnel of certain technical qualifications have been appointed who will operate under military auspices to assist the Republic of Korea in distribution and official certification of relief supplies, and provide adequate liaison and coordination between the Republic of Korea and United Nations military forces in relief action.

Subsistence supplies are becoming a problem of increasing concern which will require the whole-hearted assistance of all members of the United Nations. With the advent of autumn change, assistance will be required in providing adequate clothing and blankets for the civilian population of Korea. Recently needed medical supplies are a cause of grave concern and I trust will be given immediate attention. Estimated requirements of food, clothing and medical and relief supplies are being continuously computed and forwarded to the Joint Army, Navy, State Coordinating Group as for procurement in accordance with established procedure. There is little doubt that our members of the United Nations will contribute as generously to the relief of the destitute people of Korea as they have to the military effort.

In conclusion

1. United Nations strength to accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea is growing slowly but steadily.
2. British Army units have arrived in Korea.
3. The United Nations air force and naval air attacks on purely military targets are bringing important results on the invader's ability and will to fight. The charges of indiscriminate bombing in Korea are groundless.
4. The United Nations fighting forces are conducting their operations with valor, efficiency and a determination to win. The magnificent coordination of all services not only within forces of one nation but also between forces of different nations is a tribute to those forces and the nations they represent.
5. Positive proof has been obtained that during 1949 and 1950 the Soviets have supplied the north Korean forces with munitions and the Chinese Communists have supplied trained manpower.
6. The north Koreans have in some instances conducted extremely barbarous killings of captured Americans.
7. Both the Republic of Korea government and people are valiantly and courageously supporting the cause to the extent of their capabilities.
8. Requirements for civilian relief assistance and supplies have as far as set by emergency measures not prevent action by member nations is needed to provide food, warmth and medical supplies during the coming winter.
9. The funds to be provided by member nations are urgently needed in Korea.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



ORIGINAL

2/1834
3 October 1950

ORIGINAL: CHINESE

NOTE DATED 3 OCTOBER 1950 FROM THE DELEGATION REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TRANSMITTING THE FIFTH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1950)

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the "Fifth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the Period 1 to 14 September 1950".

/SIGNED: CHINESE
2/1834

October 3, 1950

WEEKLY REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 1 TO 14 SEPTEMBER 1950

I herewith submit report number five of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 to 14 September, inclusive. Eighth Army component numbers 66 through 69 and Korean volunteer numbers 353 through 437 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Ground Operations

On 1 September the North Korean high command, employing thirteen infantry divisions, two new tank regiments, and elements of a previously identified command division, launched their strongest offensive to date against the United Nations position in Korea. This comprehensive attack, which constituted one of the enemy's major efforts to date, initially struck hard at the United Nations positions south of Taehang and, within two days, had extended over the entire United Nations perimeter.

His initial effort, in the south, was unsuccessful. At the southern end of the front the enemy 6th and 7th Divisions had been driven back 3,000 yards to their original positions by 3 September, through determined counterattacks of the U.N. 8th Divisions supported by other United Nations forces. Thereafter, despite constant attacks, North Korean forces made no advances in this sector.

Further north, in the Heklong River area between Kyongju and the Son River, the 10th, 2nd, 4th and 5th enemy Divisions plus armored elements began a general offensive eastward over the Heklong which secured initial advances of 6,000 to 8,000 yards against bitter resistance by the United Nations forces. By 5 September, however, the enemy had lost the initiative, and was forced to give ground under heavy United Nations forces' pressure. By the end of the period, the enemy retained only a two to three mile strip east of the Heklong River.

The enemy 3rd and 13th Divisions achieved gains of similar magnitude (6,000-8,000 yards) along the Taegu salient, from 4 to 11 September, in some of the heaviest fighting of the war. By that date, United Nations forces had absorbed the drive on Taegu, and began to register slow progress against strong enemy resistance. In the Sinsung sector, the Republic of Korea 8th Division had gained about 3,000 yards by 4 September. During the series of heavy, but indecisive engagements which followed, United Nations forces blocked further enemy advances.

The British 27th Infantry Brigade joined the United Nations forces in the defense of the Heklong River line on 7 September. This unit has assumed its proportionate share of the United Nations operations in that sector and is engaged in defensive operations and systematic police action to eliminate small enemy parties in the rear areas.

/In the Nelson-Angus

In the Hae-san-Kang sector near the eastern flank of the United Nations perimeter, the North Korean 13th and 12th Divisions posed a most serious threat temporarily. Initiating heavy attacks near Hae-san on 3 September, enemy forces penetrated to within four miles of Kyoungju by 5 September, though the threat in Kyoungju was checked by United Nations counterattacks the next day. On 8 September, the enemy occupied the important town of Yangcheon, but was driven out almost immediately by prompt aggressive action of Republic of Korea Army units. At his furthest advance the enemy had settled in upon almost two miles deep and 11.5 miles wide in this sector, seriously threatening United Nations communications. However, beginning on 11 September, Republic of Korea and United States Army units conducted vigorous counterattacks and advanced up to six miles on the west flank of the pocket, relieved pressure on Yangcheon and Kyoungju, and threatened the North Korean forces in town with encirclement.

On the east coast the North Korean 5th Divisions, after yielding some ground to United Nations attacks, resumed the offensive on 4 September. This offensive coordinated with the North Korean 12th and 13th Divisions' penetration on the west of Pohang, long necessitated a withdrawal of the Republic of Korea Army units holding Pohang, sang. Following their withdrawal three some Republic of Korea Army units counterattacked and established a firm line two miles south of Pohang-sang.

During the period, the most significant gains were made initially along the north and west flanks where enemy forces drove in within seven miles of Taegu, penetrated the lateral road net between Taegu and Kyoungju, and United Pohang sang. By 12 September, however, the momentum of the attacks was largely spent and the enemy was forced to fall back in the face of counterattacking United Nations forces. This abortive effort had cost the enemy an estimated 10,000 casualties without any significant losses in the United Nations forces either in territory or in combat effectiveness. At the end of the period, the United Nations perimeter ran northwest from Taekai on the south coast, to the confluence of the Nam and Nakdong Rivers, thence north, parallel with, and two miles east of the Nakdong River in Kyoungsang, thence along the river for fifteen miles, thence, northwest through Sin-dong in a broad arc extending eastward below Hae-san and Angang to the east coast at a point two miles south of Pohang-sang.

Naval Operations

United Nations naval forces during the period of this report continued to demonstrate their versatility of application by sustaining with maximum effectiveness all operational tasks mentioned. During the enemy's major attack across the Nakdong River, commencing early in the period, naval aircraft were almost actively engaged in an all-out effort in close support of the ground troops for several days until the attack was effectively reduced. Thereafter, naval aircraft resumed their missions against North Korean targets in addition. A concentrated effort was made especially against transportation facilities, arsenals, military warehouses and supply camps, and troop concentrations wherever located.

Naval surface forces continued coastal bombardment missions on an increasing scale until continuous day and night firing on the east coast military targets between Hae-san,

/At end

It was along the Korean coast a very large number of enemy small craft have been destroyed, including small transports and freighters, trawlers, junks and barges carrying North Korean military personnel and supplies. Difficulty of identification of water-borne craft engaged in military operations continues to be a problem. In some cases the enemy has forced native fishing operations to his use, and it is reported above all that it was interfering with United Nations ships conducting investigations. Nevertheless, every effort is being made to reduce destruction of small craft to those conducting military operations.

Heavy opposition to United Nations naval forces was insufficient to hamper United Nations naval operations.

AIR OPERATIONS

Hostile aircraft have been observed on several occasions during the current period but have exerted no influence on the course of operations. It is a certainty that no difficulties will be experienced with the North Korean Air Force unless it procures planes from sources outside North Korea. Any future significant air action by North Korea will be a measure of the assistance given to her in open contravention of the actions and intent of the United Nations. Anti-aircraft artillery fire is increasing somewhat both in volume and in accuracy.

A review of the accomplishments of the United Nations air effort from 25 June through 15 September reveals that, while sustaining losses of approximately 100 aircraft, over 25,000 combat missions have been flown. The greater part of these have been in direct support United Nations ground forces. More than 10,000 non-combat missions have been flown in support of the United Nations effort. The bulk tonnage delivered to strategic and tactical military targets by the United States Far East Air Force medium bombers exceeds 17,000 tons.

The previous report of the United Nations Command emphasized the commitment made to the civilian communities that military targets would be attacked by air and the warning to civilians to vacate the immediate zone of such targets. There has been and there remains the capability of the United Nations air forces to completely devastate the urban areas of North Korea, but with assistance core destruction of the civilian population has been avoided and only targets of military significance have been attacked.

Among the targets are the following: Pyongyang arsenal, the largest in North Korea, producing over half the arms and ammunition (exclusive of that from outside sources) supplied to the enemy, is about seventy per cent destroyed. The ports and naval bases of Chongjin and Wonsan have received attacks in force. The largest integrated chemical complex in the Far East, contributing explosives, aluminum and magnesium has been reduced by eighty per cent. Specific targets in this complex have been the hydrogen sulfide fertilizer plant, the hydrogen chemical plant and the hydrogen explosive plant. The oil refinery at Wonsan is about ninety-five per cent destroyed. Iron works at Chongjin and steel plants at Songjin and Kyangju have been attacked with percentage destruction varying from thirty to ninety per cent.

/Operations

Operations of the Chinsungyo stadium, largest stadium in North Korea of any size, level, and time, have been steadily curtailed. In addition, at Chinsungyo, an aircraft plant and one of the few North Korean magazine printers have sustained fifty to eighty per cent destruction. Other stadium targets have been and are being attacked.

Along the highway and railroad route some 250 bridges have been rendered unusable by the dropping of at least one span of each. Important overhauling yards and railroad repair facilities in North Korea are from twenty-five to eighty per cent destroyed.

Total daily sorties have at one time during this period exceeded 700. The smooth coordination of the total United Nations air effort with the over-all ground effort continued exemplary.

Prisoners of War

Since my last report many additional North Korean prisoners were captured by United Nations forces. This brings the total number of prisoners in United Nations custody to over 4,000.

United Nations personnel do check on prisoners of war camps anxious to observe particularly all the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Prisoners of war are provided with the standard Republic of Korea Army ration and with a protection between lines. At each camp there is a permanently assigned staff of United States and Republic of Korea medical officers, nurses, and medical attendants. More serious cases are treated in hospitals on the area basis by wounded United Nations troops. The geographic coordinates of United Nations prisoner of war camps have been furnished to the United States Government for transmission to the International Committee of the Red Cross in accordance with Article 23, 1949, Geneva Convention.

Allegations

It became necessary to report again continued charges made as the part of North Koreans. These were recently reported atrocious killing the pattern of other North Korean killings. A strong armed guerrilla force attacked and over-powered a group of seven Americans who were repairing a signal relay station, tied their hands together and shot the United Nations soldiers in the back. All were left for dead. However, although seriously wounded, two of the victims survived.

Civilian Relief

As a continuation of the survey of relief needs in Korea mentioned in my previous report, an estimate of civilian aid requirements for Korea for fiscal year 1951 has been completed. This report was prepared by the Economic Cooperation Administration in conjunction with the Government of the Republic of Korea and representatives of the United Nations and other interested civilian agencies. These estimates estimate want, measure over-all civilian relief

/requirements

requirements for Korea based on the best information available at this time. Further surveys will continue to be made and necessary additional requirements will be forwarded to the Joint Army, Economic Cooperation Administration, State Department Coordinating Committee for government in accordance with established procedures.

Relief supplies continue to be delivered to Korea by military transportation for distribution through the Office of Supply of the Republic of Korea. As previously reported, arrangements were made as an emergency measure to supply the Republic of Korea with 15,000 metric tons of rice and 2,000 metric tons of barley in September and 30,000 metric tons of rice and 10,000 metric tons of barley in October. Based on subsequent surveys, the amounts of barley have been increased to 15,000 metric tons in September and 30,000 tons in October.

In accordance with my request, United Nations personnel have been recruited to assist the Government of the Republic of Korea in the distribution and efficient utilization of relief supplies and to provide adequate liaison and coordination between the Republic of Korea and the military forces in relief matters. To coordinate efficiently the problems of health and welfare in Korea, a Public Health and Welfare Section has been established as a Special Staff Section of the United Nations Command. This section is presently staffed by available United States personnel who will be relieved progressively upon arrival of United Nations personnel recruited for these activities.

Psychological Warfare

United Nations radio broadcasts to the Korean people have been increased to a total of ten and three quarters hours daily, consisting almost entirely of factual news reports with brief interpretative commentary. More than 40,000,000 leaflets have been dropped by aircraft or fired from artillery howitzers. 12,000,000 of these were directed at enemy front line troops, informing them of the United Nations Command guarantee of good treatment for prisoners of war, and providing them with safe contact means for men in surrendering. The mounting military strength of the United Nations forces has enhanced the confidence which enemy soldiers place in these messages, and increasingly they are taking advantage of the safe contact plan to lay down their arms voluntarily.

In Conclusion

1. United Nations forces in the Pusan-Taegu base area last week ground including the Pusan-Kang port. The fighting determination and combat efficiency of the United Nations forces in this area have steadily improved, but more forces are required.

2. There were further atrocities committed by North Koreans against United Nations captives.

3. The effort of personnel and supplies for civilian relief are appreciated. Future events may increase the requirements. Prevention of widespread suffering amongst Korea's war-torn population will be an important United Nations task.

EYES ONLY

General MacArthur met me at Manila airport on our arrival at 9.46 A.M., August 5, 1950. He drove me to the guest house at the Embassy. As the window between the driver and his side, and ourselves, was closed, our conversation was general.

He described the satisfactory initial development in Japan since my last visit. He works of the great quality of the Japanese: his desire to work, the satisfaction of the Japanese in work, his respect for the dignity of work. He compared it unfavorably to the desire in the United States for more luxury and less work.

We considered Communist infiltration into Japanese life was in no sense a threat as Communist ideas did not appeal to the Japanese, out, were importantly, it had the Russian label. The Japanese both feared and hated the Russians.

The reaction among the Japanese to our motion is Korean one of relief, as they interpreted it to mean that we would vigorously defend them against Russian invasion. They were not disturbed by our temporary difficulties, since they understood the military difficulties caused by the surprise attack. Their pride had been crossed by "his" confidence in them, shown by the withdrawal of most of the American troops. He would withdraw them all without any danger of disaster in Japan.

I was struck by the change in Tokyo: The reconstruction that had taken place from one almost ghost city to one of activity; the active spirit of the people on the streets; the great improvement in the way they looked and were clothed. Most of the houses were of course of the most temporary type of construction, but although shanties from our standpoint, perhaps adequate by Japanese standards.

He arranged for me and the officers with me to attend the morning briefing at 10.30 at Headquarters, and that I should call on him at his office at 11.30.

I had a 2 1/2 hour talk with MacArthur in the morning; lunch with him and Mrs. MacArthur for the entire party, and then a further two-hour talk from 5.30 to 7.30 in the afternoon.

On Tuesday morning, after my return from Karu, we had a further four-hour talk before my departure.

The first 2 1/2 hours included a military discussion at which General Ridgway and Horsted participated. General Almond also was present.

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I will not attempt to divide the conversations chronologically, but largely by subjects.

Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as he saw it.

I explained to him that the President had asked us to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, "absolutely none". The President's statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from communist domination, and would be recorded in history. The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly.

MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow build-up. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the United States; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that this one of the cannons, or grave difficulties, if not disaster, were ahead.

(His military appraisal is dealt with in a separate memorandum, including the statement to the Joint Chiefs prepared by Ridgway, and signed by him, Horatad and myself.)

He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly, or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.

He described the difference between the attitude towards death of Westerners and Orientals. We have to die; only face danger out of a sense of duty and through moral issues; whereas with Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly, "folding their arms as a dove

- 3 -

folding his wings, relaxing, and dying". With that, MacArthur folded his arms, and sighed. (This was part of the dramatic speech he made to the three of us on Tuesday morning.)

MacArthur could not see why we could not quickly recruit experienced combat non-commissioned officers, so badly needed, among the many that had served in the last war. He thought we could get the fast ships and airplanes to transport the needed troops rapidly. To think that we might fail in this, he said, "makes me feel sick in my stomach". (Both of these things he said on Tuesday morning).

MacArthur wants maximum UN ground forces possible, as many as 50,000 or 40,000. He will take battalions (1,000 men) just as fast as they can come, with only their small arms. Actually, heavier artillery would be welcome, but the need is so great that he would take them with their small arms only. He feels the British should send a brigade from Hong Kong or Malaya; thinks it could be replaced from the United Kingdom. The French could send some forces from Indochina. A brigade from Pakistan and Turkey would be most welcome. Canada should send some troops. He was going to work on Kennaik when he arrived the following week. He didn't have a good word to say about the Kiangses, although he recognized the value of Eastern troops. He wasn't sure the Philippines could spare anything just now.

He has no doubts of the political outcome, once there is victory. Victory is a strong weapon in the East, and the Koreans want their freedom. When Syngman Rhee's Government is reestablished in Seoul, the UN-supervised election can be held within two months, and he has no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-communist parties. The North Koreans will also vote for a non-communist government when they are sure of no Russian or communist intervention. He said there was no need to change the Constitution, which now provides for 100 seats for the North. Korea can become a strong influence in stabilizing the non-communist movement in the East.

MacArthur thinks highly of Ambassador Macelis. He said they worked together fully and effectively.

In my first talk with MacArthur, I told him the President wanted us to tell him he must not permit Chiang to be the cause of starting a war with the Chinese communists on the mainland, the effect of which might drag us into a world war. He answered that he would, as a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the President. He said that he had discussed only military matters with the Generalissimo on his trip to Formosa. He had refused to discuss any political subjects whenever the Generalissimo attempted to do so. The Generalissimo had offered him command of the Chinese National troops. MacArthur had replied that that was not appropriate, but that he would be willing

- 4 -

to give military advice if requested by the Generalissimo to do so.

(MacArthur described the way to deal with Orientals. You must never make a direct command; always suggest what you want to be done as an idea worthy of thought; but suggest, however, as he did with the Generalissimo, that he would know best. We could then obtain complete loyalty and confidence. If he wanted a Chinese general to be appointed to a position of command, he would never demand it, but point out the qualities of the individual; and then it would be accepted as the Generalissimo's own idea. One should never talk in large groups, but personally, on matters of importance so that the individual's dignity could be maintained with his associates. One should only ask for important things, and recognize that Orientals have their own ways of doing things and we could not change them completely. He had not vetoed all the laws⁹ prevented them from taking many of the steps the Japanese Government desired, but vetoed only when he felt it most essential, even though on certain matters he thought they were making mistakes. They would learn then in their own way.) He thought that this was the way he had dealt with the Japanese and what had contributed to his success.

MacArthur gave us his views of June 18 on the importance of Formosa from a strategic standpoint in the defensive system of the United States in the Far East. (A copy is in my file.) For reasons which are rather difficult to explain, I did not feel that we came to a full Agreement on the way he believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President's position and will act accordingly, but without full conviction. He has a strange idea that we should back anybody who will fight communism, even though he could not give an argument why the Generalissimo's fighting communists would be a contribution towards the effective dealing with the communists in China. I pointed out to him the basic conflict of interest between the U.S. and the Generalissimo's position as to the future of Formosa, namely, the preventing of Formosa's falling into hostile hands. Perhaps the best way would be through the medium of the UN to establish an independent government. Chiang, on the other hand, had only the burning ambition to see Formosa as a stepping-stone for his re-entry to the mainland. MacArthur recognized that this ambition could not be fulfilled, and yet thought it might be a good idea to let him lead and get rid of him that way. He did not seem to consider the liability that our support of Chiang as such a move would be to us in the East. I explained in great detail why Chiang was a liability, and the great danger of a split in the unity of the United Nations on the Chinese-Communist-Formosa policies; the attitude of the British, Nehru and such countries as Norway, who, although stalwart in their determination to resist Russian invasion, did not want to stir up trouble elsewhere. I pointed out the great importance of maintaining UN unity among the friendly countries, and the complications that might

result from any mis-steps in dealing with China and Formosa.

MacArthur would never recognize the Chinese Communists, even to the use of the veto in seating the Communists. He believes it would only strengthen the prestige of Mao Tse Tung's Government in China and destroy what he considers should be our objective: the isolating of the present supporters of Mao Tse Tung and the developing of strengthened resistance movements. He does not believe the Chinese want to come under Russian domination. They have historically opposed invasion from the North. He should be more aggressive than we have been so far in creating stronger disension within China. I told him of the President's appointment of Tedall-Smith as Director of the CIA, which he warmly welcomed and asked me to extend an invitation to Tedall-Smith to come to see him as early as possible. MacArthur has not developed any plan of action in China. He believes there are great potentialities.

I emphasized the importance of getting evidence on the participation of the Chinese Communists in supporting the North Korean attack and present operations. There will be considerable support in seating the Chinese Communists at the next meeting of the Assembly. I explained that if we could obtain real evidence of direct support for the North Koreans, this might be the reason by which we could prevent the seating of the Communists on the moral issue involved.

In all, I cannot say that he recognizes fully the difficulties, both within the world and within the East, of whatever moves we make within China in our position with the Generalissimo in Formosa. He believes that our policies undermine the Generalissimo. He has confidence that he can get the Generalissimo to do whatever he is asked to undertake; is prepared to deal with the political problems, but will conscientiously deal only with the military side, unless he is given further orders from the President.

He had much to say of a derogatory nature about Strong, the Charge at Formosa, but said that he had a good impression of Rankin, the man who is to take his place. He will not inform Rankin of what he does in the military field in Formosa, but will revert fully to the Joint Chiefs who can then keep the State Department informed. He believes that the reports which Strong has been sending have been inaccurate and harmful and he does not want to have any of his reports misinterpreted or watered-down, by being transmitted through State Department sources.

He has sent a military mission under General Fox to Formosa to find out the equipment needs of the National troops; it is already clear that they need barbed wire, reinforcing bars for concrete beach defenses, some additional water transport, so that a defense can be

- 4 -

worked out in depth with mobility for the reserves. He is quite satisfied that the military arrangements already available will be sufficient to take care of whatever they need. He has no intention of recommending any military equipment for anything other than the defense of the island, which in no sense would increase the ability of the National Army to invade the continent. He regrets the Joint Chiefs' recommendation to permit Chiang's airplanes to attack the concentration of troops, and particularly the airstrip on the mainland, has been overruled, but accepts the decision and will use every means to stop the Generalissimo sending out his planes, barring "shooting them down". He is satisfied the Chinese Communists will not attempt an invasion of Formosa at the present time. His intelligence and photographs show no undue concentration of forces, although they are building airstrips. He is convinced that the 7th Fleet plus the air jets from the Philippines and Okinawa, B-29's and other aircraft at his disposal, can destroy any attempt which may be made. He believes that the Chinese National troops can be organized to fight effectively and destroy any Communist troops which might get through. Should the Chinese Communists be so foolhardy as to make such an attempt, it would be the bloodiest victory in Far Eastern history, and would strengthen favorably morale in the East. He does not believe the reports that have been made to Washington of the bad situation within Formosa. He believes, however, that it can be improved, both politically and economically, and hopes ICA will continue its economic work so that Formosa can become increasingly important in trade relations with Japan and in the improvement of the economic life of the Formosans. He explained that his observations were of course preliminary, and he might amend them when he had more information, but he thought there was reasonable political stability; the Assembly of 22 members was included 18 Formosans and only 4 mainland Chinese. The budget had been balanced. Currency had been stabilized at 10 to 1 for the dollar. There was only a small black market. Prices and wages had been stabilized. Schools and the judicial system were working normally. Governor Wu (formerly Mayor of Shanghai) has perhaps been largely responsible for improved conditions. "People are well fed and clothed and housed, perhaps as well now as they were under the Japanese. There was an air of tranquillity on the island. He considered the ICA work had been good and should be continued. We should see that the distribution got to the people, avoiding, as far as possible, graft.

The Japanese psychology is strongly and firmly friendly towards us. He believes the Japanese would be a good influence in the East; we should use the psychology of the present situation to press for an early peace treaty. I showed him the draft which had been given to me by Dean Rusk of the security provisions of the Treaty. He read them and said, "This is the right idea: I approve." He said he

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believed...

- 7 -

believed he could "sell them to the Japanese Government". I explained that these provisions were still in the discussion stage, but I had been asked by the State Department to show them to him to get his reaction.

He spoke warmly of his relations with the State Department in the past five years, and of Sebald, his Political Adviser. He said the State Department had shown greater strength of understanding than the Pentagon, and had supported him in his concepts in the development of Jowa.

In talking about arming the Japanese, the Japanese can pay for the maintenance of what forces are developed, MacArthur said, but we will have to supply the equipment which can be given on a lend-lease basis. He had asked for about 40 coast-guard cutters; further coastal patrol vessels could be considered later.

He said that he had already started to organize the Central Police Force, which in fact was a military organization of 75,000 men, which were being organized into four infantry divisions. Officers were being carefully selected from the Reserve officers who had fought in the war. Some of the regular officers whose group had been accused of war crimes, were included. The men had combat experience. This force could be expanded if desired for the defense of the island only. At the present time, they were being equipped with small arms, but heavier equipment could be given them at a later time, should it be decided to do so. Such questions as a Japanese air force, stronger coast and navy defense, would be considered at a later date. The Japanese were quite prepared to develop their own defenses. They did not desire, nor should we permit, the development of a force which had offensive capabilities outside of the islands.

He spoke about the problem of the island of Quency, close to the mainland. The Generalissimo claims to have 70,000 men there which is important from the standpoint of eventually landing on the mainland, but has no value to the U.S. The Generalissimo considers Formosa part of China. MacArthur didn't see any evidence of a desire for independence so far, even among the Formosans he talked to, but perhaps that was natural at this stage. There were no soldiers on the street and on warfare, no evidence to support the pessimistic reports that had come from the State Department. Strong had been reporting exaggerated gossip.

MacArthur feels that we have not improved our position by hinking Chiang around, and hoped that the President would do something to relieve the strain that existed between the State Department and the Generalissimo. He suggested the President might reiterate his previous statements by threatening the Chinese Communists that he would withdraw ^{the Communists} immediately from attacking the airfields on the mainland if the Chinese

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- 8 -

continued he do this work, or he build up their positions. I told him that if he wanted he make that recommendation to the President it was up to him, but I assured him that I would strongly recommend to the President against his doing so. I emphasized the over-powering importance of UN unity and that this would only give further trouble and give the Russians a chance to develop an entering wedge.

MacArthur strongly supports the development of strong forces in Europe, and further believes we should be more vigorous in strengthening the military forces to resist Communists in the East. He believes the Chinese Communists will not move their own troops south, but will train Indochinese and Burmese, equip them, and attempt to create by infiltration and supported by well-equipped local Communist troops dissension, with the eventual hope of taking over these areas. Nehru, he believes is concerned over the threat of communism, but is acting wrongly in thinking he will get anywhere by appeasement. "We should fight the communists every place - fight them like hell!" He considers the Truman Doctrine "great". It should be carried out more vigorously. We should organize economic assistance in the East as we have been doing in the Marshall Plan in Europe. Large sums are not required. This assistance should be capably directed. We should see that it gets to the people and corruption is avoided.

When he saw me off at the airport, he said loudly so that all could hear, "The only fault of your trip was that it was too short".

WAB/Ambo.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Tokyo, Japan.

8 August 1950.

Dear Mr. President:

(About the matter you discussed with me on Thursday, 3 August 1950).

Lieut. Colonel Charles C. Canada, ME, GP; Medical Officer, examines General MacArthur, at least, bi-monthly. The General's medical record shows last absence from duty by reason of illness was in 1912 due to an accident resulting in a fractured wrist. He was wounded twice in the A.E.F., but was not evacuated from his GP. His record shows no absence from duty for any reason since the outbreak of World War II; in fact his record shows no leaves of absence for any reason throughout the last thirty years or more. Dr. Canada states:

- a. General MacArthur's blood pressure at last examination (about six weeks ago) was $120/80$. This has remained unchanged for at least thirty years.
- b. His weight has not varied over two pounds in the same period.
- c. His habits are spartan in simplicity; hence his digestion and elimination are perfect. He sleeps regularly and soundly.
- d. Since assigned to command at the start of World War II, he has partaken of alcoholic beverages only when and as required by diplomatic protocol and common courtesy. These incidents could be counted on the fingers of one hand. No alcoholic beverages are served at the General's home under any circumstances whatever.
- e. Further information corroborating the above statements has been furnished to me by two persons known to me personally over a long period of time, and who have been most closely associated with this picture over the last ten years.

I have known General MacArthur, as you know, and rather more than casually, for the last twenty-two years. During that period I have been impressed most deeply by the manner in which he filed his life and habits to the task in hand. When I met him last Sunday morning, for the first time in over four years, I thought his appearance improved and his vigor, both mental and physical, even greater than when I was with him in the Philippines in 1945.

Colonel Canada tells me that he accompanied General MacArthur on his two trips to the Korean front in the last thirty days. These missions required pre-dawn plane departure from Japan, a long, hard day via jeep to the front, and return to Japan late at night. Colonel Canada states that no member of the party showed evidence of better endurance or less fatigue. In each case, General MacArthur resumed his usual schedule at 7.30 the following morning. Now I took a sore socket trip of the same sort yesterday, and I know what two hundred miles via jeep over Korean roads (!) means, and I know how I feel this morning as I write this letter.

Conclusion:

a. Colonel Canada. He has been personal attending physician to General MacArthur for rising three years, and states officially and unequivocally that in his opinion General MacArthur has to-day the physiological characteristics of a superior physical specimen at fifty years of age; this regardless of General MacArthur's chronological age.

b. General MacArthur. He appreciates very, very much your concern over his health and welfare. He has directed me to say that he has no trepidation whatever over undertaking the task in hand; that when we take the offensive he proposes to take the field and assume personal command of all combat forces engaged; and that when he cannot out-walk or out-last his staff or has less durability than any or all of his field commanders, he will notify you of that fact immediately and ask to be relieved of command at your convenience.

I indicate the above without hesitance or equivocation. I urge that you have no trepidation whatsoever (I have none) in the matter you discussed with me just before I left Washington.

Yours faithfully,

Frank E. Love

FRANK E. LOVE,
Major General, U.S.A. (Res.)

HERE IS THE TEXT OF GEN. MAC ARTHUR'S MESSAGE TO THE 51ST NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS. CLAIR A. LEWIS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

YOUR INSPIRING MESSAGE OF THE 17TH HAS MOVED ME DEEPLY AND I TRUST THAT YOU WILL CONVEY TO ALL OF MY COMRADES-IN-ARMS OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS ASSEMBLED ON THE OCCASION OF OUR 51ST ANNUAL NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT MY ASSURANCE THAT THEIR CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT WILL GIVE THIS COMMAND MUCH ARMED STRENGTH TO MEET THE TESTS OF BATTLE WHICH LIE IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. TELL THEM THAT I AM HAPPY TO REPORT THAT THEIR SUCCESSORS IN ARMS NOW BEHOLDING THE BATTLE ALONG OUR BATTLE LINES IN SOUTH KOREA ARE REEMULATING THAT SAME HIGH STANDARD OF DEVOTION, FORTITUDE AND VALOR WHICH CHARACTERIZED THEIR OWN MARCH TO VICTORY WHEN THEY THEMSELVES ENGAGED IN COMBAT IN THE FIELD. FROM SENIOR COMMANDERS THROUGH ALL RANKS, THEIR TACTICAL SKILL, THEIR INVINCIBLE DETERMINATION, AND THEIR FIGHTING QUALITIES AGAINST A FANATICAL FOE, WELL TRAINED, expertly DIRECTED AND HEAVILY ARMED, HAVE SPUN OUR COUNTRY'S FINEST TRADITIONS. TOWARD VICTORY, HOWEVER DIFFICULT THE ROAD, THEY ARE GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES WHICH SHOULD MAKE EVERY AMERICAN HEART BEAT WITH PRIDE AND INFINITE SATISFACTION.

IN VIEW OF MISCONCEPTIONS CURRENTLY BEING FUELED CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORMOSA TO OUR STRATEGIC

POTENTIAL IN

POTENTIAL IN THE PACIFIC, I BELIEVE IT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO AVOID HIMSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STATE MY VIEWS THERE-
OF TO YOU, ALL OF WHOM HAVE POSESSED OVERSIGHT UNDERSTAND
BROAD STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. TO BRING WITH, ANY APPRAISAL OF
THIS STRATEGIC POTENTIAL REQUIRES AN APPRECIATION OF THE
CHANGES BROUGHT IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST WAR. PRIOR THERETO
THE ENTIRE STRATEGIC FRONTIER OF THE UNITED STATES LAY ON
THE LITTORAL LINE OF THE AMERICAS WITH AN EXPOSED ISLAND
BALISEY EXTENDING OUT THROUGH MEXICO, CENTRAL AND SOUTH TO THE
PHILIPPINES. THAT BALISEY WAS NOT AN OUTPOST OF STRENGTH
BUT AN AVENUE OF WEAKNESS ALONG WHICH THE ENEMY COULD AND
HAD ATTACK US. THE PACIFIC WAS A POTENTIAL AREA OF ADVANCE-
MENT FOR ANY PREDATORY FORCE DESIRING UPON STRIKING AT THE
DOMINANT LAND AREAS.

ALL OF THIS HAS CHANGED BY OUR PACIFIC VICTORY. THE
STRATEGIC FRONTIER THEN SHIFTED TO ENBRACE THE ENTIRE PACIFIC
OCEAN WHICH HAS BECOME A VAST BARRI TO PROTECT US AS LONG AS
WE HOLD IT. INDEED, IT ACTS AS A PROTECTIVE SHIELD TO ALL
OF THE AMERICAS AND ALL PORTIONS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN
AREA WE CONTROL TO THE DOOR OF ASIA BY A CHAIN OF ISLANDS
EXTENDING IN AN ARC FROM THE ALYTIANS TO THE MARIANAS AND
IT IS AND THE FREE ASIA. FROM THIS ISLAND CHAIN WE CAN
DOMINATE WITH ANY POWER EVERY ASIATIC PORT FROM HONOLULU
TO SINGAPORE AND PREVENT ANY HOSTILE MOVEMENT INTO THE
PACIFIC. ANY PREDATORY ATTACK FROM ASIA MUST BE AN AMPHIBI-
OUS EFFORT. NO AMPHIBIOUS FORCE CAN BE SUCCESSFUL WITH THE

CONTROL OF THE

CONTROL OF THE SEA LANE AND THE AIR OVER THESE LANES IS ITS APPROACH OF ADVANCE. WITH NAVAL AND AIR SUPERMACY AND MODERN SECOND ELEMENTS TO DEFEND BARRS, ANY MAJOR ATTACK FROM CONTINENTAL ASIA TOWARD US OR OUR FRIENDS OF THE PACIFIC WOULD COME TO FAILURE. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS THE PACIFIC NO LONGER REPRESENTS MIRACING ADVENTS OF APPROACH FOR A PROSPECTIVE INVADER -- IT ASSUMES INSTEAD THE FIRMEST ASPECT OF A PEACEFUL LANE. OUR LACK OF DEFENSE IS A NATURAL ONE AND CAN BE MAINTAINED WITH A MINIMUM OF MILITARY EFFORT AND EXPENSE. IT DETERMINES NO ATTACK AGAINST ANYONE NOR DOES IT PROVIDE THE BASTIONS ESSENTIAL FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, BUT PROPERLY MAINTAINED WOULD BE AN INDIVISIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSION. IF WE HOLD THIS LINE WE MAY HAVE PEACE -- LOSE IT AND WAR IS INEVITABLE.

THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF FORMOSA IS SUCH THAT IN THE HAND OF A POWER UNFRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES IT CONSTITUTES AN ENEMY SALIENT IN THE WEST CENTER OF THIS DEFENSIVE PERIMETER, 100 TO 150 MILES CLOSER TO THE ADJACENT FRIENDLY ELEMENTS -- CHINA AND THE PHILIPPINES -- THAN ANY POINT IN CONTINENTAL ASIA. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS ON FORMOSA A CONCENTRATION OF OPERATIONAL AIR AND NAVAL BASES WHICH IS POTENTIALLY GREATER THAN ANY SUCH CONCENTRATION OF THE ASIATIC MAINLAND BETWEEN THE YELLOW SEA AND THE STRAIT OF MALACCA. ADDITIONAL BASES CAN BE DEVELOPED IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME BY AN AGGRESSIVE EXPLOITATION OF ALL WORLD WAR II JAPANESE FACILITIES. AN ENEMY FORCE UTILIZING THESE INSTALLATIONS CONVENIENTLY AVAILABLE COULD INCREASE BY 100 PERCENT

BY 100 PERCENT THE AIR EFFORT WHICH COULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST CHINA AS COMPARED TO OPERATIONS BASED ON THE MAINLAND AND AT THE SAME TIME COULD SELECT DAMAGING AIR ATTACKS WITH FIGHTER TYPE AIRCRAFT AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH ARE CURRENTLY WITHIN THE RANGE OF FIGHTERS BASED ON THE MAINLAND. OUR AIR SUPREMACY AT ONCE WOULD BECOME DOUBTFUL.

AS A RESULT OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND BASE POTENTIAL, UTILIZATION OF FORMOSA BY A MILITARY POWER HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES WITNESS COVERT-BALANCE OR OVERWHELM THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE ON THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE U.S. FRONT LINE POSITION. FORMOSA IF THE HANDS OF SUCH AN HOSTILE POWER COULD BE COMPARED TO AN UNDESIRABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND SUPPLY LINE THUS IDEALLY LOCATED TO ACCOMPLISH OFFENSIVE STRATEGY AND AT THE SAME TIME CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OR COVERT-OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY FRIENDLY POWERS BASED ON CHINA AND THE PHILIPPINES. THIS STRONGHOLD CARRIER-THUNDER HAS THE CAPACITY TO OPERATE FROM 15 TO 20 AIR GROUPS OF TYPES RANGING FROM JET FIGHTERS TO B-29 TYPE BOMBERS AS WELL AS TO PROVIDE FORWARD OPERATING FACILITIES FOR SHORT-RANGE COASTAL SUBMARINES. IN ACQUIRING THIS FORWARD SUBMARINE BASE, THE EFFICACY OF THE SHORT RANGE SUBMARINE WOULD BE SO INCREDIBLY INCREASED BY THE ADDITIONAL RANGE OF ACTIVITY AS TO THREATEN COMPLETELY SEA TRAFFIC FROM THE SOUTH AND INTERDICT ALL SEA LANE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.

PACIFIC. SUSTAINING BLOCKADE BY THE ENEMY WITH ALL ITS DESTRUCTIVE RAMIFICATIONS WOULD THEREBY BECOME A VENTRAL CERTAINTY.

SHOULD FORMOSA FALL AND RUINS THEREAFTER COME INTO THE HANDS OF A POTENTIAL ENEMY OF THE U.S., THE LATTER WILL HAVE ACQUIRED AN ADDITIONAL "PILST" WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN OBTAINED AND CAN BE MAINTAINED AT AN INCOMPARABLY LOWER COST THAN COULD ITS EQUIVALENT IN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND SUBMARINE TENDERS. CURRENT ESTIMATES OF AIR AND STRATEGIC RESOURCES IN THE FAR EAST INDICATE THE CAPABILITY OF SUCH A POTENTIAL ENEMY TO EXTEND HIS FORCES SOUTHWARD AND STILL MAINTAIN AN IMPRESSIVE NUMBER OF MILITARY UNITS FOR EMPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE PACIFIC AREA.

HISTORICALLY, FORMOSA HAS BEEN USED AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR JUST SUCH MILITARY AGGRESSION DIRECTED AGAINST AREAS TO THE SOUTH. THE MOST STRIKE AND RECENT EXAMPLE WAS THE UTILIZATION OF IT BY THE JAPANESE IN WORLD WAR II. AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE PACIFIC WAR IN 1941, IT PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART AS A STAGING AREA AND SUPPORTING BASE FOR THE VARIOUS JAPANESE INVASION CORPS. THE SUPPORTING AIR FORCES OF JAPAN'S ARMY AND NAVY WERE BASED ON FIELDS SITUATED ALONG SOUTHERN FORMOSA. FROM 1942 THROUGH 1944 FORMOSA WAS A VITAL LINK IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION CHAIN WHICH STRETCHED FROM JAPAN THROUGH OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES TO SOUTHWEST ASIA. AS THE U.S. CARRIER FORCES ADVANCED INTO THE WESTERN PACIFIC, THE ISLAND OF FORMOSA ASSUMED AN

INCREASINGLY

INCREDIBLY GREAT RISK IN THE JAPANESE EXTREME SCHOOL. SHOULD FORMOSA FALL INTO THE HANDS OF AN HOSTILE POWER, HISTORY WOULD REPEAT ITSELF. ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL WOULD AGAIN BE FULLY EXPLOITED AS THE MEANS TO BRUSH AND SUBTLE THE OUR WESTERN PACIFIC DEFENSE SYSTEM AND MOUNT A WAR OF CONQUEST AGAINST THE FREE NATIONS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN.

REASON COULD BE MORE FALLACIOUS THAN THE USUAL ARGUMENT BY THOSE WHO ADVOCATE ATTACHMENT AND DEVIATION IN THE PACIFIC THAT IF BY LOYAL FORMOSA WE ALTERNATE CONTINENTAL AREA. THERE WAS SPEAK THIS DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE ORIENT. THEY DO NOT WANT THAT IT IS IN THE PATTERN OF THE ORIENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TO RESPECT AND FOLLOW AGGRESSIVE, RESOLUTE AND STARK LEADERSHIP -- TO QUICKLY TURN ON A LEADERSHIP CHARACTERIZED BY TIMIDITY OR VACILLATION -- AND THEY UNDERSTAND THE ORIENTAL MENTALITY. NOTHING IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS HAS SO IMPROVED THE FREE EAST AS THE AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE THE NEARLY ON OUR PACIFIC OCEAN STRATEGIC POSITION FROM FUTURE ENCROACHMENT, FOR THE ON ITS PEOPLE FALL AGGRAVATED TO APPRAISE THE CAPACITIES SUCH DETERMINATION BRINGS TO BORN FREE INSTITUTIONS. TO FORCE ANY OTHER POWER WOULD BE TO TURN OVER THE FRUITS OF OUR PACIFIC VICTORY TO A POTENTIAL ENEMY. IT WOULD SHIFT ANY FUTURE BATTLE AREA FIVE THOUSAND MILES EASTWARD TO THE COASTS OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENTS, OUR OWN HOME COAST. IT WOULD COMPLETELY EXPOSE OUR PRISON IN THE PHILIPPINES,

OUR PRISON IN

OUR FRIENDS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, OUR FRIENDS IN
INDONESIA, OUR FRIENDS IN JAPAN, AND OTHER AREAS, TO THE
LARGEFUL THOUGHTS OF THOSE WHO STAND FOR SLAVERY AS AGAINST
LIBERTY, FOR ATROCITY AS AGAINST GOD.

THE DECISION OF PRESIDENT THOMAS ON JUNE 27 LIGHTED INTO
FLAME A LAND OF HOPE THROUGHOUT ASIA THAT WAS BURNING DARKLY
TOWARD EXTINCTION. IT MARKED FOR THE FAR EAST THE FOCAL
AND TURNING POINT IN THIS AREA'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM.
IT SET ASIDE IN ONE GREAT MOMENTOUS STRIKE ALL OF THE
REPOULSIVE AND THE SOPHISTICATED WHICH AS CONFOUNDED AND DELUDED
SO MANY PEOPLE DISTANT FROM THE ACTUAL SCENE. — END OF
MESSAGE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RECEIVED
U.S. ARMY, WASH. D.C. 20315
11 AUG 50
11-3-50 14

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PARAPHRASE NO.

Office Secretary
Washington, DC

TO: CINC7E TOKYO JAPAN

NR: DEF 89880

26 AUG 50

From SECRET Johnson PERSONAL FOR MacArthur

The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Emancement of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Paragons are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations.



ORIGIN: MR JOHNSON

- Distribution
- (1) THE PRESIDENT
 - (2) SECRETARY ACHESON
 - (3) DEPT. OF THE ARMY
S.W.O. FILE
 - (4) J.C.S.
 - (5) SECRETARY JOHNSON'S FILE

(AUG 50) DTG: 261727Z and
TOP SECRET 11:21 PM EDT.

COPY NO.

1

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949-000000

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD OF THE EVENTS OF
SATURDAY, AUGUST 26, 1950

Mr. Acheson met about 8:15 a.m. with Mr. Rusk with regard to the message which General MacArthur had sent to the VFW. The meeting had been called the preceding night. Mr. Matthews, Mr. Jessup and Mr. Webb joined the Secretary in that order.

Mr. Rusk asked me to call Ambassador Harriman and ask him to stop by the Secretary's office on his way to his own office. Mr. Harriman agreed to do this and arrived at the State Department about 8:55. Consideration was given to the message which General MacArthur had sent and to the political problems which such a message would raise.

Mr. Harriman came out and told me that he wanted to see the President prior to the 9:30 meeting which was scheduled. He asked me to call Matt Connelly and arrange for him to see the President before this meeting. I was unable to reach Mr. Connelly but spoke to Mr. Hopkins who told me that he would arrange for Mr. Harriman to come in.

After the meeting at the White House, the Secretary said that the President had raised the question of the message which General MacArthur had sent out. The President then read the message in its entirety, commenting on certain portions of it as he did so. The Secretary did not discuss the message during the course of this meeting. The President referred to the message as having been given to him by Mr. Harriman. The President considered the matter carefully and decided that the only course was to order withdrawal of the message. He instructed Secretary Johnson to issue an order to General MacArthur for the withdrawal of this message.

Following this, there were numerous telephone conversations which are reported separately.

LDBattle

CLASSIFIED
EX-100 (1952) (Rev. 1-17-54)
By 4-1-10
PROCESSED BY 10-10
10-10-10

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August 28, 1950

Secretary Johnson telephoned Secretary Acheson shortly after the latter's return from the White House meeting. Secretary Johnson said he had been thinking over the order to MacArthur to withdraw his statement to the VFW. He thought that to do so would cause a great deal of embarrassment, and said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff said he thought that a message should go to him stating that if the General's statement were issued "we" will have to issue one stating that it is one man's opinion and is not the official policy of the Government.

Secretary Acheson said he thought that the matter raised the issue as to who is the President of the United States; that MacArthur had made a statement contrary to what the President and Acheson have stated was our position on Formosa. Simply to say that the statement is one man's view gets the President and the Government into complete confusion as to what parts of the statement are not the Government's policy; as to whether the Government knew about the statement before it became public; why it is not our policy, etc., etc. The Secretary said he thought there was nothing to do but for the President to assert his authority, and in this way make it clear that the President's stated position on Formosa stood.

Secretary Johnson at this point asked Secretary Acheson if he thought "we dare send him a message that the President directs him to withdraw his statement". Secretary Acheson said he saw nothing else to do.

Secretary Johnson then said he did not understand from the meeting this morning that the President had actually agreed to send a direct order to MacArthur. Mr. Acheson said that it was his recollection that Ambassador Harriman had put forward the view quite clearly that MacArthur should be ordered to withdraw the order, and that the President had clearly agreed that this was the course to follow.

Since there seemed to be doubt in Secretary Johnson's mind and the minds of the JCS that this was the clear decision, Secretary Acheson agreed to call Ambassador Harriman and straighten out the matter.

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Secretary Acheson telephoned Ambassador Harriman and reported that he had been talking with Secretary Johnson, who had been discussing the matter with the JCS, who thought it would be very unwise to order MacArthur, and that they recommended sending him a telegram saying that if the message is delivered, they will have to put out a statement that it is one man's opinion and not official.

The Secretary said to Ambassador Harriman that he had thought it clear that the President had agreed with the position which Ambassador Harriman had set forth at the meeting this morning at the White House--that MacArthur should be ordered to withdraw the statement. If Ambassador Harriman had any doubt about Secretary Acheson's understanding, then they should go back to the President. The Secretary reiterated his own view that it was a question of who is President of the U.S., and that when one of the highest army officials says something directly contrary to what the President says, he must be ordered not to do so.

The Secretary said he would like to ask Mr. Harriman (1) whether the President did issue a clear order that an order should go to MacArthur; (2) whether Mr. Harriman still considered this a wise order.

Ambassador Harriman said that he was talking with Mr. Charles Ross at that moment and had told him that the President had said that the order should go to MacArthur and that he, Ambassador Harriman, agreed with it fully; that that was the only way to deal with it. Everyone knew that this was going to cause a bad mess at the best. Ambassador Harriman had said that if Mr. Ross thought there was anything wrong about this course, something might still be done. Ambassador Harriman had said to Mr. Ross that he understood Secretary Johnson was going to call up MacArthur. Mr. Ross said he did not think this was sufficient; that there must be something in writing which could be released as soon as anything leaked.

Mr. Harriman said it was very clear in his mind that, unless MacArthur were ordered not to make the statement, there will be confusion all around the world. He did not believe repudiation of the statement after it was made public was the same thing as an order not to make it. The matter was so serious

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-3-

that only drastic measures could cope with it. Repudiation simply could not catch up with the results of the statement. Ambassador Harriman said he was ready, in recommending the order of the President, to face the possibility that it might mean MacArthur's resignation. But to do less would mean that there would be repercussions which could never be caught up with.

Ambassador Harriman said he thought that Secretary Johnson had seen the President for a moment after the meeting.

Secretary Acheson said he would call Secretary Johnson and say (1) that Ambassador Harriman had understood that the President had issued the order to withdraw the statement; and (2) that is Mr. Harriman's opinion that is the wise course; (3) If there is any doubt we ought to reassemble and go over it again.

Ambassador Harriman said that he and Mr. Ross agreed that something should be done here about the Matthews statement also.

Ambassador Harriman asked if Secretary Acheson could find out how the MacArthur message was given out--by the VFW or by MacArthur. Secretary Acheson said he would find out.

The information which the Secretary later conveyed to Mr. Harriman is as follows:

By making discreet inquiries, it was learned that

There is some reason to believe that key newspaper publishers around the country were supplied the complete text of General MacArthur's letter directly. We were unable to find out whether it was sent directly from Tokyo or by the VFW. The only formal press release was made in Chicago.

Secretary Acheson has telephoned Secretary Johnson and said he had been authorized by Ambassador Harriman to say:

1. It was Ambassador Harriman's very clear understanding that the President had directed MacArthur by order to withdraw the statement;

2. That Ambassador Harriman thinks that is the right course;

3. That if we are not clear about it, we ought to ask the President to receive his advisers again and discuss it.

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Mr. Acheson also told Secretary Johnson that Ambassador Harriman thought that because of MacArthur's prestige the repercussions would be heard around the world, and that without the order to withdraw, we could never catch up with the consequences.

It was agreed that Secretary Johnson would call Ambassador Harriman and ask him to see if the President would see the advisers to reopen the matter.

* * * * *

Very shortly after the above, Secretary Johnson called back and said that when he had hung up from talking with Secretary Acheson (and before he could call Ambassador Harriman, as agreed), the President had called him and had dictated the following order which he said was to go to MacArthur:

"The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the Policy of the U.S. and its position in the UN."

Secretary Acheson said he would put this before his staff and call Secretary Johnson back if they had any objection to it.

* * * * *

The Secretary called Secretary Johnson a little later to tell him that he had been studying the President's draft order to MacArthur, and that he thought it covered the matter very well.

Secretary Johnson again raised the question as to whether it was wise to order MacArthur to withdraw, or whether it would not be better to send a message to the following effect:

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"The President and I have seen a copy of the statement to the VFW. This statement includes several features in connection with Formosa which are in conflict with U.S. policy and with the position of the U.S. in the United Nations. When queried on this subject this Government must state that this statement is the statement of one individual only and is not the policy of the United States Government." (This may not be an exact and accurate transcription.)

Secretary Johnson said that Deputy Secretary Early had come into the conference and he was very much opposed to sending MacArthur a telegram ordering him to withdraw the statement.

Mr. Early then came on the phone and outlined his views as follows:

It seemed to him that the directive of the President asked the impossible. It was not mechanically possible to withdraw the statement, because it had been received by the VFW, which is a hostile group; it has been given world-wide distribution by them. Its withdrawal would never, in his opinion, prevent its publication, or answer the issue. A directive to MacArthur to withdraw the statement, not being possible of accomplishment, would add fuel to the fire, when the statement is issued. Mr. Early thought if we took the position, which he thought was truthful and factual, that the General had ignored Washington, the Government, the "League of Nations", and everyone here, and that traditionally we grant the right of free speech, and can consider this only as an expression by an individual, we would get off better than by sending a flat directive asking the impossible.

Mr. Early then brought up the question of handling the matter by having Mr. Sebald talk with MacArthur in Tokyo. He said that he could not believe that MacArthur would have made the statement if he had known what the policy of the Government was. Mr. Early said he was 100% sure that MacArthur knew nothing about it all. He thought it would be worthwhile to get Sebald on the telephone and have him check. He thought Sebald might, by talking with MacArthur and explaining the position he had put us in, get MacArthur to act on his own and withdraw it without a directive.

The Secretary's reply was that since Sebald was a subordinate, he did not think he would be received by MacArthur without a directive from the President.

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-6-

In response to Mr. Early's general line, the Secretary said he understood that the whole matter would get out. If that is so, the main question is - how does it get out? The Secretary again outlined the confused position we would be in if there was simply a repudiation of the statement if made by MacArthur, with no directive not to do so; whereas if it comes out after the order to withdraw has been sent, the President has asserted his authority, and the position of the US in relation to other governments will be maintained. In answer to the consideration of whether an order to withdraw would be a suppression of MacArthur in his right to free opinion and free speech, the Secretary thought that this would be understood, since this Government has taken a position and high officials of the Government cannot be allowed to make statements opposite to that position. Even though this meant a serious row, the Secretary thought this was the cleanest way to have the matter come out.

Mr. Early still maintained that he thought his proposal would cause less trouble. He suggested that perhaps the President might talk on the telephone to MacArthur. The Secretary replied that this would put the President in the position of supplicant, which he did not think was wise. Mr. Acheson thought also that a written order should be sent and that the decision should not be left to a telephone call.

Mr. Early said he was just trying to get his views across. If Secretary Acheson did not agree, he would not press this further.

(There may have been a little more here, but my impression was that the Secretary hung up without either Mr. Johnson or Mr. Early making any definite commitment one way or other to send the order, or to go back to the President.)

* * * * *

The next conversation was between Messrs. Harriman and Acheson (although who called whom at this point, I am afraid I don't know).

Ambassador Harriman said he supposed the Secretary had talked with Secretary Johnson, and the Secretary said he had; that he did not agree with any of Secretary Johnson's or Mr. Early's

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views. Secretary Acheson's understanding of the present position was that, since the President had issued a definite order to Secretary Johnson to send the order to General MacArthur, after putting forth their views in a last ditch stand, they were prepared to issue the order.

However, evidently Mr. Johnson and/or Mr. Early had also called Mr. Harriman and expressed their doubts to him and had read him the same proposed message that Mr. Early had read the Secretary. Ambassador Harriman said he was of the opinion that the President should have everybody's views before he takes such a serious step, although he, Ambassador Harriman, was still of the opinion that the course advocated by the Defense people did not make sense. The Secretary said he thought the President had decided and that Secretary Johnson had told him he would not reopen the matter unless Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Harriman also wanted it reopened. He said he would do nothing further about it.

But, Ambassador Harriman thought that, leaving aside the froth of the matter, as the situation stood, the essentials were that the handling of the matter showed disagreement "on both sides of the Potomac", and that the MacArthur statement would plague us through the election. (The Secretary later asked for clarification of what the Ambassador meant by "disagreement on both sides of the Potomac"; i.e., whether that meant that the JCS and the Defense agreed with the substance of the MacArthur statement. Ambassador Harriman said he did not think this was so; that what he meant was only that there was disagreement on how to handle the matter.) In these circumstances, Ambassador Harriman thought it would be well to know that the President had weighed the matter carefully.

Secretary Acheson agreed that the President should not take an important decision without getting everyone's opinion, but he thought that the President had done this.

The Secretary and Mr. Harriman had a good deal of discussion as to whether or not the President should be asked to reopen the matter, during which Secretary Acheson was quite non-committal, and Mr. Harriman seemed disposed to go back to the President. The question then arose as to who should go to the President if it were done; and it was agreed that Mr. Harriman

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would ask Secretary Johnson to ask the President for further consideration, since it was he who wanted it.

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Shortly after this, Mr. Harriman again called and said that before he could call Johnson back, he had talked with the President and found that the President knew exactly what he was doing and what was in Mr. Early's mind. The President had said to Mr. Harriman that he had dictated what he wanted to go and he still wanted it to go.

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AUGUST 27, 1950

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR GUSTIN

Dear Warren:

As I told you on the telephone this morning I want to congratulate you on your able presentation of the views of the United States Government in the Security Council of the United Nations from the first onset of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Throughout the entire course of the proceedings you have represented this Government with great effectiveness and in full accordance with my directions.

The letter which you addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25 on the subject of Formosa admirably sums up the fundamental position of this Government as it had been stated by me on June 27 and in my message to the Congress on July 19. You have clearly set forth in that letter the nature and essence of the problem. You have faithfully set down my views as they were then and as they are now.

To the end that there be no misunderstanding concerning the position of the Government of the United States with respect to Formosa, it may be useful to repeat here the seven fundamental points which you so clearly stated in your letter to Mr. Lie,

"(1) The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

"(2) The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations forces operating in Korea under the auspices of the Security Council to repel the aggression on the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

"(3) The action of the United States was an impartial mediating action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

"(4) The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future peaceful settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

"(5) The

"(5) The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

"(6) The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation here, or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forcible solution of that problem.

"(7) We do not believe that the Security Council need be, or will be, diverted from the consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression.

"Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force.

"If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the President of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda, which is the complaint of Aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States Resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict."

These seven points accurately record the position of the United States.

In the forthcoming discussion of the problem in the Security Council you will continue to have my complete support.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

August 27, 1950

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MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN 040 MACARTHUR

TO : DEFEND WASH DC FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NR : C 61325

27 AUG 50

MEMORIAL FOR JOHNSON FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR

Revised DEF 89880, 26 Aug.

The Veterans of Foreign Wars, of which I am a long-time member, requested of me, through its Commander-in-Chief, a message to be read at its National Encampment since I could not personally be present. My message was most carefully prepared to fully support the President's policy decision of 27 June 1950, reading in part as follows:

"--The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area."

My remarks were calculated solely to support this declaration and I am unable to see wherein they might be interpreted otherwise. The words were purely my personal ones and the subject had previously been freely discussed in all circles, Governmental and private, both at home and abroad. The message has undoubtedly been incorporated in the printed agenda for the Encampment and advance press releases thereof have already reached world wide centers of circulation.

Under these circumstances I am sure that it would be mechanically impossible to suppress the same at this late date, and I believe to attempt it under such conditions would be a grave mistake. Please therefore present my most earnest request to the President for reconsideration of the order given me in your message as I believe that reconsideration resulting in compliance therewith would be constructive and most helpful to the National interest.

CM IN 5561

(27 Aug 50)

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U.S. 12085 Doc. 3402

900 London 71212, 2nd 12, 1979

By 61-1111-1000 10-21-79 2

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INCOMING
MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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NR: C 61425

PAGE 2

If despite the foregoing the decision remains unchanged, please send the following message to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army of Foreign Wars, Mr Clyde A Lewis, care of Sherman Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

"I regret to inform you that I have been directed to withdraw my signature to the National Newspaper of Veterans of Foreign Wars. Signed Randolph."

ACTION: MR JOHNSON

ON 18 5581

(27 - mg 50)

DRG: 2707132 ocl/d

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
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FORM 10-1 (Rev. 1-60)

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PLAINTEXT NOT REQUIRED

Office of the Secretary
Defense

~~PERSONAL FOR~~
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TO: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN

INFO: ODP 09919

27 AUG 50

PERSONAL FOR General MacArthur from Secretary of
Defense Johnson.

Word C 61325 received. Your message to Clegg & Levin
forwarded verbatim as requested by you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 1-402
DOD Declass S.L.D. 13, Jan 11, 1979

By ~~SLT~~ ~~ALC~~ ~~WCL~~ ~~DAW~~ ~~ALC~~ ~~WCL~~ ~~DAW~~

ORIGIN: JO JOHNSON JOHNSON

ON ODP 09919

(AUG 50) INFO: 271400Z LP

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STAFF MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PERSONAL FOR TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

Office of the Secretary
Defense

TO: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN

NR: DEF 19919

27 AUG 50

PERSONAL FOR General MacArthur from Secretary of
Defense Johnson.

Unit C 41323 received. Your message to Clyde A Lewis
forwarded verbatim as requested by you.

ORIGIN MR LOUIS JOHNSON

CM OUT 19919

(AUG 50) DTG: 271400Z LP

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Retyped by UPA

On the record.

In order to avoid confusion as to the United States position with respect to Formosa, the President directed that the statement prepared by General MacArthur on this subject be withdrawn.

For background.

The President has clearly stated American policy toward Formosa, in his statement of June 27 and in his message to the Congress on July 19. In addition, on August 25, Secretary Austin acting on instructions of the President, summed up the position of the United States on Formosa fully and clearly in the letter addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations. The President's statements must stand as the official position of the United States. There can be only one voice in stating the position of the United States in the field of foreign relations. This is of fundamental constitutional importance.

Furthermore, General MacArthur is the United Nations Commander in Korea, the question of Formosa has not been brought before the Security Council of the United Nations, and members of the United Nations have differing points of view regarding Formosa.

In considering the problem of Formosa certain specific points of the position of the United States Government must be borne in mind.

1. For instance, the President's statement of June 27

makes clear that, as a corollary of the action in directing the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa, he was calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland.

2. In the same statement, the President said that the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of peace in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations.

3. In the President's message to Congress of July 19, he stated that we have no territorial ambitions and do not seek for ourselves any special position or privileges on Formosa.

4. In this message the President also said that the present military action is without prejudice to the political questions affecting that island and that our desire is that those political questions be settled by peaceful means.

5. The President also said that with peace re-established even the most complex political questions are susceptible of solution, but in the presence of brutal aggression some of these questions may have to be held in abeyance in the interests of the security of all.

Not only in these statements said by the President as official statements of the Government, but in the official communication which Ambassador Austin as the direct representative of the President made to Mr. Tzygwe Lie on August 25, Ambassador Austin quoted the President's statements referred to above and said: "These statements and the facts to which they related make perfectly clear certain fundamental points which the

people

people of the world will have clearly in mind."

The fundamental points which Ambassador Acheson then listed as the essence of American policy include those just referred to. It is essential that these fundamental points remain absolutely clear on United States policy amid the storm of propaganda which Mr. Malik is raising on this very subject.

The President's action in directing the withdrawal of the General's message was an effort to preserve the clarity of the position of the United States.

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 29, 1950

The President this morning sent the following message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur:

I am sending you for your information the text of a letter which I sent to Ambassador Austin dated August 27. I am sure that when you examine this letter, and the letter which Ambassador Austin addressed to Trygve Lie on August 25 (a copy of which I am told was sent your headquarters that night), you will understand why my action of the 26th in directing the withdrawal of your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was necessary.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman have given me a comprehensive report of their conversations with you and of their visit to the United Nations forces now fighting under your command in Korea. Their reports were most satisfactory and highly gratifying to me.

The text of the letter to Ambassador Austin referred to above follows:

(Text of August 27 letter to Ambassador Austin has already been released.)

To Mr Murphy from W.S. Harrison

C O P Y

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Conference in Office of CDRS

Conference Gen. MacArthur
 Mr. Harrison
 Gen. Banfill
 Ridgway
 Almond

On August 1950
1500 to 1800
Tokyo Time

1. In a brilliant 1 1/2 hour presentation, made with utmost earnestness, supported by every logical military argument of his rich experience, and delivered with all of his dramatic eloquence, General MacArthur stated his compelling need for additional combat ground forces by the following dead-lines:

15 Sept - 54 Infantry Division (U.S.)

East of 1st Marine Division (U.S.)

15 Oct - 3d Marine Division (U.S.)

2. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Time works against us in the KOREAN situation.
- b. Early military victory is essential.
- c. Delay in achieving it increases the chance of direct military participation Chinese Communist or SOVIET forces, or both.
- d. A maximum co-ordinated offensive effort of U.S. forces should be made at the earliest possible date that affords reasonable chance of decisive success.
- e. This effort should have as its objective the destruction of the main NORTH KOREAN armed forces in NORTH KOREA before the onset of next winter.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 1-4B2

Date Rec. Classification July 17, 1978

PA-7707 MILITARY 7-24-78
G. H. T. H.



f. The forces now scheduled to be operationally available in PECCO by 25 September are inadequate for the successful accomplishment of this mission.

g. Decisive success - destruction of hostile main forces in SCOTIE HOLE - is reasonably attainable by early winter, if the offensive is launched by about 25 September, and if the forces now in or enroute to PECCO are augmented by the approximate equivalent of two U.S. infantry divisions and one U. S. airborne BCT.

h. The diversion of these forces to this mission will still further seriously impair our mobilization base, and therefore entail acceptance of a substantial additional risk which the JCS must evaluate and proper authority decide.

i. Once launched, this operation must be given every chance of success.

j. To insure success, it must have reasonably adequate forces at the outset.

k. The alternatives to furnishing the additional forces required, involve the certainty of a more difficult and costly operation later, of an inavoidable loss of military prestige world-wide and consequently of political advantage, and the probability of greater non-battle casualties during a WINTER winter, than of battle losses in the operation as planned.

l. Present best intelligence estimates are that the SOVIET will NOT intervene with armed forces during the next few months.

m. The forces should be furnished by the dates indicated and the operation ordered executed as planned.



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2. Every effort should be made to secure the maximum of United Nations combat ground forces, particularly BRITISH, CANADIAN, PAKISTANI, AUSTRALIAN, TURKISH, and perhaps FRENCH, and at the earliest possible date.

(S) RIDGEWAY

3. CONCURRENCES: Mr. Bernstein (S) H.A.B.
Gen. Norstad (S) L. N.
Gen. Ridgway (S) H.A.B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1950.

MEMO FOR MR. MURPHY:

This is the latest draft incorporating Agency suggestions we thought worthwhile.

Although the same number of pages as the last draft, it is actually shorter because a larger type machine was used. I have vigorously fought attempts, particularly from the CIA, to lengthen it.

As far as I am concerned, it is ready for us to show to the President.

S.J.S.

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TYPE OF REFERENCE

The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads:

"That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."

The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part:

"It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudges the mere fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a special bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R."

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I. BACKGROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of

expediency

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 FOR THE
 NATIONAL ARCHIVES
 COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND

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expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that an coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With confidence and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take resolute and fateful decisions.

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II. FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: "...to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to secure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

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U. S. GOV. Doc. 100-1 and 100-2, 10-10-80

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The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

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freedom in the building of a just society.

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the largeness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.

For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.

The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breath of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing submission, a

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degradation allied by the individual upon himself with the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission is the will of God because submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Gandhi's non-violence is not acceptable--for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.

The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism", is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.

The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autocracy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat

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to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.

The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible realm of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.

Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

B. Objectives:

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B. Objectives:

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.

2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.

3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to

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seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions.

All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every reconsideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that
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the Soviet regime will become convinced of the futility of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgment of realities which in turn will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.

There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our over-all objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian people or a Russia shorn of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime which enslaves them. Neither these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian people will have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our allies in this enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain.

The objectives outlined in NSC 68/4 (November 23, 1948) and quoted in Chapter I, are fully consistent

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with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting settlement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.

C. Means:

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends. Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or group of individuals within it threatens the rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commit itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to its basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

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The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its fundamental design. Thus it can make the best of several possible worlds, conducting the struggle on those levels where it considers it profitable and enjoying the benefits of a pseudo-peace on those levels where it is not ready for a contest. At the ideological or psychological level, is the struggle for men's minds, the conflict is worldwide. At the political and economic level, within states and in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of the peace, although using its vast forces to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation, and the Kremlin has indisputably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our purpose.

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We have an such freedom of choice, and least of all is the use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas. The idea of slavery can only be overcome by the timely and persistent demonstration of the superiority of the idea of freedom. Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict, for although the

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ability of the Kremlin to threaten our security might be for a time destroyed, the resurgence of totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system or its equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress were made in the fundamental conflict.

Practical the ideological considerations therefore both lead us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.

For as the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and use of military force.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect these values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or

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non-violent, which serves the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves as we do affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people libeled of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the aim of force? Unless we do use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, one once one created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) 'The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief.' The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be engrained to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

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societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge and a subversive influence. Given the nature of the Kremlin, and the evidence at hand, it seems clear that the ends toward which this policy is directed are the same as those where its control has already been established.

The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any event, the Kremlin's conviction of its own infallibility has made its devotion to theory so subjective that past or present pronouncements as to doctrines offer no reliable guide to future actions. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality.

With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in the free and Soviet worlds which could destroy it. The Kremlin's policy toward us is consequently animated by a particularly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex of forces, in this country and in the rest of the free world, on which our power is based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and followed the sound principle of seeking maximum results with minimum risks and commitments. The present application of this strategy is a new form of

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expression for traditional Kremlin sections. However, there is no justification to Soviet theory or practice for predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that it could cause any downfall by one revolutionary blow, it would not seek that solution.

In considering the capabilities of the Soviet world, it is of prime importance to remember that, in contrast to ours, they are being drawn upon alone to the maximum possible extent. Also in contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more with less, - it has a lower standard of living, its economy requires less to keep it functioning and its military machine operates effectively with less elaborate equipment and organization.

The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the Kremlin is inseparably militant. It is inseparably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement, because it is the inheritor of Russian imperialism and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy. This dynamic serves to intensify all Soviet capabilities.

The enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret police, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an instrument of propaganda, subversion and espionage. In its police apparatus, it has a democratic repressive instrument guaranteeing under present circumstances the continued security of the Kremlin. The demonstrated capabilities of these two basic organizations, operating openly or in disguise, in area or through single agents, is unsurpassed

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in history. The party, the police and the conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to create an overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among many peoples of the free world.

The ideological pretensions of the Kremlin are another great source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet system with communism, its past campaigns and its championing of colonial peoples may be viewed with apathy, if not cynicism, by the expressed totalitarian of the Soviet world, but in the free world these ideas find favorable responses in vulnerable segments of society. They have found a particularly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the Asians have been impressed by what has been plausibly portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the U.S.S.R. from a backward society to a position of great world power. Thus, in its pretensions to being (a) the source of a new universal truth and (b) the ideal 'scientific' society, the Kremlin cynically identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of large numbers of people, and places itself at the head of an international crusade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.

Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should be taken into consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the utmost tactical latitude, with stealth and with speed.

The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people.

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That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear and demoralization. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of natural cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.

The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.

In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the best and potentially the strongest instincts of man, and deny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful instincts of man and was capable of fulfilling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be fatally weak.

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The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin vulnerability. In a system where supreme power is acquired and held through violence and intimidation, the transfer of that power may well produce a period of instability.

In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of its own dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is frustrated, if in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior force which halts the expansion and exerts a superior counter-pressure. Yet the Kremlin cannot relax the condition of crisis and mobilization, for to do so would be to lose its dynamism, whereat the seeds of decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.

The Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses. It must know that in the present world situation they are of secondary significance. So long as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchallenged by clearly superior counter-forces--spiritual as well as material--its vulnerabilities are largely inoperative and even camouflaged by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet been given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot within its system.

B. Economics

The Kremlin has an economic intention unrelated to its overall policies. Economics in the Soviet world is not an end in itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to do with economics, is to utilize economic processes to contribute to the overall strength, particularly the war-making capacity

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capacity of the Soviet system. The material welfare of the totalitarian is severely subordinated to the interests of the system.

As for capabilities, even granting optimistic Soviet reports of production, the total economic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares with that of the U.S. as roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in gross national product (1944: U.S.S.R. \$48 billion; U.S. \$480 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>U.S.S.R. and European Orbit Combined</u>
Ingot Steel (Million Met. tons)	80.4	21.6	82.0
Primary aluminum (thousand Met. tons)	417.8	130-135	140-145
Electric power (billion kw-h.)	410	78	112
Crude oil (million Met. tons)	278.8	33.0	36.8

Assuming the maintenance of present policies, while a large U.S. advantage is likely to remain, the Soviet Union

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Union will be steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the U.S. by continuing to devote proportionately more to capital investment than the U.S.

But a full-scale effort by the U.S. would be capable of precipitately altering this trend. The U.S.S.R. today is on a near maximum production basis. No matter what efforts Moscow might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase in overall production could be brought about. In the U.S., on the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized. The fact remains, however, that as long as the Soviet Union is virtually mobilized, and the United States has scarcely begun to summon up its forces, the greater capabilities of the U.S. are to that extent inoperative in the struggle for power. Moreover, as the Soviet attainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated, the totalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focus its efforts on any given project far more readily than the democratic state.

In other fields--general technological competence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.--the gap between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. roughly corresponds to the gap in production. In the field of scientific research, however, the margin of United States superiority is unclear, especially if the Kremlin can utilize European talents.

C. Military

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The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend its national territory. These armed forces are probably not yet considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to initiate a war which would involve the United States. This excessive strength, coupled now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would risk war.

Should a major war occur in 1950 the Soviet Union and its satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out the following campaigns:

a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East; and to consolidate Communist gains in the Far East;

b. To launch air attacks against the British Isles and air and sea attacks against the lines of communications of the Western Powers in the Atlantic and the Pacific;

c. To attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United States. Alternatively, this capability,

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-10-

coupled with other actions open to the Soviet Union, might deny the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations for allied forces. It also should be possible for the Soviet Union to prevent any allied "Normandy" type amphibious operations intended to force a reentry into the continent of Europe.

After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaign and consolidated its positions in the Western European area, it could simultaneously conduct:

a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British Isles;

b. Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;

c. Further operations in the Near and Middle East, continued air operations against the North American continent, and air and sea operations against Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and

d. Diversionsary attacks in other areas.

During the course of the offensive operations listed in the second and third paragraphs above, the Soviet Union will have an air defense capability with respect to the vital areas of its own and its satellites' territories which can oppose but cannot prevent allied air operations against these areas.

It is not known whether the Soviet Union possesses war reserves and Arsenal capabilities sufficient to supply its satellite armies or even its own forces

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throughout a long war. It might not be in the interest of the Soviet Union to equip fully its satellite armies, since the possibility of defections could exist.

It is not possible at this time to assess accurately the finite disadvantages to the Soviet Union which may occur through the implementation of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. It should be expected that, as this implementation progresses, the internal security situation of the recipient nations should improve concurrently. In addition, a strong United States military position, plus increases in the armaments of the nations of Western Europe, should strengthen the determination of the recipient nations to counter Soviet moves and in event of war could be considered as likely to delay operations and increase the time required for the Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe. In all probability, although United States backing will stiffen their determination, the armaments increases under the present aid program will not be of any major consequence prior to 1952. Unless the military strength of the Western European nations is increased on a much larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated rate, it is more than likely that these nations will not be able to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Considering the Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area sufficient possibly to deter the ~~TOP SECRET~~ in a major war or, in any event,

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any event, to delay materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on the continent against Soviet Union offensives.

We do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability is but the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence estimates, concurred in by State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission, assign to the Soviet Union a production capability giving it a fission bomb stockpile within the following ranges:

By mid-1950	10- 20
By mid-1951	25- 45
By mid-1952	45- 90
By mid-1953	70-135
By mid-1954	200

This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet activities and represents the production capabilities of known or deducible Soviet plants. If others exist, as is possible, this estimate could lead us into a feeling of superiority in our atomic stockpile that might be dangerously misleading, particularly with regard to the timing of a possible Soviet offensive. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union experiences operating difficulties, this estimate could be reduced. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union is acquiring certain materials essential to research on and development of thermonuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union now has aircraft able to deliver the atomic bomb. Our intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union an atomic bomber capability already in excess of that needed to deliver available bombs. We have at present no evaluated estimate regarding the Soviet

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accuracy of delivery on target. It is believed that the Soviets cannot deliver their bombs on target with a degree of accuracy comparable to ours, but a planning estimate might well place it at 40-60 percent of bombs sorted. For planning purposes, therefore, the date the Soviets possessed an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would be a critical date for the United States for the delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this country.

At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise blow and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be met with no more effective defense opposition than the United States and its allies have programmed, results of these attacks could include:

- a. Laying waste to the British Isles and thus depriving the Western Powers of their use as a base;
- b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the communications of Western Europe, thus precluding effective defense by the Western Powers;
- and

- c. Delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and Canada.

The possession by the Soviet Union of a thermonuclear capability in addition to this substantial atomic stockpile would result in tremendously increased damage.

During this decade, the defensive capabilities of the Soviet Union will probably be strengthened particularly by the development and use of modern aircraft, aircraft warning and communication services, and defensive guided missiles.

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VI. U.S. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES—ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

A. Political and Psychological

Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.

This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do.

The policy of striving to develop a healthy international community is the long-term constructive effort which we are engaged in. It is this policy which gave rise to our vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations. It is of course the principal reason for our long continuing endeavors to create and now develop the Inter-American system. It, as much as containment, underlay our efforts to rehabilitate Western Europe. Most of our international economic activities can likewise be explained in terms of this policy.

In a world of polarized power, the policies designed to develop a healthy international community are more than ever necessary to our own strength.

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As for the policy of "containment", it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and (4) in general, to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations. One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment", the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment". Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment"—which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion—is no more than a policy of bluff.

At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of a policy of "containment" that we always leave open the possibility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R. A diplomatic freeze--and we are in one now--tends to defeat the very purposes of "containment" because it raises tensions at the same time that it makes Soviet retractions and adjustments in the direction of moderated behavior more difficult. It also tends to inhibit our initiative

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and deprives us of opportunities for maintaining a moral ascendancy in our struggle with the Soviet system.

In "containment" it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion which will avoid so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open the possibility for the U.S.A.R. to retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face and to secure political advantage from the failure of the Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the openings we leave it.

/// We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of "containment". In the face of obviously mounting Soviet military strength ours has declined relatively. Partly as a by-product of this, but also for other reasons, we now find ourselves at a diplomatic impasse with the Soviet Union, with the Kremlin growing bolder, with both of us holding on grimly to what we have and with ourselves facing difficult decisions.

In examining our capabilities it is relevant to ask at the outset--capabilities for what? The answer cannot be stated solely in the negative terms of resisting the Kremlin design. It includes also our capabilities to attain the fundamental purpose of the United States, and to foster a world environment in which our free society can survive and flourish.

Potentially we have these capabilities. To know we have them in the economic and military fields. Potentially we also have them in the political and psychological fields. The vast majority of Americans are confident that the system of values which animates our society--the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual and the supremacy of ~~TOP SECRET~~

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-4-

than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet dynasties. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other peoples--our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement and insecurity.

Essentially, our democracy also possesses a unique degree of unity. Our society is fundamentally more cohesive than the Soviet system, the solidarity of which is artificially created through force, fear and fever. This means that expressions of national consensus in our society are soundly and solidly based. It means that the possibility of revolution in this country is fundamentally less than that in the Soviet system.

These capabilities within us constitute a great potential force in our international relations. The potential within us of bearing witness to the values by which we live holds promise for a dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality of our system. The essential tolerance of our world outlook, our generous and constructive impulses, and the absence of covetousness in our international relations are assets of potentially enormous influence.

These then are our potential capabilities. Between them and our capabilities currently being utilized is a wide gap of unrealized power. In sharp contrast is the situation of the Soviet world. Its capabilities are inferior to those of our allies and to our own. But they are mobilized close to the maximum possible extent.

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The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only through the traditional democratic processes. This process requires, firstly, that sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed. Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the Government.

The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way because, in seeking to protect and fulfill the individual, it demands of him understanding, judgment and positive participation in the increasingly complex and exacting problems of the modern world. It demands that he exercise discriminations: that while pursuing through free inquiry the search for truth he knows when he should commit an act of faith; that he distinguish between the necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression. *with det?*
A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses -- the excesses of a perpetually open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of tolerance degenerating into

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into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess of resorting to suppression when more moderate measures are not only more appropriate but more effective.

In coping with dictatorial governments acting in secrecy and with speed, we are also vulnerable in that the democratic process necessarily operates in the open and at a deliberate tempo. Weaknesses in our situation are readily apparent and subject to immediate exploitation. This Government therefore cannot afford in the face of the totalitarian challenge to operate on a narrow margin of strength. A democracy can compensate for its natural vulnerability only if it maintains a clearly superior overall power in its most inclusive sense.

The very virtues of our system likewise handicap us in certain respects in our relations with our allies. While it is a general source of strength to us that our relations with our allies are conducted on a basis of persuasion and consent rather than compulsion and capitulation, it is also evident that dissent among us can become a vulnerability. Sometimes the dissent has its principal roots abroad in situations about which we can do nothing. Sometimes it arises largely out of certain weaknesses within ourselves, about which we can do something--our active impotency and a tendency to expect too much from people widely divergent from us.

The full capabilities of the rest of the free world are a potential increment to our own capabilities. It may even be said that the capabilities of the Soviet world,

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-7-

world, specifically the capabilities of the masses who have nothing to lose but their Soviet chains, are a potential which can be enlisted on our side.

Like our own capabilities, those of the rest of the free world exceed the capabilities of the Soviet system. Like our own they are far from being effectively mobilized and employed in the struggle against the Kremlin despot. This is so because the rest of the free world lacks a sense of unity, confidence and common purpose. This is true in even the most homogeneous and advanced segment of the free world--Western Europe.

As we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of moral and political direction, so these same qualities will be evoked in Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also anticipate a general improvement in the political tone in Latin America, Asia and Africa and the real beginnings of weakening among the Soviet totalitarianist.

In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the free world is almost certain to become demoralized. Our friends will become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power.

In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important sense, a function of our own. An affirmative decision to summon up the potential within ourselves would evoke the potential strength within others and add it to our own.

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3. Economics

1. Capabilities. In contrast to the war economy of the Soviet world (cf. Ch. I-3), the American economy (and the economy of the free world as a whole) is at present directed to the provision of rising standards of living. The military budget of the United States represents 6 to 7 percent of its gross national product (as against 13.8 percent for the Soviet Union). Our North Atlantic Treaty allies devoted 4.8 percent of their national product to military purposes in 1949.

This difference in emphasis between the two economies seems that the readiness of the free world to support a war effort is tending to decline relative to that of the Soviet Union. There is little direct investment in production facilities for military end-products and in dispersal. There are relatively few men receiving military training and a relatively low rate of production of weapons. However, given time to convert to a war effort, the capabilities of the United States economy and also of the Western European economy would be tremendous. In the light of Soviet military capabilities, a question which may be of decisive importance in the event of war is the question whether there will be time to mobilize our superior human and material resources for a war effort (cf. Chs. VIII and IX).

The capability of the American economy to support a build-up of economic and military strength at home and to assist a build-up abroad is limited not, as in the case of the Soviet Union, so much by the ability to produce as by the decision on the proper allocation of resources

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-9-

to this and other purposes. Even Western Europe could afford to assign a substantially larger proportion of its resources to defense, if the necessary foundation in public understanding and will could be laid, and if the assistance needed to meet its dollar deficit were provided.

A few statistics will help to clarify this point.

Percentages of Gross Available Resources
Allocated to Investment, National Defense,
and Consumption in 1941 & 1942.

Approximate only
GHP?

(in percent of total)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>GROSS</u> <u>INVESTMENT</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CONSUMPTION</u>
U.S.S.R.	25.4	13.8	40.8
Soviet Orbit	22.0 <u>a/</u>	4.0 <u>b/</u>	74.0 <u>b/</u>
U.S.	13.6	6.5	79.9
European War ⁵ countries	20.4	4.8	74.8

a/ Crude estimate.

b/ Includes Soviet Zone of Germany; otherwise 5 percent.

The Soviet Union is now allocating nearly 40 percent of its gross available resources to military purposes and investment, much of which is in war-supporting industries. It is estimated that even in an emergency the Soviet Union could not increase this proportion to each more than 50 percent, or by one-fourth. The United States, on the other hand, is allocating only about 20 percent of its resources to defense and investment (or 22 percent including foreign assistance), and little of its investment outlays are directed to war-supporting industries. In an emergency the United States could allocate more than

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50 percent of its resources to military purposes and foreign assistance, as five to six times as much as at present.

The same point can be brought out by statistics on the use of important products. The Soviet Union is using 14 percent of its ingot steel, 47 percent of its primary aluminum, and 18.5 percent of its crude oil for military purposes, while the corresponding percentages for the United States are 1.7, 8.6, and 5.6. Despite the tremendously larger production of these goods in the United States than the Soviet Union, the latter is actually using, for military purposes, nearly twice as much steel as the United States and 8 to 76 percent more aluminum, ^(and more oil.)

Perhaps the most impressive indication of the economic superiority of the free world over the Soviet world which can be made on the basis of available data is provided in the following comparison (based mainly on the Economic Survey of Europe, 1954):

Conclusion

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Comparative Statistics on Economic
Capabilities of East and West

	<u>U.S.</u> <u>1948-9</u>	<u>European</u> <u>NAT</u> <u>Countries</u> <u>1948-9</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u> <u>(1950</u> <u>Plan)</u>	<u>Satellite</u> <u>1948-9</u>	<u>Total</u>
Population (millions)	149	173	122	198 ^{1/}	75	273
Employment in non-Agricultural Establishments (millions)	45	--	--	31 ^{2/}	--	--
Gross National Production (billion dollars)	250	84	334	45 ^{2/}	21	66
National Income per capita (current dollars)	1700	480	1040	330	280	315
<u>Production Data:</u>						
Coal (million tons)	592	306	488	290	88	378
Electric Power (billion KWH)	356	124	480	82	15	97
Crude Petroleum (million tons)	277	1	278	35	5	40
Pig Iron (million tons)	55	24	79	19.5	3.2	22.7
Steel (million tons)	80	32	112	25	4	31
Cement (million tons)	35	21	56	10.5	2.1	12.6
Motor Vehicles (thousands)	5273	580	5853	500	25	525

^{1/} 1949 data.

^{2/} For the European NAT countries and for the satellites,
the data include only output by major producers.

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-12-

It should be noted that these comparisons understate the relative position of the six countries for several reasons: (1) Canada is excluded because comparable data were not available; (2) the data for the U.S.S.R. are the 1950 targets (as stated in the fourth five-year plan) rather than actual rates of production and are believed to exceed in any case the production actually achieved; (3) the data for the European NATO countries are actual data for 1948, and production has generally increased since that time. *There are also some NATO countries which report only increases.*

Furthermore, the United States could achieve a substantial absolute increase in output and could thereby increase the utilization of resources to a build-up of the economic and military strength of itself and its allies without suffering a decline in its real standard of living. Industrial production declined by 10 percent between the first quarter of 1948 and the last quarter of 1949, and by approximately one-fourth between 1944 and 1949. In March 1950 there were approximately 4,750,000 unemployed, as compared to 1,070,000 in 1943 and 670,000 in 1944. The gross national product declined slowly in 1949 from the peak reached in 1948 (\$262 billion in 1948 to an annual rate of \$236 billion in the last six months of 1949), and in terms of constant prices declined by about 20 percent between 1944 and 1948.

With a high level of economic activity, the United States could soon attain a gross national product of \$300 billion per year, as was pointed out in the

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President's Economic Report (January 1950). Progress in this direction would permit, and might itself be aided by, a build-up of the economic and military strength of the United States and the free world; furthermore, if a dynamic expansion of the economy were achieved, the necessary build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the national standard of living because the required resources could be obtained by siphoning off a part of the annual increment in the gross national product. These are facts of fundamental importance in considering the course of action open to the United States (cf. Ch. II).

2. Intentions. Foreign economic policy is a major instrument in the conduct of United States foreign relations. It is an instrument which can powerfully influence the world environment in ways favorable to the security and welfare of this country. It is also an instrument which, if wisely formulated and employed, can do actual harm to our national interests. It is an instrument uniquely suited to our capabilities, provided we have the tenacity of purpose and the understanding requisite to a realization of its potentials. Finally, it is an instrument peculiarly appropriate to the cold war.

The preceding analysis has indicated that an essential element in a program to frustrate the Kremlin design is the development of a successfully functioning system among the free nations. It is clear that economic conditions are among the fundamental determinants of the will and the strength to resist subversion and aggression.

United States

United States foreign economic policy has been designed to assist in the building of such a system and such conditions in the free world. The principal features of this policy can be summarized as follows:

(1) assistance to Western Europe in recovery and the creation of a viable economy (the European Recovery Program);

(2) assistance to other countries because of their special needs arising out of the war or the cold war and our special interests in or responsibility for meeting them (grant assistance to Japan, the Philippines, and Korea, loans and credits by the Export-Import Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank to Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Iran, etc.);

(3) assistance in the development of under-developed areas (the Point IV program and loans and credits to various countries, overlapping to some extent with those mentioned under 2);

(4) military assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty countries, Greece, Turkey, etc.;

(5) restriction of East-West trade in items of military importance to the East;

(6) purchase and stockpiling of strategic materials; and

(7) efforts to re-establish an international economy based on multilateral trade, declining trade barriers, and convertible currencies (the GATT-ITO program, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, the IMF-IMB program, and the program now being developed to solve the problem of the United States balance of payments).

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In both their short and long term aspects, these policies and programs are directed to the strengthening of the free world and therefore to the frustration of the Kremlin design. Despite certain inadequacies and inconsistencies, which are now being studied in connection with the problem of the United States balance of payments, the United States has generally pursued a foreign economic policy which has powerfully supported its overall objectives. The question must nevertheless be asked whether current and currently projected programs will adequately support this policy in the future, in terms both of need and urgency.

The last year has been indecisive in the economic field. The Soviet Union has made considerable progress in integrating the satellite economies of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy, but still faces very large problems, especially with China. The free nations have important accomplishments to record, but also have tremendous problems still ahead. On balance, neither side can claim any great advantage in this field over its relative position a year ago. The important question therefore becomes what are the trends?

Several conclusions seem to emerge. First, the Soviet Union is widening the gap between its preparedness for war ^{not proven} and the unpreparedness of the free world for war. It is devoting a far greater absorption of its resources to military purposes than are the free nations and, in significant components of military power, a greater absolute quantity of ^{not proven} resources. Second, the Communist success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a springboard for a further incursion in

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-16-

this troubled area. Although Communist China faces serious economic problems which may impose even strains on the Soviet economy, it is probable that the social and economic problems faced by the free nations in this area present more than offsetting opportunities for Communist expansion. Third, the Soviet Union holds positions in Europe which, if it maneuvers skillfully, could be used to do great damage to the Western European economy and to the maintenance of the Western orientation of certain countries, particularly Germany and Austria. Fourth, despite (and in part because of) the Russian defection, the Soviet Union has accelerated its efforts to integrate satellite economy with its own and to increase the degree of autarky within the areas under its control.

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Fifth, meanwhile Western Europe, with American (and Canadian) assistance, has achieved a record level of production. However, it faces the prospect of a rapid tapering-off of American assistance without the possibility of achieving by its own efforts a satisfactory equilibrium with the dollar area. It has also made very little progress toward "economic integration", which would in the long run tend to improve its productivity and to provide an economic environment conducive to political stability. In particular, the movement towards economic integration does not appear to be rapid enough to provide Western Germany with adequate economic opportunities in the West. The United Kingdom still faces economic problems which may require a moderate but politically difficult decline in the British standard of living or more American assistance than is contemplated. At the same time,

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stability of the Commonwealth is not to be impaired and if it is to be a focus of resistance to Communist expansion in South and South-East Asia. Improvement of the British position is also vital in building up the defensive capabilities of Western Europe.

Sixth, throughout Asia the stability of the present moderate governments, which are more in sympathy with our purposes than any probable successor regimes could be, is doubtful. The problem is only in part an economic one. Assistance in economic development is important as a means of holding out to the peoples of Asia some prospect of improvement in standards of living under their present governments. But probably more important are a strengthening of central institutions, an improvement in administration, and generally a development of an economic and social structure within which the peoples of Asia can make more effective use of their great human and material resources.

Seventh, and perhaps most important, there are indications of a let-down of United States efforts under the pressure of the domestic budgetary situation, disillusion resulting from excessively optimistic expectations about the duration and results of our assistance programs, and doubts about the wisdom of continuing to strengthen the free nations as against preparedness measures in light of the intensity of the cold war.

Eighth, there are grounds for predicting that the United States and other free nations will within a period of a few years at least experience a decline in

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economic activity of serious proportions unless some positive governmental programs are developed that are now available.

In short, as we look into the future, the programs now planned will not meet the requirements of the free nations. The difficulty does not lie so much in the inadequacy or misdirection of policy as in the inadequacy of planned progress, in terms of timing or impact, to achieve our objectives. The risks inherent in this situation are set forth in the following chapter and a course of action designed to reinvigorate our efforts in order to reverse the present trends and to achieve our fundamental purpose is outlined in Chapter IX.

C. Military

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offensive air operations against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.

The scope of the operations listed in the preceding paragraph is limited by the effective forces and material in being of the United States and its allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Considered with the aggressive threat facing us and in accordance with overall strategic plans, the United States must provide to its allies on a continuing basis as large amounts of military assistance as possible without serious detriment to United States operational requirements.

If the potential military capabilities of the United States and its allies were rapidly and effectively developed, sufficient Forces could be produced probably in short order, or if the Soviet Union chooses not to withstand the initial Soviet attacks, to stabilize supporting attacks, and to retaliate in turn with even greater impact on the Soviet capabilities. From the military point of view alone, however, this would require not only the generation of the necessary military forces but also the development and stockpiling of improved weapons of all types.

Under existing peacetime conditions, a period of from one to three years is required to produce a material increase in military power. Such increased power could be provided in a somewhat shorter period in a declared period of emergency or in wartime through a full-out national effort. Any increase in military power in peacetime, however, should be related both to its probable

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military role in war, to the implementation of immediate and long-term United States foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and to the realities of the existing situation. If such a course of increasing our military power is adopted now, the United States would have the capability of eliminating the disparity between its military strength and the exigencies of the situation we face; eventually of gaining the initiative in the "cold" war and of materially delaying if not stopping the Soviet offensive in our itself.

*Every one believes in the "cold" war
but will depend on - a - 20%
of present military strength?*

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VII. PRESENT RISKS

A. General

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we could face the great problem of the free society, accustomed very fond to this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirements of freedom. We could face the fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. The Kremlin design seeks to impose order among nations by means which would destroy our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of atomic weapons puts one year behind its design, and increases the jeopardy to our system. It adds new strains to the uneasy equilibrium-without-order which exists in the world and raises new doubts in men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this state without moving toward some kind of order, on anybody's terms.

The risks we face are of a new order of magnitude, commensurate with the total struggle in which we are engaged. For a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never wholly attained, are always in the process of being attained. But defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is total defeat. These risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice, ultimately, between meeting them effectively or being overruled by them. ~~TOP SECRET~~

B. Specifics

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B. Specifics

It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war. The preferred technique is to subvert by infiltration and intimidation. Every institution of our society is an instrument which it is sought to stultify and turn against our purposes. Those that touch most closely our material and moral strength are obviously the prime targets, later unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing opinion. The effort is not so much to make them serve obvious Soviet ends, as to prevent them from serving our ends, and thus to make them sources of confusion in our economy, our culture and our body politic. The doubts and disorientations that in terms of our values are part of the merit of a free system, the weaknesses and the problems that are peculiar to it, the rights and privileges that free men enjoy, and the disorganization and destruction left in the wake of the last attack on our freedoms, all are but opportunities for the Kremlin to do its evil work. Every advantage is taken of the fact that our means of prevention and retaliation are limited by those principles and scruples which are precisely the ones that give our freedom and democracy the meaning for us. None of our scruples deter those whose only code is, "morality is that which serves the revolution".

Since everything that gives us or others respect for our institutions is a suitable object for attack, it also

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like the Kremlin's design that where, with impunity, we can be insulted and made to suffer indignity the opportunity shall not be missed, particularly in any context which can be used to cast dishonor on our country, our system, our motives, or our methods. Thus the means by which we sought to restore our own economic health in the '30's, and now seek to restore that of the free world, were equally under attack. The military aid by which we sought to help the free world was fraudulently denounced by the Communists in the early days of the last war, and of course our present efforts to develop adequate military strength for ourselves and our allies are equally denounced.

At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military forces, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation. In the only terms in which it understands strength, it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack it are decadent and doomed. In Israel incidents it threatens and threatens both for the sake of Israeli gains and to increase anxiety and defection in all the free world.

The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, and the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in the other, puts a premium on a surprise attack against us. It equally puts a premium on a more violent and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold war, especially if the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the improbability of our presenting a preventive

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war. It also puts a premium on placid aggression against others, counting on our unwillingness to engage in stoic war unless we are directly attacked. I run all these risks and the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of each.

The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with ever narrower and more desperate alternatives, is the greatest risk of all. For example, it is clear that our present weakness would prevent us from offering effective resistance at any of several vital pressure points. The only deterrent we can present to the Kremlin is the evidence we give that we may take any of the critical points which we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation.

The risk of having no better choice than to capitulate or precipitate a global war at any of a number of pressure points is bad enough in itself, but it is multiplied by the weakness it imparts to our position in the cold war. Instead of appearing strong and resolute we are continually at the verge of appearing and being ultimately irreconcilable and desperate; yet it is the cold war which we most win, because both the Kremlin design, and our fundamental purpose give it the first priority.

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The Frustration of the Kremlin Design, however, cannot be accomplished by us alone, as will appear from the analysis in Chapter IX, E. Strength at the Center, in the United States, is only the first of two essential elements. The second is that our allies and potential allies do not as a result of a sense of frustration or of Soviet intimidation drift into a course of neutrality eventually leading to Soviet domination. If this were to happen in Germany the effect upon eastern Europe and eventually upon us might be catastrophic.

But there are risks in making ourselves strong. A large measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people. They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms. Nothing could be more important than that they fully understand the reasons for this. The risks of a superficial understanding or of an inadequate appreciation of the issues are obvious and might lead to the adoption of measures which in themselves would jeopardize the integrity of our system. At any point in the process of demonstrating our will to make good our fundamental purpose, the Kremlin may decide to precipitate a general war, or in testing us, may go too far. There are risks we will invite by making ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those we seek to avoid. Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any mistakes we may make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that will. No people in history have preserved their freedom who thought that by not being strong enough to protect themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.

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*Swear to Congress to protect freedom,
they have given their freedom.*

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VIII. ATOMIC ABILITIES

A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities.

1. The United States now has an atomic capability, including both numbers and deliverability, estimated to be adequate, if effectively utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making capacity of the U.S.S.R. It is doubted whether such a blow, even if it resulted in the complete destruction of the contemplated target systems, would cause the U.S.S.R. to see for terms or prevent Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe against such ground resistance as could presently be mobilized. A very serious initial blow could, however, so reduce the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to supply and equip its military organization and its civilian population as to give the United States the prospect of developing a general military superiority in a war of long duration.

2. As the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. increases, it will have an increased ability to hit at our atomic bases and installations and thus seriously hamper the ability of the United States to carry out an attack such as that outlined above. It is quite possible that in the near future the U.S.S.R. will have a sufficient number of atomic bombs and a sufficient deliverability to raise a question whether Britain with the present inadequate air defenses could be relied upon as an advance base from which a major portion of the U.S. attack could be launched.

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It is estimated that, within the next four years, the U.S.S.R. will attain the capability of seriously disabling vital centers of the United States, provided it strikes a surprise blow and provided further that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than we now have programmed. Such a blow would so seriously damage the United States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential.

Effective opposition to this Soviet capability will require among other measures greatly increased air warning systems, air defenses, and vigorous development and implementation of a civilian defense program which has been thoroughly integrated with the military defense systems.

In the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.

3. In the initial phases of an atomic war, the advantages of initiative and surprise would be very great. A police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the necessary security and centralization of decision required to capitalize on this advantage.

4. For the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably adequate to deter the Kremlin from a deliberate direct military attack against ourselves or other free peoples. However, when it calculates that it has a sufficient atomic capability to make a surprise attack on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a military situation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike swiftly and with stealth. The existence of the large atomic capabilities in such a relationship might well act, therefore, not as a deterrent, but as an incitement to war.

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5. A further increase in the number and power of our atomic weapons is necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of any U.S. retaliatory blow, but would not of itself seem to change the basic logic of the above points. Greatly increased general air, ground and sea strength, and increased air defense and civilian defense programs would also be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the free world could survive an initial surprise atomic attack of the weight which it is estimated the U.S.S.R. will be capable of delivering by 1974 and still permit the free world to go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. Furthermore, such a build up of strength could safeguard and increase our retaliatory power, and thus might put off for some time the date when the Soviet Union could calculate that a surprise blow would be advantageous. This would provide additional time for the effects of our policies to produce a modification of the Soviet system.

6. If the U.S.S.R. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S., the risks of greatly increased Soviet pressure against all the free world, or an attack against the U.S., will be greatly increased.

7. If the U.S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. should for the time being be able to bring increased pressure on the U.S.S.R.

8. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons-

1. From the foregoing analysis it appears that it would be to the long-term advantage of the United States if atomic weapons were to be effectively eliminated from national peace-time armaments; the additional objectives which must be secured

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if there is to be a reasonable prospect of such effective elimination of atomic weapons are discussed in Chapter IX. In the absence of such elimination and the securing of these objectives, it would appear that we have no alternative but to increase our atomic capability as rapidly as other considerations make appropriate. In either case, it appears to be imperative to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are militarily not as heavily dependent on atomic weapons. *very heavy*

2. As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the United States employ military force only if the necessity for its use is clear and compelling and commands itself to the overwhelming majority of our people. The United States cannot therefore engage in war except as a reaction to aggression of an clear and compelling nature so to bring the overwhelming majority of our people to accept the use of military force. In the event war comes, our use of force must be to compel the acceptance of our objectives and must be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

In the event of a general war with the U.S.S.R., it must be anticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the manner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. In view of our vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued that we might wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retaliation against prior use by the U.S.S.R. To be able to do so and still have hope of achieving our objectives, the non-atomic military capabilities of ourselves and our allies would have to be fully developed and the political weaknesses of the Soviet Union fully exploited. In the event of war, however, we could not be sure that we could move toward the attainment of these objectives without the U.S.S.R.'s resorting sooner or later to the use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had overwhelming

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atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the U.S.S.R. be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the attainment of our objectives.

In the event the U.S.S.R. develops by 1954 the atomic capability which we now anticipate, it is hardly conceivable that, if our cause, the Soviet leaders would refrain from the use of atomic weapons unless they felt fully confident of attaining their objectives by other means.

In the event we use atomic weapons either in retaliation for their prior use by the U.S.S.R. or because there is no alternative shown by which we can obtain our objectives, it is imperative that the strategic and tactical targets against which they are used be appropriate and the manner in which they are used be consistent with these objectives. (That
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It appears to follow from the above that we should produce and stockpile thermonuclear weapons in the event they prove feasible and would add significantly to our net capability. Not enough is yet known of their potentialities to warrant a judgment at this time regarding their use in war to obtain our objectives.

3. It has been suggested that to announce that we will not use atomic weapons except in retaliation against the prior use of such weapons by an aggressor. It has been argued that such a declaration would decrease the danger of an atomic attack against the United States and its allies.

In our present situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional weapons, such a declaration would be interpreted by the U.S.S.R. as an admission of great weakness and

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by our allies as a clear indication that we intended to abandon them. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such a declaration would be taken sufficiently seriously by the Kremlin to constitute an important factor in determining whether or not to attack the United States. It is to be anticipated that the Kremlin would weigh the facts of our capability far more heavily than a declaration of what we proposed to do with that capability.

Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot make such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we will be in a position to attain our objectives without war, or, in the event of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for strategic or tactical purposes.

C. International Control of Atomic Energy.

1. A discussion of certain of the basic considerations involved in securing effective international control is necessary to make clear why the additional objectives discussed in Chapter IX must be secured.

2. No system of international control could prevent the production and use of atomic weapons in the event of a prolonged war. Even the most effective system of international control could, of itself, only provide (a) assurance that atomic weapons had been eliminated from national peacetime armaments and (b) immediate notice of a violation. In essence, an effective international control system would be expected to secure a certain amount of time after notice of violation before atomic weapons could be used in war.

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3. The time period between notice of violation and possible use of atomic weapons is one which a control system could be expected to secure depends upon a number of factors.

The dismantling of existing stockpiles of bombs and the destruction of weapons and firing assemblies could by themselves give little assurance of covering time. Weapons and firing assemblies are presumably easy to produce, even surreptitiously, and the assembly of weapons does not take much time.

If existing stocks of fissionable materials were in some way eliminated and the future production of fissionable materials effectively controlled, war could not start with a surprise atomic attack.

In order to secure an appreciable time lag between notice of violation and the time when atomic weapons might be available in quantity, it would be necessary to destroy all plants capable of making large amounts of fissionable material. Such action would, however, require a moratorium on those possible practices now being used for large quantities of fissionable materials.

Effective control over the production and stockpiling of the materials might further extend the time period which effective international control would secure. Now that the Russians have learned the technique of producing atomic weapons, the time between violation of an international control agreement and production of atomic weapons will be shorter than was estimated in 1948, except possibly in the field of thermonuclear or other new types of weapons.

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4. The certainty of notice of violation also depends upon a number of factors. In the absence of good faith, it is to be doubted whether any system can be designed which will give certainty of notice of violation. International ownership of raw materials and fissionable materials and international ownership and operation of dangerous facilities, coupled with inspection based on continuous unlimited freedom of access to all parts of the Soviet Union (as well as to all parts of the territory of other signatories to the control agreement) appear to be necessary to give the requisite degree of assurance against secret violations. As the Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials grows, the amount which the U.S.S.R. might secretly withhold and not disclose to the inspection agency grows. In this sense, the earlier an agreement is consummated the greater the security it would offer. The possibility of successful secret production operations also increases with developments which may reduce the size and power consumption of individual reactors. The development of a thermonuclear bomb would increase many fold the damage a given amount of fissionable material could do and would, therefore, vastly increase the danger that a decisive advantage could be gained through secret operations.

5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in international control need also to be considered. If it were possible to negotiate an effective system of international control the United States could presumably sacrifice a much larger stockpile of atomic weapons and a much larger production capacity than would the U.S.S.R. The opening up of national territory to international

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to international inspection involved in an adequate control and inspection system would have a far greater impact on the U.S.S.R. than on the United States. If the control system involves the destruction of all large reactors the thus a moratorium on certain possible peacetime work, the U.S.S.R. can be expected to argue that it, because of greater need for new sources of energy, would be making a greater sacrifice in this regard than the United States.

6. The United States and the peoples of the world as a whole desire a respite from the dangers of atomic warfare. The chief difficulty lies in the danger that the respite would be short and that we might not have adequate notice of its pending termination. For such an arrangement to be in the interest of the United States, it is essential that the agreement be entered into in good faith by both sides and the probability against its violation high.

7. The most substantial contribution to security of an effective international control system would, of course, be the opening up of the Soviet Union, as required under the U.N. plan. Such opening up is not, however, compatible with the maintenance of the Soviet system in its present rigid. This is a major reason for the Soviet refusal to accept the U.N. plan.

The studies which began with the sixteen-nationed committee and culminated in the present U.N. plan made it clear that inspection of atomic facilities would not alone give the assurance of control; but that ownership and operation by an international authority of the world's atomic

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energy activities from the mine to the last use of fissionable materials are also essential. The delegation of sovereignty which this implies is necessary for effective control and, therefore, is as necessary for the United States and the rest of the free world as it is presently unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

It is also clear that a control authority not susceptible directly or indirectly to Soviet domination is equally essential. As the Soviet Union would regard any country not under its domination as under the potential if not the actual domination of the United States, it is clear that what the United States and the non-Soviet world must insist on, the Soviet Union must at present reject.

The principal immediate benefit of international control would be to make a surprise atomic attack impossible, assuming the elimination of large reactors and the effective disposal of stockpiles of fissionable materials. But it is almost certain that the Soviet Union would not agree to the elimination of large reactors, unless the impracticability of producing atomic power for peaceful purposes had been demonstrated beyond a doubt. By the same token, it could not now agree to elimination of its stockpile of fissionable materials.

Finally, the absence of good faith on the part of the U.S.S.R. must be assumed until there is concrete evidence that there has been a decisive change in Soviet policies. It is to be doubted whether such a change can take place without a change in the nature of the Soviet system itself.

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The above considerations make it clear that at least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union could have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of economic and cooperation before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that "...the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure...their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field... . As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy."

In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.

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IX. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Intimidation. Four possible courses of action by the United States in the present situation can be distinguished. They are: (A) Continuation of current policies, with support and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies; (B) isolation; (C) war; and (D) a more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under (A), with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked.

The role of negotiation. Negotiation must be considered in relation to these courses of action. A negotiator always attempts to achieve an agreement which is somewhat better than the realities of his fundamental position would justify and which is, in any case, not worse than his fundamental position requires. This is as true in relations among sovereign states as in relations between individuals. The Soviet Union possesses several advantages over the free world in negotiations on any issue: (a) it can and does enforce secrecy on all significant facts about conditions within the Soviet Union, so that it can be expected to know more about the realities of the free world's position than the free world knows about its position; (b) it does not have to be responsive in any important sense to public opinion; (c) it does not have to consult and agree with any other countries on the terms it will offer and accept; and (d) it can influence public opinion in other countries while insulating the peoples under its control.

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There are important advantages. Together with the unfavorable trend of our power position, they militate, as is shown in Section A below, against successful negotiation of a general settlement at this time. For although the United States probably now possesses, principally in atomic weapons, a force adequate to deliver a powerful blow upon the Soviet Union and to open the road to victory in a long war, it is not sufficient by itself to advance the position of the United States in the cold war.

The problem is to create such political and economic conditions in the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack, that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradually withdraw, and eventually change its policies drastically. It has been shown in Chapter VIII that truly effective control of atomic energy would require such an opening up of the Soviet Union and such evidence in other ways of its good faith and its intent to co-exist in peace as to reflect or at least initiate a change in the Soviet system.

Clearly under present circumstances we will not be able to negotiate a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system. What, then, is the role of negotiations?

In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries still require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many people here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet Union begins to show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues.

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The free countries must always, therefore, be prepared to negotiate and must be ready to take the initiative at times in seeking negotiation. They must develop a negotiating position which defines the issues and the terms on which they would be prepared--and at what stages--to accept agreements with the Soviet Union. The terms must be fair in the view of popular opinion in the free world. This means that they must be consistent with a positive program for peace--in harmony with the United Nations' Charter and providing, at a minimum, for the effective control of all armaments by the United Nations or a successor organization. The terms must not require more of the Soviet Union than such behavior and such participation in a world organization. The fact that such conduct by the Soviet Union is impossible without such a radical change in Soviet policies as to constitute a change in the Soviet system would thus emerge as a result of the Kremlin's unwillingness to accept such terms or of its bad faith in observing them.

A sound negotiating position is, therefore, an essential element in the ideological conflict. For some time after a decision to build up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settlement along the lines of the Warkley speech by the Secretary of State

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could be only a tactic. ² Nevertheless, concurrently with a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public support for the program and to minimize the immediate risks of war. It is urgently necessary for the United States to determine its negotiating position and to obtain agreement with its major allies on the purposes and terms of negotiation.

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In the second place, assuming that the United States in cooperation with other free countries decides and acts to increase the strength of the free world and assuming that the Kremlin chooses the path of accommodation, it will from time to time be necessary and desirable to negotiate on various specific issues with the Kremlin at the area of possible agreement visées.

The Kremlin will have three major objectives in negotiations with the United States. The first is to eliminate the atomic capabilities of the United States; the second is to prevent the effective mobilization of the superior potential of the free world in human and material resources; and the third is to secure a withdrawal of United States forces

1/ The Secretary of State listed seven areas in which the Soviet Union could modify its behavior in such a way as to permit coexistence in reasonable security. These were:

1. Treaties of peace with Austria, Germany, Japan and relaxation of pressures in the Far East;
2. Withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from satellite areas;
3. Cooperation in the United Nations;
4. Control of atomic energy and of conventional armaments;
5. Abandonment of indirect aggression;
6. Proper treatment of official representatives of the U.S.;
7. Increased access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas from other countries.

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forces from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan. Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and weaknesses as against the West's (particularly the ability and will of the West to sustain its efforts), it will or will not be prepared to make important concessions to achieve these major objectives. It is unlikely that the Kremlin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared to make significant concessions.

The objectives of the United States and other free countries in negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from the ideological objectives discussed above) are to record, in a formal fashion which will facilitate the consolidation and further advance of our position, the process of Soviet accommodation to the new political, psychological, and economic conditions in the world which will result from adoption of the fourth course of action and which will be supported by the increasing military strength developed as an integral part of that course of action. In short, our objectives are to record, where desirable, the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process by making negotiation, if possible, always more expedient than resort to force.

It must be stressed that for some time the Kremlin will accept agreements only if it is convinced that by acting in bad faith whenever and wherever there is an opportunity to do so with impunity. It can derive greater advantage from the agreements than the free world. For this reason, we must take care that any agreements are enforceable or that they

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-6-

they are not susceptible of violation without detection and the possibility of effective counter-measures.

This further suggests that we will have to consider carefully the order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the control of atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament of the United States than of the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress in building up the strength of the free world in conventional forces and weapons. It might be conceived by the Soviet Union as part of a deliberate design to move against Western Europe and other areas of strategic importance with conventional forces and weapons. In this event, the United States would find itself at war, having previously disarmed itself in its most important weapon, and would be engaged in a race to redevelop atomic weapons.

This seems to indicate that for the time being the United States and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic forces and weapons and perhaps on the other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satellites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union should accept agreements providing effective control of atomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other changes in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very carefully whether we could accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will arise.

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To the extent that the United States and the rest of the free world succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces and weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted or held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable.

In the third place, negotiation will play a part in the building up of the strength of the free world, apart from the ideological strength discussed above. This is most evident in the problems of Germany, Austria and Japan. In the process of building up strength, it may be desirable for the free nations, without the Soviet Union, to conclude separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these countries in support of the free world. This will be difficult unless it has been demonstrated by attempted negotiation with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept treaties of peace which would leave these countries free, under adequate safeguards, to participate in the United Nations and in regional or broader associations of states consistent with the United Nations' Charter and providing security and adequate opportunities for the peaceful development of their political and economic life.

This demonstrates the importance, from the point of view of negotiation as well as for its relationship to the building up of the strength of the free world (see Section D below), of the problem of closer association--on a regional or a broader basis--among the free countries.

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In conclusion, negotiation is not a possible separate course of action but rather a means of gaining support for a program of building strength, of recording, where necessary and desirable, progress in the cold war, and of facilitating further progress while helping to minimize the risks of war. Ultimately, it is our objective to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union (or a successor state or states) on which the world can place reliance as an enforceable instrument of peace. But it is important to emphasize that such a settlement can only record the progress which the free world will have made in creating a political and economic system in the world so successful that the frustration of the Kremlin's design for world domination will be complete. The analysis in the following sections indicates that the building of such a system requires expanded and accelerated progress for the carrying out of current policies.

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A. The First Counter-Continuation of Current Policies,
with Current and Currently Projected Programs for
Carrying Out These Policies

1. Military aspects. On the basis of current programs, the United States has a large potential military capability but an actual capability which, though improving, is declining relative to the U.S.S.R., particularly in light of its prototype fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The same holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet world as a whole. If war broke out in 1950 or in the next few years, the United States and its allies, apart from a powerful atomic blow, will be compelled to conduct delaying actions, while building up their strength for a general offensive. A frank evaluation of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital interests and to support a vigorous initiative in the cold war, on the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other, indicates that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them.

A review of Soviet policy shows that the military capabilities, actual and potential, of the United States and the rest of the free world, together with the apparent determination of the free world to resist further Soviet expansion, have not induced the Kremlin to bring its resources generally or to give up the initiative in the cold war. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has consistently pursued a bold foreign policy, amplified only when its probing revealed a determination and an ability of the

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free world to resist encroachment upon it. The relative military capabilities of the free world are declining, with the result that its determination to resist may also decline and that the security of the United States and the free world as a whole will be jeopardized.

From the military point of view, the actual and potential capabilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war deterrent. Improvement of the state of readiness will become more and more important not only to inhibit the launching of war by the Soviet Union but also to support a national policy designed to reverse the present ominous trends in international relations. A building up of the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is a precondition to the achievement of the objectives outlined in this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster.

Fortunately, the United States military establishment has been developed into a unified and effective force as a result of the policies laid down by the Congress and the vigorous carrying out of these policies by the Administration in the fields of both organization and economy. It is, therefore, a base upon which increased strength can be rapidly built with maximum efficiency and economy.

2. Political aspects- The Soviet Union is pursuing the initiative in the conflict with the free world. Its atomic capabilities, together with its successes in the Far

-11-

the Far East, have led to an increasing confidence on the part and to an increasing nervousness in Western Europe and the rest of the free world. We cannot be sure, of course, how vigorously the Soviet Union will pursue its initiative, nor can we be sure of the strength or weakness of the other free countries in meeting it. There are, however, ominous signs of further deterioration in the Far East. There are also some indications that a decline in morale and confidence in Western Europe may be expected. In particular, the situation in Germany is unsettled. Should the belief or suspicion spread that the free nations are not now able to prevent the Soviet Union from taking if it chooses, the military policies outlined in Chapter V, the determination of the free countries to resist probably would lessen and there would be an increasing temptation for them to seek a position of neutrality.

Politically, recognition of the military implications of a continuation of present trends will mean that the United States and especially other free countries will tend to shift to the defensive, or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff, because the maintenance of a firm initiative in the cold war is closely related to aggressive strength in being and readily available.

This is largely a problem of the inadequacy of the current armed capabilities of the free world and the threat is all the more acute since the free world has an economic and military potential far superior to the potential of the Soviet Union.

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Soviet force falls darkly on Western Europe and Asia and supports a policy of encroachment. The free world lacks adequate means--in the face of forces as being--to thwart such expansion locally. The United States will therefore be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of reacting totally to a limited extension of Soviet control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual protests and half measures). Continuation of present trends is likely to lead, therefore, to a gradual withdrawal under the direct or indirect pressure of the Soviet Union, until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. In other words, the United States would have chosen, by lack of the necessary decisions and actions, to fall back to isolation in the Western Hemisphere. This course would at best result in only a relatively brief truce and would be ended either by our capitulation or by a defensive war--on unfavorable terms from unfavorable positions--against a Soviet Empire comprising all or most of Eurasia. (See Section 3.)

3. Isolation and Social Isolation. As was pointed out in Chapter VI, the present foreign economic policies and programs of the United States will not produce a solution to the problem of international economic equilibrium, notably the problem of the dollar gap, and will not create an economic base conducive to political stability in many important free countries.

The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting the restoration and expansion of production

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-12-

production in Western Europe and has been a major factor in checking the dry rot of Communism in Western Europe. However, little progress has been made toward the reassertion by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commensurate with its potential strength. Progress in this direction will require integrated political, economic and military policies and programs, which are supported by the United States and the Western European countries and which will probably require a deeper participation by the United States than has been contemplated.

The Point IV Program and other assistance programs will not adequately supplement, as now projected, the efforts of other important countries to develop effective institutions, to improve the administration of their affairs, and to achieve a sufficient measure of economic development. The economic regions now in peril in many countries, like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, will probably be unable to restore or retain their popular support and authority unless they are assisted in bringing about a more rapid improvement of the economic and social structure than present programs will make possible.

The Executive Branch is now undertaking a study of the problem of the United States balance of payments and of the measures which might be taken by the United States to assist in establishing international economic equilibrium. This is a very important project and work on it

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-14-

on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an economic program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted and vigorous political and military program, we will not be successful in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.

4. Exploitation. In short, by continuing along its present course the free world will not succeed in making effective use of its vastly superior political, economic, and military potential to build a tolerable state of order among nations. On the contrary, the political, economic, and military situation of the free world is already unsatisfactory and will become less favorable unless we act to reverse present trends.

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This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to build up our strength.

This is true despite the fact that the United States now has the capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for one of

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-15-

one of the present realities is that the United States is not prepared to threaten the use of our present atomic superiority to coerce the Soviet Union into acceptable agreements. In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not withdraw and the only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence and of no influence--a "settlement" which the Kremlin could readily exploit to its great advantage. The idea that Germany or Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of neutrality in a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design for World domination.

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B. The Second Course--Isolation.

Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its present commitments in Europe and Asia and to our isolation in the Eastern Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from a conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our present Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless they have confidence in our determination to accelerate our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.

There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a source of action, for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by reducing the former and by concentrating our present, or perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the United States.

This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which
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-17-

would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it
the as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of
order in the world. There is no way to make ourselves
inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete sub-
mission to its will. Therefore isolation would in
the end condemn us to capitulate or to fight alone
the on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive
and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the
Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities,
unless we are prepared to risk the future on the hazard
that the Soviet Empire, because of over-extension
or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy itself from
within.)

The argument also overlooks the incalculable,
but nevertheless drastic, effects on our belief in our-
selves; the in our way of life of a deliberate decision
to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came to
dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans
would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for
having abandoned their former friends and allies. As
the Soviet Union mobilized the resources of Eurasia,
increased its relative military capabilities, and
heightened its threat to our security, some would be
tempted to accept "peace" on its terms, while many could
seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented
system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous
part of our resources to defense. Under such a state
of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and
the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.

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Under this course of action, there would be no negotiation, unless on the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of importance.

It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation, many Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter decisively the balance of power by an overwhelming blow with modern weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would wait for such an attack before launching its own. But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is clear that the United States would face appalling tasks in establishing a tolerable state of order among nations after such a war and after Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years. These tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.

C. The Third Course--War.

Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of "preventive" war--in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies--is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explicable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is
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probably unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct its resources to the checking and rolling back of the Kremlin's drive for world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.

The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone could not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people could be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.

Apart from this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocation of recent Soviet behavior, could be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the check of responsibility

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-21-

D. The Russian Course of Action--a Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Post-War Era

A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the theist Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, theist expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed policies of a limited or total theist. The potential strength of the free world is great; its ability to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet expansion will be determined by the vision and will with which it undertakes to deal its political and economic problems.

1. Military Aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI that U.S. military capabilities are strategically more defensive in nature than offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evident, from an analysis of our past and of the trend of weapons development, that there is now and will be in the future no absolute defense. The history of war also indicates that a favorable decision was only to achieved through
offensive

United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to catch item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada had an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States and our allies.

Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for protection against disaster but also to support our foreign policy. In fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily available are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to provide the nucleus of strength and the mobilization base on which the tremendous forces required for victory can be built. For example, in both World Wars I and II the ultimate victors had the strength, in the end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or readily available to prevent the outbreak of war. In part, at least, this was because they had not had the military

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military strength on which to base a strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.

Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local moves the occasion for war--for which we are not prepared. This situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particularly in Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet occupation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased, our allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a firm foreign policy on our part and increasingly anxious to seek other solutions, even though they are aware that appeasement means defeat. An important advantage in adopting the fourth course of action lies in its psychological impact--the revival of confidence and hope in the future. It is recognized, of course, that any announcement of the recommended course of action could be exploited by the Soviet Union in its peace campaign and would have adverse psychological effects in certain parts of the free world until the necessary increase in strength had been achieved. Therefore, in any announcement of policy and in the character of the measures adopted, emphasis should be given to the essentially defensive character and care should be taken to minimize, as far as possible, unfavorable domestic and foreign reactions.

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2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate objectives—to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary though not a sufficient condition—are a renewed initiative to the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes in developing its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for systematically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.

At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in consternation. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.

A program for rapidly building up strength and improving political and economic conditions will place

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heavy demands on our courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half-measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be continued for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. It would probably include:

(1) The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.

(2) A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed in Section D 1.

(3) A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our Allies for the tasks referred to in Section D 1 (a).

(4) Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.

(5) A concerted

(3) A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.

(4) Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.

(5) Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.

(6) Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.

(7) Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.

(8) Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.

(9) Increased taxes.

Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program would be (a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and (b) a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of present international trends.

The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the discrepancy between the potential capabilities of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V

and VI).

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and VII). The Soviet Union is currently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about \$45 billion) to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent), each of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these purposes to about 60 percent, or by one-fourth.

The United States is currently devoting about 25 percent of its gross national product (\$44 billion in 1949) to military expenditures (6 percent), foreign assistance (3 percent), and investment (14 percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As was pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dollar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that obtained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low military and civilian living standards in the Soviet Union.) In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 60 percent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.

From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it approached full employment, approached full efficiency.

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can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilize corruption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy the in the meantime increased the amount of resources going into government use by \$60-\$65 billion (in 1939 prices).

This comparison between the potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States also holds true for the Soviet world and the free world the is of fundamental importance in considering the vacuum of action open to the United States.

The comparison gives renewed emphasis to the fact that the problems faced by the free countries in their efforts to build a successfully functioning system are not so much in the field of economics as in the field of politics. The building of such a system may require more rapid progress toward the closer association of the free countries in harmony with the concept of the United Nations. It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice. It also seems since that a unifying ideal of this kind might awaken the creative and better spiritual energies of free men everywhere can obtain their enthusiastic support for a positive program for peace going far beyond the frustration of the Kremlin design and opening vistas to the future that would outweigh short-run sacrifices.

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The threat to the free world involved in the development of the Soviet Union's atomic and other capabilities will rise steadily and rather rapidly. For the time being, the United States possesses a marked atomic superiority over the Soviet Union which, together with the potential capabilities of the United States and other free countries to other forces and weapons, inhibits aggressive Soviet action. This provides an opportunity for the United States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch a build-up of strength which will support a firm policy directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design. The immediate goal of our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world backed by adequate military strength is to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability, might arise in 1975 on a continuation of our present programs. By acting promptly and rigorously in such a way that this task is, so to speak, pushed into the future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation, withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war attendant upon a decision to build up strength will steadily increase the longer we defer it.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fissile bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than and previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In turn, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.

Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:

"14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system.

"15. The

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"15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the U.S.S.R. is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist countries.

"16. The risk of war with the U.S.S.R. is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.

"a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.

"b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.

"17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

"18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal developments, important among which are:

"a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.

"b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.

"c. Internal political and social disunity.

"d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.

"e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.

"f. Lessening

N.B.!
Let this warning of
last November
be heeded now!

-3-

"f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through restriction or apportionment or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.

"g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics.

Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18 above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which adequate strength can now be rapidly built.

The thesis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 15), are still valid, as are the aims and measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures:

"1y.

"a. To reduce the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

"b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the U.N. Charter.

"In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

"20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:

"a. To

"c. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the U.S.S.R.

"d. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.

"e. To eradicate the myth by which people react to Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.

"f. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter.

"21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:

"a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

"b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

"c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.

"d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of these nations as are able and willing to

make

make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.

"g. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.

"h. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt."

* * *

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic, and military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and direct the
energies

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energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used.

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be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program--harmonious with our fundamental national purposes and our objectives--is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our Allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision had been made on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable

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equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people and all free peoples that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of nonpartisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

That the President:

a. Approve the foregoing conclusions.

b. Direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President, and with the participation of other departments and agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure the implementation of the conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the major departments and agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other departments and agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.

1285-6

Marine Corps

August 29 1950

FILED BY
MISS CONWAY
SEP 2 1950

My dear Congressman McDermough-

I read with a lot of interest your letter in regard to the Marine Corps. For your information the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's. 1259
1220
1427

Nobody desires to hamper the efforts of the Marine Corps but when the Marine Corps goes into the army it works with and for the army and that is the way it should be. 1415B

I am more than happy to have your expression of interest in this naval military organization. The Chief of Naval Operations is the Chief of Staff of the Navy of which the Marines are a part. 1125-6 Naval
Adjut. Gen

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH P. TROTT

Honorable Gordon L. McDermough X
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

x1285-6

Room 1000
200 W. 4th St.
San Francisco 4, Calif.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

THE SPEAKER
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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RECEIVED

The Honorable Harry S. Truman
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

The United States Marine Corps has again on the battlefields of Korea demonstrated that it is an effective hard-hitting mobile force which can be depended upon to produce results on the battleground.

Over the past 180 years, the Marine Corps time and again have proved that they are invaluable to the defense of America and fight the aggressors which threaten American security.

In my opinion, the United States Marine Corps is entitled to full recognition as a major branch of the Armed Services of the U. S., and should have its own representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense. I, therefore, sincerely urge that as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces you will grant the Marine Corps representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

X-1485-7

Very truly yours,

Gordon L. McDonough

Gordon L. McDonough, M.C.
15th District, California

September 8, 1958



My dear Mr. Nixon:

I am concerned over the situation which has arisen because of the publishing of my letter of August 19th to Representative McDonough.

I have this date addressed a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a copy of which I am enclosing.

I should be happy to have you read my letter to the members of your organization.

Sincerely yours,

Commandant Clay Nixon
Marine Corps League
Fort Stetter
Washington, D. C.

4 September 1950



Dear General Cates:

I sincerely regret the unfortunate choice of language which I used in my letter of August 29 to Congressman McDermough concerning the Marine Corps.

What I had in mind at the time this letter was written was the specific question raised by Mr. McDermough, namely the representation of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have been disturbed by the number of communications which have been brought to my attention proposing that the Marine Corps have such representation. I feel that, inasmuch as the Marine Corps is by law an integral part of the Department of the Navy, it is already represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chief of Naval Operations. That the Congress concurs in this point of view is evidenced by the fact that, in passing the National Security Act of 1947, and again in amending that Act in 1949, the Congress considered the question of Marine Corps representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and did not provide for it. It is my feeling that many of the renewed pleas for such representation are the result of propaganda inspired by individuals who may not be aware of the best interests of our Defense Establishment as a whole, and it was this feeling which I was expressing to Mr. McDermough. I am certain that the Marine Corps itself does not indulge in such propaganda.

I am profoundly aware of the magnificent history of the United States Marine Corps, and of the many heroic deeds of the Marines since the Corps was established in 1775. I personally learned of the splendid combat spirit of the Marines when the Fourth Marine Brigade of the Second Infantry Division fought at France in 1918.

On numerous occasions since I assumed office, I have stated my conviction that the Marine Corps has a vital role in our organization for national security and I will continue to support and maintain its identity.

I regard the Marine Corps as a force available for use in any emergency, whatever or whenever necessary. When I spoke of the Marines as the "Navy's police force", I had in mind its immediate readiness, and the provisions of the National Security Act which states that "The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."

The Corps' ability to carry out whatever task may be assigned to it has been splendidly demonstrated many times in our history. It has again been shown by the immediate response of the Marine Corps to a call for duty in Korea. Just Marine ground and air forces have arrived in Korea I have received a daily report of their actions. The country may feel sure that the record of the Marines now fighting there will add new laurels to the already illustrious record of the Marine Corps.

Sincerely yours,



General Clinton B. Cates, USMC
United States Marine Corps
Washington, D. C.

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE MARINE CORPS LEAGUE
IN THE STATELY ROOM,

September 7, 1950, at 7:00 A.M., E.D.T.

General Gates, Mr. Commander, Members of the Marine Corps League: I am happy to be with you this evening. You succeeded in contacting me over here.

There are incidents, sometimes, that appear to be almost the end of the world when they happen, that usually turn out for the good of the cause.

The thing that I am most interested in is a unified approach to the crisis which we face. My whole endeavor for five years has been to obtain a peaceful settlement of the greatest war in history. I have striven for that since I have been President of the United States. That effort seemed to be approaching a consummation until the 29th day of June. Then we were faced with the situation in which we had to stand up and say that we supported the United Nations in its effort to obtain peace in the world, or we had to back out and surrender. That is not my way of doing business.

When I make a mistake, I try to correct it. I try to make as few as possible. I hope that this organization will support the President of the United States in his effort to get peace in the world — that's all I want.

Conditions have come about — one, I must say, is a certain political event which will take place in November — which have caused unfounded attacks to be made on certain men in public service. This has made it almost impossible to get the men capable of filling the jobs to come here and stand for a heritage of that kind. It is not only unfair, it is unjust, and these attacks in the long run are not on the individuals as when they are made, they are direct attacks on the President of the United States, who is responsible under the present situation for the Government, and for its actions and for its policy.

I can't tell you how much I appreciate your cordial reception, how kind you have been to me, and I hope that from now on there will never be any misunderstanding between us.

- - - - -



National Headquarters - Marine Corps League

OFFICE OF NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
CLAY NIXON
720 MARINE BUILDING
BENTLEY, WASHINGTON

CLAYTON
ADVISOR: 1940-1941
1942-1943

September 8, 1950



The Honorable Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter to me of September 6, enclosing a copy of your letter to General Cates, received and read to our Joint Convention, who, upon unanimous recommendation of my Staff, unanimously voted to express to you their satisfaction and to consider the Congressman McDonough letter issue closed.

The above was written yesterday, but not delivered to you prior to your appearance before our Convention, and I wish to further express my, and the Convention's appreciation of your gracious act, and in the words of General Cates, your "personal courage," coming to us as a man, an American, and the President of the United States.

"Semper Fidelis,"

Clay Nixon
Clay Nixon,
National Commandant.

ENCL:10

"Cape and Colors in Every Detachment - Every Detachment Active"

"Once a Marine. Always a Marine"